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Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch* 
When transferee judges receive a multidistrict proceeding, they select a 
few lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to efficiently manage litigation and settlement 
negotiations. That decision gives those attorneys total control over all 
consolidated plaintiffs’ claims and rewards them richly in common-benefit 
fees. It’s no surprise then that these are coveted positions, yet empirical 
evidence confirms that the same attorneys occupy them time and again. 
Anytime repeat players exist and exercise both oligopolistic leadership 
control across multidistrict proceedings and monopolistic power within a 
single proceeding, there is concern that they will use their dominance to 
enshrine practices and norms that benefit themselves at consumers’ (or here, 
clients’) expense. Apprehensiveness should increase when defense lawyers are 
repeat players too, as they are in multidistrict litigation. And anxiety may 
peak when the circumstances exhibit these anti-competitive characteristics, but 
lack regulation as they do here. Without the safeguards built into class 
certification, judicial monitoring and appellate checks disappear. What 
remains is a system that may permit lead lawyers to act, at times, like a cartel. 
Basic economic principles demonstrate that noncompetitive markets 
can result in higher prices and lower outputs, and agency costs chronicle ways 
in which unmonitored agents’ self-interest can lead them astray. By analyzing 
lead lawyers’ common-benefit fees, the non-class deals that they design, and 
the results they generate for their clients, this Article introduces new empirical 
evidence that multidistrict litigation is not immune to market or agency 
principles. It demonstrates that repeat players on both sides continually 
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achieve their goals in tandem—defendants end massive suits and lead 
plaintiffs’ lawyers increase their common-benefit fees. But this exchange may 
result in lower payouts to plaintiffs, stricter evidentiary burdens in claims 
processing, or more coercive plaintiff-participation measures in master 
settlements. 
These circumstances warrant regulation. Even though judges entrench 
and enable repeat players, they are integral to the solution. By tinkering with 
selection and compensation methods and instilling automatic remands after 
leaders negotiate master settlements, judges can capitalize on competitive 
forces already in play. Tapping into the vibrant rivalries within the plaintiffs’ 
bar allows judges to use dynamic market solutions to remap the existing 




I.   LEAD LAWYERS’ MONOPOLISTIC POWER   
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION .............................................. 79 
A.  Empirical Evidence of Oligopolies:  
Repeat Play and Market Share .................................. 79 
B.  Institutional Practices Foster Rule  
Entrenchment and Erect Entry Barriers ................... 81 
1.  Leadership Selection Methods  
Restrain Competition ..................................... 81 
2.  Compensation Methods Impose  
Costs on Competitors ..................................... 84 
3.  Repeat Play Can Promote Efficiency  
and Economies of Scale .................................. 85 
II.   EMPIRICALLY AND ETHICALLY ASSESSING   
THE DEALS REPEAT PLAYERS DESIGN ................................... 86 
A.  Defendants Bargain for Closure  
and Returned Funds .................................................. 90 
1.  Recommendation, Withdrawal,  
and Walkaway Provisions Impart Closure, 
Restrain Competition ..................................... 94 
2.  Case-Census Provisions Yield  
Judicially Reinforced Closure  
and Define the Relevant Market .................. 102 
3.  Latecomer and Reverter Clauses  
Promote Finality, Inhibit Advertising,  
and Return Funds ........................................ 104 
B.  Lead Lawyers Bargain  
for Common-Benefit Fees ......................................... 107 
        
2017] MONOPOLIES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 69 
1.  Using Early Bird Discounts  
and Summary Fee Increases ........................ 112 
2.  Expanding Fees to State-Court Litigants .... 114 
3.  Negotiating Common-Benefit Fees  
with the Defendant ....................................... 119 
C.  Cartel-like Sanctions Suppress  
Dissent and Competition ......................................... 122 
D.  What Then Do Plaintiffs Receive? ........................... 124 
1.  Plaintiffs Are Unlikely to Receive  
the Peace Premium ....................................... 127 
2.  Plaintiffs Appear to Be  
Inadequately Represented ........................... 132 
III.  REGULATING THE MONOPOLY .............................................. 135 
A.  Competing to Become the Monopoly:  
Leadership Selection Criteria .................................. 137 
1.  Competitive Selection Processes  
and Criteria .................................................. 138 
2.  Permitting Confidential Objections  
to Special Masters ........................................ 141 
3.  Presumptive Appointments and Removals  
Based on Structural Conflicts ...................... 143 
B.  Regulating Fees to Encourage Competition   
and Fidelity to Claimants........................................ 145 
1.  Compensate Leadership on  
a Quantum Meruit Basis .............................. 146 
2.  Best Practices Can Empower State-Court 
Cases as Competitive Checks ....................... 150 
C.  Automatically Requesting Remand  
for Non-settling Plaintiffs ........................................ 152 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 154 
TABLE A1: AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS OCCURRING WITHIN THE 
DATASET .............................................................................. 156 
TABLE A2: REPEAT PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS’ PARTICIPATION IN 
NON-CLASS SETTLEMENTS ................................................... 158 
A3: POCKET GUIDE FOR LEADERSHIP APPOINTMENT AND 
COMPENSATION ................................................................... 160 
A4: SAMPLE LEADERSHIP APPLICATION FORM ............................... 162 
A5: LEADERSHIP APPLICANT SCORING SHEET ................................ 164 
A6: SAMPLE ORDERS SUGGESTING REMAND AND REPLACING 
LEADERS .............................................................................. 165 
 
        
70 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:67 
INTRODUCTION 
Clients are people, not inventories. But their claims are often 
“sold” through referring attorneys and warehoused like commodities 
by the high-end plaintiffs’ lawyers who control multidistrict 
litigations. As in class actions, judicially appointed lead lawyers 
dominate settlement discussions. By consolidating control in the 
hands of a few lawyers and giving those attorneys negotiating power 
over all the claims pending before the transferee court, leadership is 
able to both credibly threaten the defendant with significant exposure 
and promise some degree of holistic closure. If lead lawyers can 
conscript individual plaintiffs’ attorneys into consenting to a deal that 
allows those attorneys to cash in on their fees only by settling their 
entire client list, then the defendant will receive something of value 
that only such a monopoly can offer. 
Nevertheless, as in any monopoly, the downside may well be 
that leadership receives higher common-benefit fees for reduced 
outputs.1 Common-benefit fees are akin to the price that a monopoly 
charges for goods or services. And it’s clear that even less frequent 
repeat players in leadership roles fare quite well as evidenced by some 
of their lavish lifestyles—some have appeared in The Real Housewives 
of Beverly Hills and in magazine spreads alongside yachts and private 
planes.2 Common-benefit fees alone—without the accompanying 
contingent fees—have ranged from $4 million to over $356 million.3 
What is less clear, however, is how the plaintiffs fare—the 
consumers, so to speak. Not all plaintiffs’ claims are created equal.4 If 
leadership’s influence is unchecked, it’s possible that lead attorneys 
could secure generous common-benefit fees for themselves, while 
generating suboptimal outcomes for some or all claimants. It is here 
that a significant departure from the class-action baseline emerges, 
 
 1.  Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 164 (2003). 
 2.  Amanda Bronstad, With a Smooch, Tom Girardi Makes Debut on ‘Real Housewives,’ 
NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202745063522/With-a-
Smooch-Tom-Girardi-Makes-Debut-on-Real-Housewives?slreturn=20160912185720 
[https://perma.cc/SSR6-SFPE]; Richard Johnson, Perry Weitz is Living the Lavish Life, PAGE SIX 
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://pagesix.com/2015/01/30/perry-weitz-is-living-the-lavish-life/ [https://perma 
.cc/Q45G-HSLD]. Perry Weitz appeared only once in the dataset (Fosamax), though his law firm 
had attorneys in ten leadership positions; Tom Girardi was a leader in three multidistrict 
proceedings (BPA, Yasmin/Yaz, and Nexium). 
 3.  Infra tbl.3. 
 4.  The scholarly literature is rife with such examples. The interested reader, however, 
might begin with Nagareda, supra note 1, at 166 (pointing out sources of variance in the 
determination of damages, such as plaintiff friendly jurisdictions).  
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for without certification, multidistrict proceedings lack the judicial, 
competitive-market, and institutional checks that can help safeguard 
and legitimize class outcomes. 
Self-dealing settlement terms and collusive behavior have been 
well documented in class actions even though classes require 
extensive regulation throughout the proceedings.5 In Rule 23(b)(3) 
classes, because only class counsel stand to gain attorneys’ fees, a host 
of competing attorneys who are otherwise boxed out of that fee award 
have incentives to solicit and assist class members in opting out. 
Appellate courts stand ready to reverse collusive deals and chastise 
self-dealing attorneys.6 And even defendants occasionally serve as 
watchdogs for class members when their interests align: they invoke 
inadequate representation as a rationale against class certification 
and then, when settling, may consider its existence to prevent the 
class-wide settlement’s preclusive effect from unraveling.7 
But even these safeguards crumble in non-class, multidistrict 
proceedings. When transferee judges select lead lawyers, they rarely 
attend to adequate representation, focusing instead on financial 
means, expertise, and cooperation—factors that empower repeat 
players but may stifle competition. And unlike class settlements that 
require judges to ensure that they are fair, reasonable, and adequate, 
judges have little say in “private” global deals that leaders design. 
External competitive checks are likewise absent: the overwhelming 
message sent by transferee judges is that leadership appointments—
and the lucrative fees accompanying them—are conditioned upon 
cooperation and team play. So, even though plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
assertive and ambitious, their calculated response may be to silence 
their discord and achieve financial success by playing the long game. 
Defendants are no help either, for finality hinges not on adequate 
 
 5.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23; e.g., Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 729 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(overturning a class settlement approved by the lower court because the settlement “flunked the 
‘fairness’ standard by the one-sidedness of its terms and its fatal conflicts of interest . . .”); 
Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action Settlements, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 6.  E.g., Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2014); Eubank, 753 F.3d at 
729. 
 7.  E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 393 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing to an observation by the magistrate judge 
that the defendant’s willingness to create a settlement fund, thereby reducing the amount 
received by the plaintiffs’ counsel, resulted from a desire to avoid further litigation in related 
state law claims); Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 346 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2003) (involving the 
potential preclusion of an earlier class-action settlement creating a compensation program for 
the plaintiffs that purported to resolve all claims based on the harm giving rise to the prior class 
action).  
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representation and preclusion, but on convincing claimants to accept 
the deal.8 
Maybe these circumstances would be less troubling if they 
affected only a few cases, but multidistrict litigation is mushrooming 
in both impact and sheer numbers. These cases often attract sustained 
media attention (e.g., General Motors’ ignition switch litigation), 
which influences public perception. And from 2002 to 2015, 
multidistrict proceedings leapt from sixteen to thirty-nine percent of 
the federal courts’ entire civil caseload.9 Removing prisoner and social 
security cases escalates that number to 45.6 percent.10 Many factors 
surely contribute to that increase, but two pulling in divergent 
directions stand out: corporations operate nationally (and 
internationally), but recent congressional and judicial decisions have 
hobbled the use of nationwide class actions, particularly when state 
laws govern.11 
In short, multidistrict litigation impacts the entire civil justice 
system. Even though the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(“the Panel”) centralizes factually related cases to promote efficient 
pretrial handling only,12 the reality is that just 2.9 percent of cases 
return to their original districts.13 As cases routinely conclude through 
 
 8.  Infra Part II.A.1. 
 9. DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, MDL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES, at x 
(2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/MDL_Standards_and_Best 
_Practices_2014-REVISED.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SXR-TGG8]; JUDICIAL PANEL ON 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT 1 (2015). 
 10.  DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, supra note 9, at x–xi. This number will likely 
increase once the 2015 year-end statistics are publicly available. 
 11.  E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 §§ 2(a)–(b), 4, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4–6 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (creating federal jurisdiction over class actions, which 
increases choice-of-law problems); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363–67 (2011) 
(strengthening commonality requirement for class certification under Rule 23(a)). For a detailed 
overview of these changes, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 1855, 1860–66 (2015). The settlement class action in mass torts has, however, seen a recent 
revival. E.g., In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 448 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (affirming approval of a class-action settlement for former NFL players); In re Oil Spill 
by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, 295 F.R.D. 112, 161 
(E.D. La. 2013) (certifying a class of medical claims). 
 12.  28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 
U.S. 26, 40 (1998) (pointing to legislative history indicating that the statute applies only to 
pretrial stages). 
 13.  Since its creation in 1968, the Panel has centralized 462,501 civil actions for pretrial 
proceedings. By the end of 2013, a total of 13,432 actions had been remanded for trial, 398 had 
been reassigned within the transferee districts, 359,432 had been terminated in the transferee 
courts, and 89,123 were pending throughout the district courts. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation—Judicial Business 2013, U.S. COURTS (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation-judicial-business-2013 [https://perma.cc/MZJ2-
CYB7]. 
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these proceedings, the lack of checks and balances to thwart self-
dealing temptations becomes all the more startling and suggests that 
regulation is warranted. Part I adds theoretical and empirical support 
to that argument. It highlights evidence that a small cadre of elite 
actors routinely occupies the most powerful positions, pinpoints the 
institutional policies that promote monopolization, and describes how 
players use their influence to create and entrench practices that serve 
their mutual interests. 
Part I’s point, however, is not that repeat players form an 
actionable oligopoly, cartel, or monopoly under antitrust law. Instead, 
antitrust and economic principles enter in two distinct, but 
intertwined ways. First, like oligopolies where a few sellers control 
most of the market’s output, repeat players occupy plaintiffs’ 
leadership positions across many multidistrict proceedings, as Part I 
illustrates empirically, and a handful of those repeat players are 
central to every proceeding.14 By designing and replicating beneficial 
practices, as well as imposing social and financial sanctions on rivals, 
repeat players may use cartel-like understandings and enforcement 
mechanisms to disable other firms from competing and to make their 
own next leadership appointment more likely.15 Second, once judges 
appoint leaders in a particular multidistrict proceeding, those 
attorneys control the litigation, usurping the traditional attorney’s 
daily responsibilities. As such, lead lawyers monopolize decisions, 
negotiation strategies, and settlement discussions, often in ways that 
encompass even state-court cases. The deals they devise reduce 
competition by tethering all attorneys’ financial interests together and 
sometimes further diminish the demand for legal services by 
 
 14.  Infra Part I.A.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as 
Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 813, 817–18 (2011) (defining a cartel as “an organization of two 
or more separate firms that coordinates output or price, [but] may coordinate other aspects of its 
members’ behavior as well”); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested 
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (1969) (defining oligopolies).  
 15.  See TIM FRAZER, MONOPOLY, COMPETITION AND THE LAW 9 (1992) (noting that 
monopoly power can be achieved through unfair competitive techniques that prevent firms from 
competing); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 1.2a (5th ed. 2016) (noting that 
economists would label repeat players as “dominant firms,” not as “monopolists” due to the 
existence of a competitive “fringe” of smaller competitors); Myriam Gilles, Tribal Rituals of the 
MDL, 5 J. TORT L. 173, 178 (2012): 
On this [hub-and-spoke] model, a principal reason why some lawyers recurrently 
appear in MDLs is that they’ve managed to form, or join, fluid networks that are held 
together through mutually beneficial arrangements that are only possible among 
repeat players, where there is always a “next time”—a next MDL—in which a favor 
can be repaid, or a threat can be carried out; 
Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 584–90, 593–600 
(2004) (explaining how cartels use social sanctions). 
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restricting attorney advertising. Without regulation, this consolidated 
control may tempt plaintiffs’ leadership to collude with defense 
attorneys in ways that hurt plaintiffs. 
Monopolistic power over individual proceedings carries an 
inherent potential for abuse.16 It is here that classic principal-agent 
concerns over agents’ self-dealing tendencies converge with market 
theory. Well-established economic principles demonstrate that non-
competitive markets can result in higher prices and lower outputs 
that harm consumer welfare.17 In principal-agent terms, the worry is 
that agents may bargain for higher common-benefit fees in return for 
selling out their principals—perhaps in the form of reduced payouts to 
plaintiffs, stricter evidentiary burdens in claims processing, or more 
coercive participation measures. 
Accordingly, Part II builds on Part I’s evidence of repeat play to 
shine fresh empirical light onto the settlements those players design. 
It shows that multidistrict litigation is not immune to agency or 
market principles. Analyzing the non-class settlements that occurred 
within an original dataset built from all product-liability and sales-
practices multidistrict litigations pending as of May 2013, I identified 
provisions that one might argue principally benefit the attorneys and 
not the litigants, such as those that compensate lead lawyers or 
generate closure for defendants. One theme emerged from this 
exercise: the outcomes seem to favor repeat agents. They achieved 
their goals time and again in concert—defendants gained finality, and 
lead lawyers increased their fees. They accomplished both by 
marrying individual lawyers’ attorneys’ fees to all their clients’ 
willingness to settle; if too few clients settled, then the deal would 
collapse. This allowed defendants to receive closure, plaintiffs’ 
leadership to receive common-benefit fees, and individual attorneys to 
receive their cut of the contingency fee. 
This win-win-win may not extend to plaintiffs even though the 
main goal of personal injury suits is to compensate them—not to 
resolve a big case. To take but one example, in the Propulsid 
litigation, 6,012 plaintiffs traded their lawsuit for the settlement 
process. Yet, only thirty-seven of them (0.6 percent) recovered any 
money through the rigorous physician-controlled settlement process, 
 
 16.  Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“[Monopolistic power] like all power . . . is laden with the possibility of abuse; because it 
encourages sloth rather than the active quest for excellence; and because it tends to damage the 
very fabric of our economy and our society, monopoly power is ‘inherently evil.’ ” (quoting United 
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953))). 
 17.  See FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 13–19 (1970) (showing how monopolies can lead to market inefficiencies). 
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and they received little more than $6.5 million in total.18 Yet, the court 
awarded lead lawyers over $27 million in common-benefit fees based 
on an $87 million-dollar fund,19 the bulk of which reverted back to the 
defendant.20 
Whether lead lawyers trade finality for enhanced common-
benefit fees and whether this uniformly comes at an unacceptable cost 
to plaintiffs is impossible to decipher given how few comparisons exist. 
It is also besides the point. The point is not to demonstrate a causal 
relationship, to reveal explicit collusion, or even to claim that repeat 
players are inherently bad. Rather, the point is that self-interest can 
take over if left unchecked, and no checks exist. 
As such, Part III shifts from Part II’s question of why we 
should regulate to how. Over the years, academics have proposed 
various monitoring solutions, each with its own merits and drawbacks. 
First, clients might monitor, much as they do in individual suits. But 
lawyers in large multidistrict litigations often represent hundreds of 
clients, making tailored client communication difficult. While judges, 
special officers, and even lawyers can empower clients to interact,21 
share information, form groups, and even govern themselves,22 
collective-action problems may persist without intervention. Moreover, 
doctrinal confusion among courts and the bar over ethical obligations 
in aggregate settlements undermines the enforcement threat of 
attorney malpractice suits.23 
Second, courts might embrace class actions and let judges 
police misconduct.24 Acting as a fiduciary for absent class members, 
 
 18.  Infra note 294 and accompanying text.  
 19.  Infra note 295 and accompanying text.  
 20.  Infra notes 115 and 120 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See Robert H. Klonoff et al., Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the 
Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727, 730 (2008) (advocating for the use of the internet in facilitating 
class interaction); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, 
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 394–95 (1996); Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451 (2012). 
 22.  I have expanded upon this idea elsewhere. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating 
Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87 (2011). Judge Weinstein has 
written extensively in this area as well. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT 
LITIGATIONS 57–61 (1995); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. 
U. L. REV. 469, 542–49 (1994). 
 23.  See Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving 
Landscape, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 298–304 (2015) (illustrating doctrinal confusion). 
 24.  E.g., Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client 
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 527–28 (“Another 
direction might be to consider judicial approval of class settlement and fees . . . .”); David 
Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 831, 834 (2002) (arguing that courts should take a more active role in class action 
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the judge substitutes judicial wisdom for individual autonomy. While 
retrofitting class actions to non-class aggregation via “quasi-class 
actions” is problematic,25 courts could theoretically revive plenary 
class actions26 or certify a defendant’s uniform conduct toward 
plaintiffs as an issue class.27 Though judges appear increasingly 
comfortable with issue classes, plaintiffs’ lawyers rarely propose them; 
if they lose the issue-class trial, then issue preclusion prevents them 
from relitigating, and, even if they win (unless the win prompts the 
defendant to settle), there is still no common fund from which to 
collect attorneys’ fees.28 
Finally, looking outside the traditional litigation context, third-
party financiers might monitor lead lawyers. If plaintiffs assigned a 
financier a stake in their lawsuit as the contingent fee does now and, 
in exchange, the financier funded the suit on a non-recourse basis, 
then the financier would become a super stakeholder akin to 
institutional lead plaintiffs in securities class actions.29 As sizeable 
and sophisticated monitors, these funders might help manage 
principal-agent problems by unbundling attorneys’ competing roles as 
investors and advisors. They might likewise become repeat players. 
Just as the NAACP, ACLU, and unions counteract the typical 
disadvantages one-shot plaintiffs face by aggregating interests and 
resources, a third-party financier could monitor and discipline lawyers 
by ending relationships with certain law firms, for example.30 The 
more difficult question, however, is how to ensure that financiers do 
 
litigation). For a perspective that plays to the strengths of judges and the needs of claimants, see 
Resnik et al., supra note 21.  
 25.  The Principles suggest that issue classes might “more closely approximate 
restitutionary principles” than the infamous “quasi-class action.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.09 reporter’s notes on cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 26.  This would require the Supreme Court to reverse its trend toward stricter certification 
standards. 
 27.  For more on how this approach might work, see Burch, supra note 11, at 1871–90.  
 28.  Id. at 1905–16; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financing Issue Classes: Benefits and 
Barriers to Third-Party Funding, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 889 (examining the possible role of third-
party financing in incentivized issue class trials).  
 29.  For more on this proposal, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in 
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1291–1300 (2012). 
 30.  See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 13, 37–38 
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) (suggesting that organizing one shotters into 
repeat players might prove advantageous). Financiers, like other organizations, will have their 
own agenda. See e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512–15 (1976) (arguing that some 
civil rights lawyers have failed to put the needs of their clients ahead of their own idealistic legal 
objectives).  
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not turn into toll collectors who extract additional rents from 
plaintiffs.31 
While each of these potential monitors—clients, judges, and 
third-party financiers—promises to alleviate some agency concerns, 
they all share one principal deficit: information barriers. Judges might 
want to appoint leaders who collectively represent claimants’ diverse 
composition, but without the adversarial airing of potential conflicts 
they lack the knowledge to do so. Claimants might push for self-
governance, but they need sophisticated legal advice to understand 
why their best interests may not align. And financiers—who may have 
access to the requisite facts and law—may represent only a fraction of 
the claimants. 
Enter competition. By drawing on the vibrant rivalries within 
the plaintiffs’ bar, judges can use market solutions to remap the 
existing regulatory landscape without rule amendments or legislation. 
In a somewhat related vein, Professors Charles Silver and Geoffrey 
Miller have proposed an incentive-based approach where judges 
appoint a plaintiffs’ management committee comprised of attorneys 
with the largest client inventory, and those attorneys then pick, 
compensate, and monitor the lawyers performing the common-benefit 
work.32 Relying on plaintiffs’ attorneys shifts power away from the 
judge, a move they explain by noting, “[J]udges have compromised 
their independence, created unnecessary conflicts of interest, 
intimidated attorneys, turned a blind eye to ethically dubious 
behavior, and weakened plaintiffs’ lawyers’ incentives to serve clients 
well.”33 To be sure, judges can be part of the problem. But they can 
become part of the solution as well. Although Silver and Miller’s 
proposal overcomes information asymmetries, the concern is that it 
may reward lawyers who “purchase” referrals that include 
undifferentiated (and often weak) claims, further entrench repeat 
players, and allow inadequate representation to persist particularly 
for plaintiffs with idiosyncratic claims. 
Accordingly, Part III offers a different approach. Educating 
judges and encouraging them to implement four key innovations can 
incentivize those with the greatest access to information—other 
plaintiffs’ lawyers—to police the monopoly when it threatens to wield 
its power in self-serving ways. First, judges should reject consensus 
 
 31.  Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in 
Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 581 (2014) (“[O]ne of the few veritable truths of 
life is that every gatekeeper in life will at some point become a toll collector.”).  
 32.  Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing 
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 111 (2010).  
 33.  Id.  
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slates for leadership positions and use a competitive selection process 
where attorneys openly jockey to hold the leadership’s monopoly 
power. Competing for the market, that is, competing to become the 
monopoly, may produce some of the same benefits of open market 
competition,34 particularly if attorneys can confidentially air objections 
about one another to a special master. Second, issuing an order that 
presumptively adds (or replaces) lead lawyers with challengers who 
successfully demonstrate the presence of unaddressed structural 
conflicts of interest incentivizes those selected to remedy inadequate-
representation concerns quickly.35 It likewise maximizes the payoff for 
outside challengers, making it more profitable to compete and 
discipline leaders than to play the long game in hopes of receiving 
common-benefit work or leadership roles. 
While the first two proposals infuse competition into leadership 
selection, the latter two revamp compensation methods and external 
safeguards. Thus, the third proposal urges judges to compensate lead 
lawyers based on a percentage of the benefit they actually confer on 
claimants—not a set percentage of the fund. This promotes fidelity by 
realigning common-benefit fees with basic contingent-fee principles: 
the better claimants fare, the better leadership fares. Quantum meruit 
principles can also invigorate state-court competition over claims that 
are not exclusively federal by replacing flat fees with tailored pricing 
packages for state litigants who need access to some (but not all) 
common-benefit work, and rewarding state lawyers whose efforts 
benefit all claimants. 
Finally, issuing a standing order that automatically 
recommends the Panel remand non-settling cases to their courts of 
origin after a global settlement can harness market forces to check the 
leadership’s monopoly power.36 Automatic remands pressure lead 
lawyers to design a deal that caters to multiple injury types by 
threatening to destabilize their consolidated power and weakening the 
settlement vortex, which currently gives plaintiffs only two choices: 
settle or risk dismissal. Remanding puts trials back on the table, 
returning one of plaintiffs’ most valuable bargaining chips. When 
combined, these proposals tap into the robust rivalries within the 
plaintiffs’ bar, inciting those who possess the most relevant 
 
 34.  CHRISTOPHER DECKER, MODERN ECONOMIC REGULATION 37–40 (2015) (describing the 
competition for the market approach); Elizabeth E. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of 
Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 178, 178 (1981) (“In the case of contestable 
markets, potential entry or competition for the market disciplines behavior almost as effectively 
as would actual competition within the market.”).  
 35.  Structural conflicts of interest present a high bar. See infra Part III.A.3.  
 36.  The Panel can likewise accomplish this unilaterally by amending its own rules. 
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information and have the most at stake to hold those with 
monopolistic power accountable.37 
I. LEAD LAWYERS’ MONOPOLISTIC POWER  
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
Academics have long expected that more extensive repeat 
players (as I use the term) who regularly encounter the legal system 
will have different goals than those who don’t—“one shotters.” 
Because repeat players encounter the system and its inhabitants 
routinely, they may act strategically to maximize gains over a series of 
cases, and play for “rules,” the short-hand term for standard practices 
and norms that tip the scales in their favor in future cases.38 
While major corporate defendants are repeat players in 
multidistrict proceedings, they are not the only ones. Many plaintiffs’ 
and defense attorneys are likely to be repeat actors, too. This leaves 
only one segment as probable one-shotters: the plaintiffs themselves, 
and perhaps their individually retained non-lead attorney. Repetitive 
play might advantage plaintiffs through their representative’s inside 
knowledge. Or, repeat agents’ frequent interactions with one another 
may tempt them to be more loyal to each other, to those who supplied 
them with client referrals, or even to defendants who could pay them 
handsomely in return for delivering finality, than to their own 
clients.39 
A. Empirical Evidence of Oligopolies: Repeat Play and Market Share 
The first question then is whether repeat players exist and, if 
so, whether they dominate influential positions across multidistrict 
 
 37.  Although this Article focuses on multidistrict litigation, many of these proposals apply 
equally to all mass, non-class settlements. Such settlements can occur in federal courts without 
multidistrict litigation (toxic torts, for example) or in state courts. 
 38.  Galanter, supra note 30, at 15. 
 39.  Id. at 24 (“For the lawyer who services [one shotters], with his transient clientele, his 
permanent ‘client’ is the forum, the opposite party, or the intermediary who supplies clients.”). 
As plaintiff’s attorney Francis Scarpulla noted in supporting the “consensus” group in the 
leadership appointment hearing, “this group works collegially and cooperatively with every 
single person sitting at that defense table. I’ve known some of them for 45 years, as long as I’ve 
been practicing. And I’ve probably been lead counsel in more cases than anybody in this 
courtroom . . . .” Transcript of Proceedings at 40, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., 
4:13-md-02420-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013). When the judge then asked the defendants’ 
counsel about objections to the proposed plaintiffs’ structure, Jim McGinnis responded, “I been 
[sic] practicing here for almost 34 years, have known all of the people on that side of the 
courtroom for most of those years, and I can tell you with the utmost confidence that I’ve never 
had a problem with any one of them.” Id. at 44–45. 
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litigations. Influential positions vary but typically include lead 
counsel, who heads the litigation; steering and executive committees, 
which make key decisions concerning litigation strategy and 
settlement; liaison counsel, who disseminates information to other 
attorneys, calls meetings, and coordinates with counsel in related 
state (and sometimes bankruptcy) actions; and occasionally separate 
committee chairs, such as discovery and trial committees.40 
Previous research has suggested that plaintiffs’ leadership is 
rife with repeat players,41 but included little evidence on the defense 
side.42 In a recent article,43 my co-author Margaret Williams and I 
collected data on all judicially appointed attorneys in all product-
liability and sales-practice proceedings pending on the multidistrict 
litigation docket as of May 14, 2013—seventy-three total 
proceedings.44 The Panel centralized those proceedings over a twenty-
two-year span, and collectively they include over 312,500 actions. 
We confirmed that repeat players are prevalent leaders on both 
sides, with repeat players holding 62.8 percent of the available 
plaintiffs’ leadership positions; and seventy-three of 414 judicially 
appointed defense leadership positions, or 17.6 percent. Of course, 
defense lawyers are rarely judicially selected (the defendant chooses a 
firm), so evidence of repeat play by law firm was more telling: of the 
414 available leadership roles, attorneys from repeat-player defense 
firms occupied 341, or 82.3 percent.45 
We then conducted a social network analysis to reveal those 
actors’ connections to one another and found that no matter what 
measure of centrality we used, a key group of attorneys maintained 
their elite position within the network.46 In fact, a small group of the 
same five high-level repeat players (Richard Arsenault, Daniel Becnel, 
Jr., Dianne Nast, Jerrold Parker, and Christopher Seeger) 
consistently occupied the most powerful positions, and seemed to have 
 
 40.  MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 (2004). 
 41.  See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 
95–97 (2015); Margaret S. Williams, Emery G. Lee III & Catherine R. Borden, Repeat Players in 
Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141, 149–60 (2012). 
 42.  For a historical overview of repeat players’ development on both sides, see Samuel 
Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional 
Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1581–84, 1590–99 (2004). 
 43.  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict 
Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2724637 [https://perma.cc/KNY3-GBR6]. 
 44.  For a table of included cases as well as information about how the cases were 
identified, see id. (manuscript at 20–22, 70–72).  
 45.  A list of these firms appears in Burch & Williams. Id. (manuscript at 35). 
 46.  Id. (manuscript at 24–33). 
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far more impact on settlement design than did the total number of 
involved repeat players.47 
Consequently, while there is a vast market for legal services in 
litigating tort claims generally, the market for representing claimants 
in mass torts like products liability and sales practice cases can be 
highly concentrated on both the plaintiff and defense side.48 
Institutional coordination through multidistrict practices, referrals, 
specialization, long-standing social networks, high litigation start-up 
costs, and economies of scale winnow the pool of available lawyers.49 
For those in this pool, leadership selection practices create further 
entry barriers to leadership, allowing repeat actors to occupy those 
roles across multiple multidistrict proceedings—much like an 
oligopoly. 
B. Institutional Practices Foster Rule Entrenchment  
and Erect Entry Barriers 
Judges’ leadership selection methods and institutional norms 
combine to concentrate market share in the hands of a small number 
of repeat players.50 And, once in power, repeat players may use their 
advantage to influence, create, perpetuate, and enforce practices—
“rules,” for short. Playing the long game allows them to reap the 
advantages those rules provide, standardize rules across proceedings, 
and erect entry barriers for rivals. 
1. Leadership Selection Methods Restrain Competition 
Judges’ current methods for choosing leaders favor repeat 
actors by encouraging private ordering and consensus.51 Consensus 
 
 47.  Id. (manuscript at 41–42). 
 48.  See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 42, at 1621–25 (explaining the highly concentrated 
market for asbestos representation). 
 49.  See id.; see also Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical 
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 387–90 
(2000). 
 50.  While multidistrict litigation has changed these conditions, they existed in class actions 
too. Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 42, at 1618–20.  
 51.  It is often impossible to tell which selection method a judge uses: attorney applications 
are rarely on the judicial dockets, judges tend not to state their methodology on the record, and 
attorneys’ behind-the-scenes efforts to coordinate may ultimately dictate the slate regardless. 
E.g., Carolyn A. Dubay, Trends and Problems in the Appointment and Compensation of Common 
Benefit Counsel in Complex Multi-District Litigation: An Empirical Study of Ten Mega MDLs 
32–33 tbl.3 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (identifying the 
procedures for appointing plaintiffs’ leadership that varied substantially in levels of generality 
and observing “while the court may initially dictate a competition, consensus, or hybrid 
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selection relies on informal attorney networks to identify necessary 
leadership roles and pick their own leaders.52 Although private 
ordering might be preferable for positions that demand 
communication and camaraderie, such as liaison counsel, judges may 
use this method to appoint the entire leadership slate.53 Somewhat 
similarly, the hybrid process allows interim lead counsel to apply, 
nominate executive committee members, and appoint subcommittees 
while simultaneously permitting those who were not handpicked to 
apply.54 Still, interim lead counsel influences most appointments, 
which leaves only a few positions truly open to applicants.55 
Alternatively, judges might invite submissions and choose among 
them for all positions—a competitive process. 
While it is simpler for judges to defer to private ordering, doing 
so makes it difficult for new entrants to break into the leadership 
market—despite their expertise.56 Private ordering favors attorneys 
with long-standing business relationships, encourages attorneys to 
curry favor with one another to secure lucrative positions in future 
leadership hierarchies, and condones attorneys’ behind-the-scenes 
political wrangling.57 Long before attorneys even lobby the Panel to 
 
approach, ultimately the actions of the attorneys themselves will dictate the level of cooperation 
in the development of a leadership slate”). 
 52.  E.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06-md-01811-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 
2007) (order appointing leadership counsel); In re Neurontin Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 1:04-cv-10981-PBS (D. Mass. Dec. 17, 2004) (order granting motion to appoint 
counsel) (appointing plaintiffs’ counsel’s proposed slate). The first Manual for Complex Litigation 
recommended this approach, though it changed course by the second edition and advised judges 
to oversee the appointment process. Compare MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FIRST) §§ 1.92, 
4.53 (1982) (recommending attorney networks), with MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
(SECOND) § 20.224 (1985) (recommending judicial oversight). 
 53.  See, e.g., In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-
02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 2012) (order concerning plaintiffs’ counsel organizational 
structure at 1–2); Plaintiffs’ Proposed Counsel Organizational Structure at 2, 4–5, In re Biomet 
M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 
2012). 
 54.  Letter from Aaron S. Podhurst and Harley S. Tropin to Judge Jesse M. Furman 2, In re 
Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 1:14-md-02543-JMF (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014). 
 55.  E.g., Letter from Steve W. Berman, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, and Mark P. Robinson, Jr., 
to Judge Jesse M. Furman 4, In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 1:14-md-02543-
JMF (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014). 
 56.  See FRAZER, supra note 15, at 10–11 (observing how dominant firms might use business 
relationships and governmental agents to block entry). 
 57.  Supplemental Objection of Daniel E. Becnel, Jr. to Plaintiffs’ Common Benefit Fee 
Award, Ex. A (Application of the Becnel Law Firm, LLC as Per Pre-Trial Order No. 6(D)) at 2, In 
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-MD-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2011) (“I personally 
called a meeting at Antoine’s Restaurant in New Orleans, at my expense, and invited every 
lawyer who had a filed case or was interested in the litigation to meet and confirm leadership.”); 
see FRAZER, supra note 15, at 11 (chronicling entry barriers). 
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transfer cases to a specific location, players may make backroom deals 
as to how many positions to create and who will serve in which roles. 
In the Power Morcellator cases, for example, one of the lead lawyers 
noted, “The leadership team was created before we even applied for an 
MDL.”58 So, although that judge seemed to use an open application 
process and had several applicants, one competing attorney withdrew 
and another joined the consensus slate, prompting co-lead counsel to 
remark, “Part of our effort over the last year was to get the team 
together . . . [so] that we wouldn’t have to worry about competition. It 
worked.”59 
Even when judges select leaders, they stress applicants’ 
experience, cooperative tendencies, and ability to finance the 
litigation.60 At least one judge has identified “team players” as “the 
primary factor” in choosing leaders.61 To assess cooperation, judges 
often request short applications and call other judges to ask about 
uncooperative and disruptive attorneys.62 This too advantages lawyers 
with pre-existing relationships who have a track record of working 
well together.63 
 
 58.  Amanda Bronstad, In a First, Women Compose Majority of MDL Committee, NAT’L LAW 
JOURNAL (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202742961283/In-a-First-
Women-Compose-Majority-of-MDL-Committee?slreturn=20160826171813 [https://perma.cc/ 
CZY5-C9GU]. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Dubay, supra note 51, at 39–40 tbl.6; e.g., In re Bos. Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md-02326 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012) (“The main criteria for PSC 
membership will be: (a) willingness and availability to commit to a time-consuming project; (b) 
ability to work cooperatively with others; and (c) professional experience in this type of 
litigation.”); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 
2010, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial order no. 1) (setting initial 
conference). 
 61.  Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Considerations in Choosing Counsel for Multidistrict Litigation 
Cases and Mass Tort Cases, 74 LA. L. REV. 391, 392 (2014). 
 62.  E.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:15-md-02672-CRB, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (pretrial order no. 2) (requesting leadership 
applicants to include the names and contact information of multidistrict judges with whom the 
applicant worked); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on 
April 20, 2010, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial order no. 1) (setting 
initial conference); Transcript of Proceedings on November 16, 2012 at 16–17, In re Biomet M2a 
Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 
2012) (“I know most of the judges who have your MDLs, and so I emailed them this week, gave 
the list of names that had been submitted, and said, ‘Tell me anybody who I should not 
appoint.’ ”). Even attorneys’ submissions sometimes suggest a litany of judges who can vouch for 
the applicant’s reputation and “proven ability to work well with others.” Plaintiffs’ Proposed 
Counsel Organizational Structure at 12, 25–26, In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 2012) (leadership applications of 
Mark Lanier and Douglass Kreis). 
 63.  See FRAZER, supra note 15, at 11 (noting that long-standing business relationships and 
barriers arising through legal practices can create barriers to entry for competitors). 
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Stressing cooperation deters dissent by implicitly labeling it as 
something that should not be rewarded. In lieu of dissent, judges 
typically receive a chorus of support for informal consensus 
nominees—not information about potential conflicts.64 Yet, because 
§ 1407 requires only that cases share a common factual question, 
plaintiffs’ best interests may not align.65 Without attorneys who are 
willing to speak up on their behalf, adequate representation is at risk. 
Of course, lawyers who work together frequently have superior 
information about both conflicts among cases and one another’s skills 
and temperament. So, allowing attorneys to object to proposed leaders 
could help vet candidates. But the circumstances make this unlikely. 
Repeat players will reveal that kind of information only if solicited 
privately; speaking publicly diminishes their chances of receiving 
common-benefit work or being appointed to a steering committee if the 
objectionable candidate is empowered.66 
2. Compensation Methods Impose Costs on Competitors 
Ample opportunities also exist for lead lawyers to influence 
both their own and others’ compensation since there is no firm 
doctrinal ground to guide judges in awarding common-benefit fees.67 
For instance, some judges institute fee-allocation committees 
comprised of the principal lead lawyers.68 This means that at any 
given time, leaders can set what amounts to pricing policies and 
pressure rivals through their influence over fees in both that 
proceeding and concurrent litigations.69 
Judges tend to defer to leaders on common-benefit fee 
practices, often implementing their proposed orders verbatim and 
increasing fees midway through the litigation at lead counsel’s 
request.70 Some transferee judges also insist that all attorneys with a 
 
 64.  E.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 59, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 
4:13-md-02420-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) (“And we are also supporting the Cotchett, Lieff 
motion, but we are glad to work with all three firms.”). 
 65.  For more information on these conflicts and a discussion of adequate representation 
concerns, see infra Part II.D.2. 
 66.  For more information on this aspect of sanctioning, see infra Part III.B.1. 
 67.  Burch, supra note 41, at 102–09. 
 68.  E.g., In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2015) (case management order no. 71) (creating 
a fee committee with five of eight members appointed by co-lead and liaison counsel). 
 69.  See infra notes 268–273 and accompanying text; see also FRAZER, supra note 15, at 12 
(noting that monopolies can affect pricing policies and use those policies to prevent market 
entry). 
 70.  Dubay, supra note 51, at 22–23, 54–55; see infra notes 194–199 and accompanying text. 
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case in the federal proceeding sign fee-transfer agreements, which tax 
an attorney’s entire client list to compensate lead lawyers—regardless 
of where that client’s related case is pending.71 Attorneys participating 
in the multidistrict proceeding have little choice in the matter; they 
cannot conduct discovery on their own and must rely on leaders’ 
common-work product unless (one might think) they litigate solely in 
state courts.72 
But state litigants are not immune to federal common-benefit 
practices either. Fee-transfer agreements and private settlements 
often allow lead attorneys to expand their power structure beyond the 
federal court’s jurisdiction to tax state-court litigants who benefit from 
their efforts.73 In economic terms, this raises costs for competitors. As 
some federal judges recognize their limited authority to impinge on 
state suits, lead lawyers design settlements to collect common-benefit 
fees from state-court plaintiffs who want to accept the deal—either by 
including fees directly within the settlement or inserting provisions 
that require settling plaintiffs to consent to the transferee judge’s fee 
orders.74 
3. Repeat Play Can Promote Efficiency and Economies of Scale 
Although repeat players’ control across and within 
multidistrict proceedings can produce costs, they can likewise 
generate positive developments that further pretrial efficiency. When 
asked, top-tier repeat players cite experience as their principal 
virtue.75 Even basic antitrust doctrine recognizes that oligopolies may 
sometimes include those “who merely by superior skill and 
intelligence . . . got the whole business because nobody could do it as 
well.”76 
 
 71.  See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 
2005) (pretrial order no. 19 at 3); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is 
Not, and Should Be, CLASS ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG., Mar. 2009, at 87, 90 (examining twenty-one 
reported cases using common-benefit fees). 
 72.  For more on fee-transfer agreements, see Burch, supra note 41, at 106–08. 
 73.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 74.  See infra notes 223–229 and accompanying text. 
 75.  Amanda Bronstad, ‘Good Ol’ Boys Club’ in MDL: Same Plaintiffs Firms Repeatedly 
Lead Suits, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id= 
1202738239700/Good-Ol-Boys-Club-In-MDL [https://perma.cc/9QJB-GPYK] (quoting Richard 
Arsenault as saying, “A lot of deference should be given to experienced plaintiffs counsel who 
have been in these wars and understand what kinds of teams they need to put together”). 
 76.  United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953) 
(quoting the legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 21 CONG. REC. 3146–52 (1890)); see 
also Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) 
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Repeat actors capitalize on economies of scale and their 
acquired knowledge is imperative; it takes expertise to comprehend 
the science behind injuries, understand the risks of various litigation 
strategies, build the infrastructure that accompanies a multidistrict 
litigation, and manage cases effectively. Certain firms are known to 
intensively vet cases before suing, and their reputation may encourage 
others to recruit clients and prompt claims to settle more quickly than 
they otherwise might. Those settlement values may likewise reflect 
repeat players’ knowledge about previous settlement amounts, which 
helps prevent defendants from using informational asymmetries 
against their clients.77 
But there are many experienced lawyers and law firms. In 
Vioxx alone, ninety-two law firms received common-benefit fees.78 Yet, 
in product-liability and sales-practices multidistrict litigations, a mere 
sixteen percent of the involved plaintiffs’ law firms occupied nearly 
fifty-four percent of all leadership roles.79 And a small cadre of five 
high-level repeat players consistently occupy the most powerful 
positions.80 As such, two points emerge: (1) high-level repeat players 
are not the only ones with experience—others can offer those same 
advantages; and (2) transactions may have become too efficient, 
without sufficient safeguards to ensure that the efficiencies further 
principals’—not agents’—collective interests. 
II. EMPIRICALLY AND ETHICALLY ASSESSING  
THE DEALS REPEAT PLAYERS DESIGN 
Multidistrict litigations riddled with repetitive play present 
special challenges for transferee judges who must often manage them 
without Rule 23’s class-action tools. The absence of clear adequate 
representation guideposts and the class action’s policing power has 
left judges looking to repeat players for guidance and advice about 
what happens elsewhere. Without much external scrutiny, past 
practices quickly become best practices, and experienced agents are 
able to cite and replicate beneficial procedures in areas that affect 
their financial remuneration. This leaves a lot of leeway for both 
ingenuity and mischief, for without class certification, the resulting 
 
(noting that monopolists cannot be condemned for developing the infrastructures necessary to 
operate in the market). 
 77.  Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 42, at 1599–1600. 
 78.  In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La. Sept. 27, 2011) (awarding 
ninety-two of 108 law firms common-benefit fees). 
 79.  Burch, supra note 41, at 96–97. 
 80.  Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 41–42). 
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settlements are private; they do not undergo Rule 23(e)’s judicial 
vetting to ensure that they are “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”81 
This begs the question of who reaps the advantage of repeat 
play—the regulars (attorneys and the defendant) or one-shotters (the 
plaintiffs). Repeat plaintiffs’ attorneys’ monopolistic bargaining 
authority adds to the conventional principal-agent concern that, 
unless properly monitored, the agent may face routine temptations to 
better herself at her principal’s expense. Since monopoly power also 
creates a potential for higher prices and lower output,82 this could 
mean higher common-benefit fees for attorneys and lower 
representation quality (and perhaps less compensation) for plaintiffs. 
Evidence as to higher fees and lower outputs is hard to obtain 
in this context, for it is often shrouded by private, closed-door 
settlement negotiations. Accordingly, to unearth some indicators that 
might shed light on this question, I analyzed all publicly available 
non-class settlements83 (thirteen settlements resulting from ten 
multidistrict litigations84) that occurred within a dataset of all 
seventy-three products-liability and sales-practices multidistrict 
litigations pending as of May 14, 2013, as well as related media 
stories, common-benefit fee awards, and docket entries from those 
proceedings.85 Although thirteen settlements seems like a small 
number, the proceedings in which those settlements occurred 
collectively included 64,107 total actions—a number that does not 
include the thousands of related state-court cases resolved through 
the same settlements.86 In general, products liability and sales 
practices should provide a representative sampling of multidistrict 
proceedings, for they constitute well over one-third of all multidistrict 
 
 81.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 82.  FRAZER, supra note 15, at 9. 
 83.  Because the focus is on the practices and norms that develop when judges lack Rule 
23’s supervisory powers, I excluded (at least for this Article) the class settlements that occurred 
within the data. 
 84.  Three of those nine litigations—Propulsid, DePuy ASR Hip Implant, and 
Yasmin/Yaz—each generated two settlements. 
 85.  For a further description of the data, see Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript 
at 20–21).  
 86.  Using the most recent data available on the proceedings, the Pending MDLs by District 
as of July 15, 2016 (or the earlier 2013 information where the proceedings were no longer 
pending), the proceedings contained the following number of actions: Propulsid 474, Vioxx 
10,320, Fosamax 1,141, Yasmin/Yaz 11,858, DePuy ASR 9,877, Biomet 2,607, NuvaRing 1,895, 
Actos 5,111, American Medical Systems 20,231, and Zimmer Durom 593. MDL Statistics 
Report—Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by District, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (July 15, 2016), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending 
_MDL_Dockets_By_District-July-15-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLA8-FE9T]. 
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litigations (the largest segment by far),87 and up to ninety-two percent 
of the actual cases pending within all proceedings on the multidistrict 
docket.88 Consequently, the data, while limited, nevertheless provides 
an interesting look into the deals that elite lawyers design. 
Table A1 in the Appendix uses boldface type to designate the 
reviewed settlements. It also lists the multidistrict proceedings within 
the data that concluded with a holistic aggregate or inventory 
settlement (thirty-one out of seventy-three), class-action settlement 
(twenty out of seventy-three), and whether the non-class settlement 
was publicly available (ten of the thirty-one non-class settlements 
were public).89 Three of the ten publically available non-class 
settlements had two settlements each, for a total of thirteen.90 One of 
the publicly available non-class settlements (the American Medical 
Systems litigation) is a partial settlement; it covers only the claimants 
represented by two law firms, not all the pending claims. Because the 
other agreements in that case were confidential, it is unclear whether 
that settlement is representative of the others. 
Using this same dataset, in Repeat Players in Multidistrict 
Litigation: The Social Network, my co-author and I confirmed that the 
repeat players are the lead plaintiffs’ attorneys who negotiated, 
designed, and implemented the relevant settlements, as Appendix 
tables A1 and A2 reflect.91 Table A2 shows which of the fifty-five 
highest-level repeat plaintiffs’ lawyers (based on the total number of 
multidistrict proceedings in which they held leadership positions) led 
those ten proceedings. More importantly, one of the top five repeat 
players participated directly in each settled proceeding’s leadership. 
Considering this evidence alongside the social network of repeat 
actors, it became evident that a relatively small group of high-level 
 
 87.  CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION 12 (2012), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year 
_Statistics-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6ZT-FCDE] (showing thirty-four sales practices 
multidistrict litigations and seventy-two products liability litigations out of 291 total 
multidistrict litigations). 
 88.  Samuel Issacharoff, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Presentation at the Duke University 
School of Law Mass-Tort MDL Program: Snapshot of MDL Caseload Statistics 3 (Oct. 8, 2015). 
 89.  Ten proceedings are still actively ongoing, one case settled through individual 
settlements, and one case settled through bankruptcy. Defendants successfully used Daubert 
motions, summary judgment motions, and arbitration to resolve ten proceedings. Burch & 
Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 15). 
 90.  Propulsid, DePuy ASR Hip Implant, and Yasmin/Yaz each generated two settlement 
agreements. And the American Medical Systems litigation settlement was a partial settlement; it 
covered only the claimants represented by two law firms, not all the pending claims. Because the 
other settlements in that proceeding were confidential, it is unclear whether it was 
representative of the others. 
 91.  Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 30). 
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repeat players who occupied the most powerful positions had more 
impact on settlement design than did the total number of involved 
repeat players. 
Because the previous article launched our factual and 
empirical findings and linked the settlements to the network of repeat 
players, this Part builds upon that work by considering the ethical 
implications of the settlement provisions and adding new empirical 
data on common-benefit fees and—to the extent available—client 
outcomes. It focuses on settlement practices that might principally 
benefit the attorneys, but not necessarily the litigants:92 (1) those that 
induce claimants to settle and thereby create closure for defendants, 
(2) those that reduce payouts to late-coming claimants who do not 
have counsel as of the settlement date, (3) those that allow unclaimed 
funds to revert to the defendant, and (4) those that compensate lead 
lawyers. 
Part A begins by considering how the first three categories 
collectively benefit defendants by producing closure and returning 
money initially earmarked for settlement. Part B then contemplates 
judicial and settlement practices that allow lead lawyers to maximize 
their profits through common-benefit fees. Collectively, both parts 
suggest that repeat players—lead lawyers, defense attorneys, and 
defendants—may benefit handsomely from the multidistrict process, 
perhaps to the detriment of non-lead plaintiffs’ attorneys and 
plaintiffs. By identifying potential cartel-like behavior among repeat 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, Part C helps explain why non-lead attorneys 
(particularly those playing the long game) do not object. To stifle 
objections and dissent, leaders can credibly threaten social and 
financial sanctions—some of which even have judicial support. 
Finally, to the extent available, Part D introduces new empirical 
evidence as to whether current practices lead to lower outputs for 
plaintiffs. Much of the desired information on settlement payouts and 
recovery rates remains private, but the available information suggests 
that repeat players benefit from the settlements they design. If the 
information that repeat players make publicly available so readily 
appears to enrich them, the concern is that the gains unlocked in 
exchange for delivering finality may well be leaders’ common-benefit 
fees—not more money for plaintiffs.93 
 
 92.  As others have explored, aggregation can create value, so one might argue that closure 
provisions benefit plaintiffs. E.g., D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate 
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1192–1201 (2013). I address this argument infra at Part II.D. 
 93.  Commentators have often reasoned that the peace premium goes to plaintiffs. E.g., 
Rave, supra note 92, at 1185 (“Defendants want peace, and they are often willing to pay for it. 
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A. Defendants Bargain for Closure and Returned Funds 
Concluding the litigation (and reassuring shareholders) 
becomes the end goal for most any defendant who cannot avoid 
liability. Achieving that goal, however, is more difficult without the 
ability to bind absent class members through class certification.94 
Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding multidistrict 
proceedings produce favorable conditions for closure: transferee judges 
are reluctant to remand cases, which keeps the litigation centralized; 
coordinating suits and vesting power in the hands of a few attorneys 
makes unified negotiation easier; and judges pressure the parties to 
settle.95 
Capitalizing on these circumstances, defense attorneys have 
been able to reach mutually beneficial arrangements with plaintiffs’ 
leadership through a fundamental shift in settlement construction: 
unlike traditional settlements between plaintiffs and defendants, all 
thirteen deals in the dataset were agreements between lead lawyers 
and defendants. These deals position lead plaintiffs’ lawyers as 
settlement gatekeepers, for defendants will not make better offers to 
others without the threat of trial; doing so would work against their 
closure goal. These new deals then serve as a mandatory gateway for 
anyone wanting to settle, and typically require non-lead attorneys to 
become signatories alongside their clients. Accordingly, master 
settlement agreements now aim some provisions at plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and some at their clients. 
Provisions targeting participating plaintiffs’ attorneys push 
ethical boundaries that require them to act in each client’s best 
interest.96 In common parlance, these provisions are referred to as 
follows: (1) attorney-recommendation provisions, which require 
participating attorneys to recommend the deal to all of their clients; 
(2) attorney-withdrawal provisions, which instruct attorneys to 
withdraw from representing non-settling clients; (3) walkaway, 
withdrawal, or “blow” provisions, which release the defendant from its 
contractual obligations if too few plaintiffs settle; (4) case-census 
 
Plaintiffs therefore may stand to gain if they can package all of their claims together and sell 
them to the defendant . . . .”). 
 94.  Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 42, at 1581–84, 1588; supra notes 45–49. 
 95.  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 
415–18 (2014). 
 96.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a), 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (requiring 
attorneys to “exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice,” and 
prohibiting representation without informed consent if there’s a significant risk that the lawyer’s 
duty to someone else will materially affect the attorney’s advice). 
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provisions, which require attorneys to register all their filed and 
unfiled claims with the court such that the defendant can use that 
number as the denominator for the walkaway percentage; (5) 
latecomer reductions that reduce payouts to claimants without counsel 
on the settlement date; and (6) reverter clauses, which allow the 
defendant to retain unclaimed settlement funds. 
In Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social 
Network, we found that all settlements allowed the defendant to 
renege if too few claimants abandoned their right to sue in favor of the 
proposed claims-processing procedure.97 These walkaway provisions 
ranged in their overall plaintiff participation requirements, with 
eighty-five percent at the low end (Vioxx), and one-hundred percent at 
the high end (Fosamax). All of the more recent settlements, 
Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy, NuvaRing, Actos, and Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, 
reinforced walkaway provisions with case-census provisions. Eighty-
four percent (all but Biomet and Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, where the 
judge required all plaintiffs to participate in the Zimmer settlement) 
likewise included some form of attorney-recommendation provision. 
On the more coercive end, Propulsid, Vioxx, Fosamax, and American 
Medical Systems enhanced the likelihood of satisfying claimant-
participation rates by including both mandatory attorney-
recommendation provisions and mandatory attorney-withdrawal 
provisions. Others, including Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy, NuvaRing, and 
Actos insisted that participating attorneys use their “best efforts” to 
meet the participation benchmarks. Three of the thirteen settlements 
immediately reduced available settlement funds for plaintiffs that did 
not have an attorney or who had not filed suit as of the settlement 
date (“latecomers”), and four settlements permitted remaining funds 
to revert back to the defendant. 
 
 
 97.  For a comparative overview of these provisions, see Burch & Williams, supra note 43 
(manuscript at 34). 
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TABLE 1: PROVISIONS BENEFITING DEFENDANTS OCCURRING 
WITHIN THE ANALYZED SETTLEMENTS 
Settlement 
Provision 







Provision (of 13) 
Walkaway 
Provision 







Yasmin/Yaz I & II, 
DePuy ASR I & II, 
Vioxx, NuvaRing, 
Actos, Zimmer Durom 
Hip Cup  
Case-census 
provisions provide 







By plaintiffs’ attorney: 




By defendant: DePuy 











Mandatory: Propulsid I 





I & II, DePuy ASR I & 




lawyers to use 







DePuy ASR I & II, 
Zimmer Durom Hip 
Cup 
23%
Reverter clauses Propulsid I & II, DePuy 
ASR I & II 
30%
Making deals with plaintiffs’ attorneys masterfully furthers 
defendants’ end game in two ways. First, the agreements impose 
uniform endorsement requirements on participating attorneys to 
discourage them from “cherry picking,” a practice in which lawyers 
settle most cases, but continue litigating those with the strongest 
claims or most sympathetic facts. By requiring a high percentage of 
plaintiffs to accept the settlement offer for it to take effect and 
insisting that individual attorneys recommend that all their clients 
settle (including clients who had not yet sued or who were pursuing 
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relief elsewhere), defense attorneys essentially conditioned plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees on achieving their closure aims. A plaintiffs’ attorney is 
either “all in” and would collect significant contingent fees from all her 
settling clients, or “all out” and would have to spend significant 
resources litigating individual cases—at least if she has too few clients 
to trigger the walkaway provision. As such, recommendation 
provisions alter the typical contingent fee model where an attorney’s 
recovery increases alongside her clients’ recovery and instead ties 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ financial self-interest to each other and to the 
entire claimant base. This shift also allows defendants to reach some 
plaintiffs who are outside of the federal court’s jurisdiction, and others 
who haven’t yet sued. 
Second, these provisions reduce demand for legal 
representation, for the settlement effectively becomes the only “game” 
in town. Some deals demanded that plaintiffs’ lawyers withdraw from 
representing non-settling clients and agree not to advertise for new 
ones.98 Like oligopolists, leaders thwart competition and reduce 
demand by using attorney withdrawal and recommendation provisions 
to restrict the legal services market (at least for similar allegations 
against the same defendant).99 When defendants threaten to abandon 
the deal if too few plaintiffs participate, and participating attorneys 
must recommend the deal to all of their clients and withdraw from 
representing those who refuse, leaders can regulate the legal service 
being offered and control a sufficiently large share of that market.100 
These deals likewise inhibit existing rivals from competing, for they 
are bound by ethical rules to convey settlement offers to their clients. 
In this sense, master settlements can recreate bottleneck 
problems where dominant firms raise competitors’ costs by obtaining 
exclusionary rights;101 once defendants negotiate master settlements 
with plaintiffs’ leadership, that agreement typically becomes the only 
settlement option. Non-settling attorneys can avoid the bottleneck 
only by taking state cases to trial. As such, the following sections 
explain how these clauses evolved, how they operate in practice, how 
 
 98.  See infra notes 143–183; text accompanying notes 166–168. 
 99.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 4.1 (explaining that “[a] cartel is an agreement 
among otherwise competing firms to reduce their output to agreed upon levels, or sell at an 
agreed upon price,” and that “cartel members must produce a sufficiently large share of the 
product or service [such] that their decisions are not undermined by existing rivals who are not 
cartel members”). 
 100.  See id. (explaining the conditions for cartels). 
 101.  See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 234–36 (1986) (explaining 
bottlenecks). 
        
94 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:67 
they restrict legal services, and how they flaunt—and sometimes 
cross—ethical boundaries. 
1. Recommendation, Withdrawal, and Walkaway Provisions  
Impart Closure, Restrain Competition 
Propulsid was the earliest available non-class settlement 
within the data and is, to my knowledge, the first of its kind to 
propose and implement non-class closure mechanisms.102 Propulsid’s 
Steering Committee characterized its accomplishment as follows: 
Never before in the history of multidistrict litigation, have counsel achieved a global 
resolution of this proportion in the unique manner by which this Settlement Program 
resolves the litigation without resort to complex joinder devices or Class Certification. 
This remarkable approach to resolution of “mass tort” litigation promises to become the 
template for similar resolution of future litigations of this kind.103 
This statement proved prophetic, for, as Figure 1 below shows, 
settlement designers replicated some aspect of Propulsid in every 
subsequent deal within the data. 
 
 
 102.  Similar closure mechanisms in the later Vioxx settlement have been the subject of 
much ethical scrutiny. E.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus 
Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 267–68 (2011). 
 103.  Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for Award of 
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 4, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-
md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005). 
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FIGURE 1: SETTLEMENTS IMPLEMENTING CLOSURE 
PROVISIONS FROM PROPULSID 
 
Propulsid’s dealmakers engineered three closure provisions—
walkaway provisions, settlement bonuses, and a hybrid 
recommendation-withdrawal provision. First, eighty-five percent of 
death claims and seventy-five percent of injury claims had to enroll for 
the settlement to take effect.104 Second, if one-hundred percent of non-
death plaintiffs enrolled, Johnson & Johnson would add a $4 million 
“bonus” to the available settlement funds.105 Third, an “opt-out” form 
accompanied the agreement even though all claimants had to 
affirmatively “opt in.”106 Designed for non-settling claimants, this form 
 
 104.  MDL-1355 Term Sheet § 1.B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-
EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Propulsid I Settlement]. The plaintiffs’ steering 
committee represented about four thousand people, three hundred of whom allegedly died from 
using Propulsid. Johnson & Johnson Unit in Legal Settlement Over Propulsid Suit, 
PHARMAWATCH: CNS, Mar. 2004, at 15–16. 
 105.  Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 3.B. 
 106.  Opt Out Form for Propulsid MDL Settlement, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 






Vioxx, Fosamax, American 
Medical Systems
“Best efforts”









Vioxx, Fosamax, American 
Medical Systems, Yasmin/Yaz, 
DePuy ASR, Biomet, 
NuvaRing, Actos
Case Census Derivative
Yasmin/Yaz, DePuy ASR, 
NuvaRing, Actos, Zimmer 
Durom Hip Cup
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authorized counsel to withdraw from representing the client (meaning 
that claimants effectively opted out of representation),107 and later 
became the template for more sophisticated attorney recommendation 
and withdrawal provisions. 
Negotiated in secret over twelve months by “The End Game 
Committee” and then approved by a unanimous Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee, the settlement (“Propulsid I”) divvied claims into three 
tiers—deaths, non-fatal heart attacks, and ventricular tachycardia 
(fast heart rate) cases—each with required proofs for establishing 
causation.108 Medical records went to a panel of two doctors, one 
picked by the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee, one picked by 
defendants, plus a third for ties, who reviewed the records and 
permitted or denied claims without explanation. If a claimant 
qualified, the special master determined the confidential, non-
appealable payment amount.109 
Four years after the agreement, the physician panel had 
deemed only eleven claimants eligible for compensation and rejected 
1,356 claims.110 The settlement didn’t cover state cases or plaintiffs 
who sued after February 1, 2004, which left around two thousand 
claimants with pending suits and around five thousand who had not 
yet sued.111 Yet, the court awarded lead lawyers $22.5 million in 
attorneys’ fees, which was the precise amount they negotiated for 
themselves with the defendant.112 No attorneys objected.113 Leaders 
based their request on a percentage of the fund or a lodestar analysis, 
 
 107.  Id. For an in-depth analysis of the unethical nature of these mandatory 
recommendation and withdrawal provisions, see Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 102, at 281–
92. 
 108.  Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for Award of 
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 11–12, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005). 
 109.  Id. at 12. 
 110.  Joint Report No. 62 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel at 2, In re Propulsid 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2008); Janet 
McConnaughey, Two Propulsid Settlements; A Handful of Checks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 29, 
2008. 
 111.  Parties Announce New Propulsid Settlement to Resolve Remaining State, Federal 
Claims, 7 Class Action Litig. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 63 (Jan. 27, 2006). Earlier reports estimated 
that 12,000 people had not yet sued at the time of the first settlement. Johnson & Johnson Unit 
in Legal Settlement Over Propulsid Suit, supra note 104. 
 112.  In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2, 
2005) (order); Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 19.  
 113.  In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2, 
2005) (order) (“No objections were made to the Motion.”); Burch, supra note 41, at 108–09. 
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using the total fund “deposited” by defendants, $87.3 million—not the 
actual money paid to claimants.114 
Eventually, only thirty-two of 4,245 claims submitted under 
Propulsid I were eligible for relief—the confidential amounts of which 
were filed under seal.115 Because relatively little money went to 
claimants, the court and parties then transferred $8.3 million to 
Canada’s Prepulsid Resolution Program and the same amount to 
“charitable organizations.”116 After a joint motion by the parties, $40 
million reverted to Johnson & Johnson, the defendant, which left $12 
million remaining in the fund.117 So, as of July 31, 2012, claimants 
likely received little more than $3.66 million combined.118 
Although Propulsid I had not yet concluded, given the 
continued need for finality with regard to the late-filed and state 
cases, lead lawyers negotiated “Propulsid II,” a $15 million settlement 
that mostly mirrored the first, but required ninety percent of death 
claimants and ninety-five percent of personal-injury claimants to 
participate.119 The physician panel found only five out of 1,767 claims 
compensable this time, and Johnson & Johnson paid only $2.85 
million from the settlement fund.120 Nevertheless, the leadership 
requested and received an additional $4.1 million in fees with no 
objections filed.121 The court also granted a joint motion to revert $5 
 
 114.  See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for Award of 
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 2, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-
md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005). 
 115.  Joint Report No. 89 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel at 1–2, In re 
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2011). 
 116.  Order Granting Joint Motion for an Order Authorizing Distribution of MDL 1 
Settlement Fund, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. 
Nov. 30, 2009). The money went to Louisiana Health Public Initiative, even though claimants 
were geographically dispersed throughout the country. Joint Report No. 95 of Plaintiffs’ and 
Defendants’ Liaison Counsel at 2, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-
KWR (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012). 
 117.  Joint Motion and Order for Partial Disbursement of Settlement Funds to Defendant 
Johnson & Johnson, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. 
Dec. 14, 2011). 
 118.  See Joint Report No. 97 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re Propulsid 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. July 31, 2012). The totals added in 
the text are not, of course, in the Joint Report, but derived from numbers provided in that and 
previous reports. 
 119.  Parties Announce New Propulsid Settlement to Resolve Remaining State, Federal 
Claims, supra note 111; McConnaughey, supra note 110. 
 120.  This number does not include the 2,059 claimants who enrolled in the program, had 
their claims extinguished, but did not submit claim forms. Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees (Re: MDL Settlement Program II) at 2, In re Propulsid Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012). 
 121.  Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees (Re: MDL 
Settlement Program II) at 5, Ex. B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-
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million of the second settlement fund as well the remaining balance of 
all funds to the defendant.122 As the litigation concluded, lead lawyers 
requested and received an additional six-percent common-benefit 
fund, which taxed settlements that occurred before the master 
settlements and equaled $397,860.00.123 
Two months after Propulsid II, the Panel centralized Vioxx 
before the same judge.124 Its resulting non-class settlement has easily 
been the most cited, discussed, and criticized deal within the data.125 
Adapting closure and fee-related lessons from Propulsid, the 
settlement offer combined two provisions—a mandatory attorney-
recommendation provision and a mandatory attorney-withdrawal 
provision—to link individual attorneys’ interests to defendant Merck’s 
closure goal. These provisions required each participating plaintiffs’ 
attorney to recommend the deal uniformly or not at all. If she 
recommended it and the client refused, then she had to withdraw from 
representing that client.126 If fewer than eighty-five percent of the 
claimants consented, Merck could abandon the deal.127 
 
KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); see also In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-
EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2012) (order) (granting motion for distribution of attorney’s fees 
(Re: MDL Settlement Program II)). The only fee objections were those by firms objecting to their 
own cut. E.g., Zimmerman Reed P.L.L.P.’s Response in Partial Objection to the Plaintiffs’ 
Steering Committee’s Motion for Distribution of Additional Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement 
Costs (Re: MDL Settlement Program I), In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-1355-
EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2012); Objection to the PSC’s Motion for Distribution of Specific 
Attorney’s Fees Awards and for Expenses and Reimbursements (Re: MDL Settlement Program 
I), In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 2009) 
(filed by Lockridge Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P.). 
 122.  In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 
2012) (order terminating the claims of all enrollees in the second MDL resolution program and 
authorizing return to the defendants the balance of the settlement fund and administrative fund 
after all payments due thereunder have been made); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-
md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2011) (order). 
 123.  In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-1355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 2014) 
(order); Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final Distribution of 
Remaining Funds at 3, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. 
La. Jan. 31, 2014); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. 
Oct. 3, 2012) (order terminating the claims of all enrollees in the second MDL resolution program 
and authorizing return to the defendants the balance of the settlement fund and administrative 
fund after all payments due thereunder have been made). 
 124.  In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 2005) 
(transfer order). 
 125.  E.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 102, at 267–68. 
 126.  Master Settlement Agreement §§ 1.2.8.1–3, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-
01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement]. After some plaintiffs’ 
attorneys contended the settlement conflicted with ethical rules, it was reinterpreted to mean 
that the attorneys should recommend the deal only if it was in the client’s best interest. In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 388 F. App’x 391, 395–97 (5th Cir. 2010); Alex Berenson, Some Lawyers 
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These similarities are unsurprising given that both Vioxx and 
Propulsid included many of the same lead plaintiff lawyers—Richard 
Arsenault, Dawn Barrios, Russ Herman, Arnold Levin, and Chris 
Seeger.128 Like Propulsid and Vioxx, Vioxx and Fosamax shared many 
key players, too. Merck manufactured and distributed both drugs, 
thus Bruce Kuhlik, Merck’s general counsel, and Ted Mayer of 
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed represented Merck in each suit. On the 
plaintiffs’ side, James Dugan II, and Shelly Sanford were lead lawyers 
in both Vioxx and Fosamax, and Ashcraft and Gerel, LLP had 
attorneys on both leadership rosters. Moreover, two law firms—
Murray Law Firm and Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty 
& Proctor, P.A—had attorneys who served as leaders in Propulsid, 
Vioxx, and Fosamax. 
Consequently, it follows that the Fosamax agreement 
replicated many Propulsid and Vioxx-like provisions: all attorneys 
with participating clients had to become parties to the agreement and 
recommend that their clients accept the deal.129 But the walkaway 
provision in Fosamax differed from those in Propulsid and Vioxx. 
Merck had two options if a single claimant or her counsel failed to 
agree: (1) Merck could declare the agreement null and void, or (2) it 
could reduce the settlement amount by however much the allocation 
committee determined would have been paid to non-participating 
claimants and their counsel.130 Merck did not activate its first option, 
but the judge allowed numerous attorneys to withdraw from 
representing non-settling claimants.131 These measures led to a 
ninety-five percent participation rate four months after the 
 
Seek Changes in Vioxx Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/12/20/business/20cnd-vioxx.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K8AN-WKWE]. 
 127.  Vioxx Settlement, supra note 126, § 11.1. 
 128.  See In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2, 
2005) (order) (Dawn Barrios and Richard Arsenault as State Liaison counsel; Russ Herman on 
Plaintiff’s Steering Committee); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-MD-01355-EEF-
KWR (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2000) (pretrial order no. 3) (Russ Herman, Arnold Levin, and Chris 
Seeger on Plaintiff Steering Committee); cf. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-01657-
EEF-DEK (E.D. La. May 22, 2009) (pretrial order no. 41) (Dawn Barrios on Private Third Party 
Payor Bellwether Trial Committee); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-01657-EEF-DEK 
(E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2005) (pretrial order no. 6) (Richard Arsenault, Arnold Levin, and Chris Seeger 
on Plaintiff’s Steering Committee). 
 129.  Master Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 1–2, 5, Exhibit C at C-15 (Certification and Joinder 
of Counsel, Claimant’s Counsel), In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Fosamax Settlement].  
 130.  Fosamax Settlement, supra note 129, ¶ 11. 
 131.  E.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 
2014) (order) (allowing Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Rafferty & Proctor, P.A. to 
withdraw as counsel). 
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settlement, which was likely later enhanced by granting Merck’s 
unopposed Lone Pine orders—orders that impose evidentiary 
production requirements on non-settling plaintiffs, sometimes with 
little advanced notice.132 As colorfully described by the leadership, 
Lone Pine orders are “a post-settlement mop-up procedure.”133 
Closure mechanisms in the American Medical Systems Pelvic 
Repair Systems agreement were strikingly similar to those in 
Fosamax, Vioxx and Propulsid: once again plaintiffs’ attorneys had to 
recommend the deal uniformly, secure releases from at least ninety-
five percent of plaintiffs, and “employ their best efforts to obtain an 
executed Release from 100%.”134 If a client still refused, counsel had to 
withdraw from representing her.135 Although the deal explicitly 
purported not to restrict attorneys’ right to practice law, which would 
violate Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 5.6(b),136 
participating counsel agreed not to “actively solicit prospective Pelvic 
Mesh clients via television, radio or website advertisement” and 
represented that the submitted claimant list included all known 
claims.137 Moreover, the special master overseeing the claims process 
 
 132.  In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 
2014) (order). Plaintiffs may be relying on common evidence produced by the lead lawyers, but, 
when a plaintiff refuses to settle, a Lone Pine order might require a plaintiff to retain an 
individual expert and produce her opinion within a couple of weeks. Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. 
L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 18, 1986).  
 133.  In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 
2014) (order) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Defendant Merck’s Motion for Entry of Lone Pine Order at 7, In re Fosamax 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2012)). Lone Pine orders 
typically require non-settling plaintiffs to provide some evidentiary support for their claims to 
avoid dismissal. Lone Pine, 1986 WL 637507 at *4; see In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 509 F. 
App’x 383, 384–85 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A] Lone Pine order[ ] imposed certain discovery 
requirements on such plaintiffs, including production of pharmacy and medical records, expert 
reports, and answers to Merck’s interrogatories.”). 
 134.  Master Settlement Agreement § II.H, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2325 (S.D. W. Va. June 14, 2013) [hereinafter Pelvic Repair 
Settlement]. 
 135.  Id. §§ II.H, I. 
 136.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A lawyer shall not 
participate in offering or making . . . an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to 
practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 13(2) (2000) (“In settling a client claim, a lawyer may not offer or 
enter into an agreement that restricts the right of the lawyer to practice law, including the right 
to represent or take particular action on behalf of other clients.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“In connection with the settlement of a 
controversy or suit, a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice 
law.”). 
 137.  Pelvic Repair Settlement, supra note 134, § II.S. 
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was the presiding judge in the New Jersey state-court Propulsid 
litigation.138 
Like all the other settlements examined thus far, the two 
Yasmin/Yaz agreements (one for gallbladder injuries and one for 
arterial thromboembolism “ATE” injuries) shared many features with 
their predecessors.139 The closure mechanism in the Gallbladder 
Settlement, however, was both novel and unorthodox. Even though it 
was not a class action, it included an automatic-enrollment provision 
that required non-participating plaintiffs to affirmatively opt-out.140 A 
case management order—citing dubious judicial authority and 
precedent according to Vioxx and Propulsid—reinforced the automatic 
enrollment, notified claimants, and required them to either 
affirmatively “opt-out” before the deadline or complete a claims 
compensation package.141 Failing to do either resulted in dismissal 
with prejudice.142 Two additional provisions fortified this closure 
mechanism: a promise by the lead lawyers to “use their best efforts to 
achieve sufficient participation,” and the defendant’s ability to 
abandon the deal if less than ninety percent of all eligible claimants 
(with cases pending anywhere) accepted.143 The Yasmin/Yaz ATE 
Settlement lacked the mandatory inclusion provision, but replaced it 
with higher participation thresholds and the same promise by 
leadership to meet those benchmarks.144 
 
 138.  See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-MD-2325 
(S.D. W. Va., May 28, 2014) (pretrial order no. 175) (appointing Judge Marina Corodemus (Ret.) 
as special master for private settlement agreements between AMS and certain plaintiffs’ 
counsel); cf. Jean Hellwege, State Court Rejects Propulsid Class; Plaintiff Lawyers Unbowed, 
TRIAL, July 1, 2002, at 90, 90. 
 139.  ATE Master Settlement Agreement, In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales 
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., Aug. 3, 2015) 
[hereinafter Yaz ATE Settlement]; Settlement Agreement, In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dropirenone) 
Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., Mar. 15, 
2013) [hereinafter Yaz Gallbladder Settlement]. 
 140.  Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 139, §1.01(A). 
 141.  In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., Mar. 15, 2013) (case management order #60 at 2). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 139, §§ 9.01, 9.02. 
 144.  Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 139, §§ 3.01, 3.02 (requiring 97.5 percent overall 
participation, ninety-five percent of death and severe injury claims, and all eligible claimants 
calendared for a trial or jury selection in state or federal court). 
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2. Case-Census Provisions Yield Judicially Reinforced Closure  
and Define the Relevant Market 
To reach the entire spectrum of claimants (state, federal, filed, 
and unfiled), more recent walkaway provisions include a new twist—
judicial reinforcement via census provisions. Settlement designers in 
the Vioxx settlement,145 the DePuy ASR settlements,146 the second 
Yasmin/Yaz ATE settlement agreement,147 the Actos settlement,148 the 
NuvaRing settlement,149 and the Zimmer Durom Hip Cup 
settlement150 employed “registration” or “case-census” provisions,151 
which involved jointly petitioning both the transferee judge and the 
coordinating state-court judges for an order notifying claimants of the 
deal and requiring them to register their claims—or face potential 
dismissal—by a certain date.152 
 
 145.  Vioxx Settlement, supra note 126, § 1.1. 
 146.  Settlement Agreement, Art. 3, §§ 3.1–3.3, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 DePuy 
ASR Settlement]; Settlement Agreement at art. 3, §§ 3.1–3.3, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip 
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 
DePuy ASR Settlement. The 2013 DePuy Hip Implant ASR settlement was the first in the 
dataset to use a registration provision. Less than two years after the original settlement, 
settlement designers implemented the 2015 ASR Settlement Agreement, which extended the 
original program deadline to cover around 1,400 revision surgeries occurring after the original 
deadline as well as claimants who rejected Johnson & Johnson’s initial offer. Joint Status Report 
Regarding U.S. Settlement Program, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. Hip Implant Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2015); Jef Feeley, J&J to Pay as Much as 
$420 Million More to Resolve Additional ASR Hip Implant Suits, 16 Class Action Litig. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 4, at 210 (Feb. 27, 2015). 
 147.  Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 139, § 1.02. 
 148.  Master Settlement Agreement § 1.02, In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
6:11-md-02299-RFD-PJH (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Actos Settlement]. 
 149.  Master Settlement Agreement § 1.05, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab., No. 4:08-md-01964-
RWS (E.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter NuvaRing Settlement]. The agreement also appointed 
the judge presiding over the NuvaRing litigation as the Special Master. Id. § 5.01. Parties 
appealing the claims administrator’s decision (BrownGreer) to the Special Master had to pay the 
Special Master’s cost, which was fixed at $300/per dispute. Id. § 5.05. 
 150.  U.S. Durom Cup Settlement Program Agreement § V.A., V.B., In re Zimmer Durom Hip 
Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-04414-SDW-SCM (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Zimmer 
Durom Settlement]. 
 151.  The Pradaxa settlement was not publicly available, but the judge in that case likewise 
issued a census order. In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-
02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. May 29, 2014) (case management order no. 76) (initial claimant 
identification certification order). 
 152.  E.g., In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 
2014) (case management order) (supplemental census of claims); In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-02299-RFD-PJH (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) (order regarding settlement 
agreement and deadlines); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Dropirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., Aug. 3, 2015) (case management order no. 
77) (census of claims). 
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All attorneys representing a single plaintiff in the issuing 
courts had to register all related claims in which they had an interest 
(broadly defined to include “any financial interest of any kind 
whatsoever”) regardless of whether the claims were unfiled or pending 
elsewhere.153 Noncompliance would prompt a show-cause hearing.154 
Dealmakers then used the census to determine the total number of 
claimants, which became the denominator for satisfying the 
defendant’s walkaway right.155 As such, census orders define the 
universe of claims and the relevant market for attorneys’ legal 
services, as well as fortify plaintiffs’ leadership’s position at the 
helm.156 But the census provision in the Zimmer Durom Hip Cup 
settlement carried added weight: the judge not only ordered all 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to register all of their clients (regardless of where 
those claims were pending), but also ordered all plaintiffs to 
participate in the settlement and stayed the proceedings pending the 
conclusion of the settlement’s mediation process.157 
Both DePuy settlements further reinforced case-census 
provisions and leaders’ control with uniform recommendation 
requirements, which prevented participating attorneys from 
“defecting.” First, signatory attorneys had to use their “best efforts” to 
enroll their clients158 and “endorse enrollment” subject to their 
independent professional judgment.159 Second, the agreement included 
a “meet and confer” provision with the special master and the steering 
committee, which lead lawyers billed as an opportunity to have 
participation questions answered.160 But the subsequent clause was 
more revealing. The special master could use that opening to decide 
that a law firm or interested counsel “did not act in good faith in 
connection with the informed consent process and participation,” 
which allowed DePuy, “at its sole option,” to expel that firm or 
 
 153.  Coordination Proceeding Special Title [Rule 3.550] Actos Prod. Liab. Cases, JCCP No. 
4696 (Cal. Sup. Ct., May 7, 2015) (stipulation and order re census of claims and continuance of 
status conference). 
 154.  E.g., id. 
 155.  E.g., Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 139, § 3.02. 
 156.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 3.2 (defining market power and describing 
mechanisms for maintaining market power, such as exclusion). 
 157.  In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-04414-SDW-SCM (D.N.J. 
May 13, 2016) (case management order regarding settlement agreement). 
 158.  2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 17.2.8; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, 
supra note 146, § 17.2.8.  
 159.  2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 17.2.8; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, 
supra note 146, § 17.2.8.  
 160.  2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 17.2.11; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, 
supra note 146, § 17.2.11.  
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attorney’s other clients from the deal.161 So, rather than requiring the 
attorney to withdraw, DePuy could expel them. But the result was the 
same as in Propulsid: attorneys had to consider their clients as a 
group—not individuals. So, the settlement’s obligatory disclaimer that 
client recommendations were “subject to their independent 
professional judgment” accomplished little. 
Defendants are, of course, free to structure settlement offers 
any way they like. They can even include provisions that force 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to treat their clients as a group. There are, however, 
some ethical principles that restrict this unbridled freedom. Model 
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(a) states: “It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or 
do so through the acts of another.”162 Unfortunately, this Rule has 
proven too flimsy to be of much use. Courts and commentators have 
differed substantially on how it applies to aggregate settlements, 
which dampens the threat of potential disciplinary repercussions.163 
3. Latecomer and Reverter Clauses Promote Finality, Inhibit 
Advertising, and Return Funds 
Two further provisions add to the possibility that repetitive 
play and plaintiffs’ leadership’s monopolistic control may principally 
benefit repeat actors: latecomer reductions and reversion clauses, 
which allow unclaimed funds to revert to the defendant. Beginning 
with the former, settlement designers in Zimmer Durom Hip Cup and 
DePuy ASR experimented with a unique provision that reduced 
payouts to claimants who were not represented by counsel as of the 
settlement date.164 The idea was to inhibit the Field-of-Dreams 
problem: creating a claims process can encourage attorneys and 
claimants to emerge, file suit, and partake of the settlement. To 
discourage this, these anticompetitive provisions immediately reduced 
unrepresented claimants’ awards by twenty-nine percent and covered 
two groups of people: (1) those litigating pro se and (2) those who 
retained attorneys and filed suit after the identified date. As to the pro 
se litigants, DePuy ASR’s designers explained that the reduction 
simply discounted their payout to the same amount they would have 
 
 161.  2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 17.2.12; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, 
supra note 146, § 17.2.12.  
 162.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 163.  Baker, supra note 23, at 298. 
 164.  2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 4.4; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra 
note 146, § 4.4; Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 150, § III.A.2.e.  
        
2017] MONOPOLIES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 105 
received if they had to pay individual attorneys’ fees, but noted, 
“[T]here will be an additional Court approved deduction for common 
benefit fees and expenses.”165 The second group was even worse off, for 
if those DePuy ASR plaintiffs wanted an attorney to help with their 
claim, then they had to pay attorneys’ fees and common-benefit fees 
out of their reduced award. 
Latecomer reductions prompt two concerns. First, by 
decreasing awards, they discourage attorneys from representing new 
clients and run into ethical rules that prohibit counsel from restricting 
their right to practice through settlements.166 To be sure, Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 5.6(b) is controversial,167 but even setting 
aside the restriction on practice, latecomer reductions unfairly 
penalize pro se litigants for representing themselves and assume they 
would have received more had they retained counsel. To the extent 
that settlement designers intended to discourage other attorneys from 
advertising, collecting a last-minute client roster, and freeriding on 
lead lawyers’ hard work, they taxed the wrong people. Requiring 
dilatory attorneys to pay a scaled-up common-benefit fee makes sense 
under a restitution theory, but the brunt of latecomer reductions fell 
on clients—not attorneys. Moreover, restricting advertising and 
reducing settlement awards (and thus attorneys’ fees) penalized and 
thereby discouraged last-minute competition, which helps insulate 
lead lawyers’ monopolistic power from challenge.168 
Second, DePuy ASR’s leadership’s attempt to disclaim fiduciary 
obligations to pro se plaintiffs by expressly stating that they “remain 
Unrepresented Claimants” even if they “obtain assistance” from the 
lead lawyers is dubious.169 While leaders lack an individual attorney-
client relationship with pro se litigants, their fiduciary obligations run 
to all plaintiffs within the proceeding equally.170 Leaders apply for the 
right to control others’ lawsuits. Allowing them to exert control 
without incurring a corollary duty to represent plaintiffs loyally would 
 
 165.  2015 ASR Settlement Agreement Benefits Overview at 4, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, 
Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2015), 
https://www.usasrhipsettlement.com/Un-Secure/WebNews.aspx [https://perma.cc/Y7UP-WLMU]. 
 166.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  
 167.  E.g., Stephen Gillers & Richard W. Painter, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit No-
Sue Promises in Settlement Agreements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 294 (2005). 
 168.  See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 295, 306–07 (1987) (discussing advertising punishments for cartels). 
 169.  2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 4.4; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra 
note 146, § 4.4. 
 170.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 1.04 reporter’s notes cmt. a, 1.05 
illus. 2, 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges 
in Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1987–89 (2011). 
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permit attorneys to exploit plaintiffs to their own advantage. 
Appointing them procedurally would likewise divest plaintiffs of 
substantive, contractual rights they would have had if their own 
attorneys retained control,171 and would thereby violate the Rules 
Enabling Act.172 
Ordinarily, leadership’s fees come out of a plaintiff’s attorney’s 
fee such that the plaintiff is no worse off for litigating a case through 
multidistrict litigation. And freeriding pro se litigants who profit from 
leaders’ work should likewise have to pay common-benefit fees.173 But 
diminishing pro se litigants’ award at the outset on top of requiring 
them to pay common-benefit fees to the lead lawyers who disserved 
them is different.174 Leaders can’t have it both ways: either they 
faithfully fulfilled their fiduciary obligations by protecting those 
claimants’ financial interests and should be compensated for any 
benefit they conferred, or they did not and should receive nothing. 
Had the court certified the litigation as a class action, latecomer 
provisions would violate Amchem’s basic precept: by negotiating side 
deals that paid their current clients more than class members, class 
counsel would have inadequately represented the latter.175 
In addition to the latecomer reductions, the DePuy settlements 
contained reversion clauses: the twenty-nine percent taken off the top 
reverted to DePuy, the defendant.176 In class actions, reverter clauses 
often indicate collusion, can create perverse incentives to implement 
restrictive claims criteria, and can undermine the judgment’s 
deterrent effect.177 Yet, settlement designers in both DePuy ASR and 
 
 171.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (stating that clients are 
entitled to representation free from any conflicts and must give their informed consent if 
conflicts exist); see also Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary 
Thoughts, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1833, 1836, 1838 (2011) (noting that by entering into a retainer 
agreement, an agent owes a duty of loyalty to clients with respect to actions within the 
representation’s scope and could be sued if she breaches her fiduciary duty). 
 172.  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (prohibiting procedural rules from abridging, enlarging, or 
modifying any substantive right). 
 173.  Burch, supra note 41, at 132. 
 174.  For further arguments as to lead lawyers’ fiduciary obligations, see Silver, supra note 
170, at 1987– 91. 
 175.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600, 606, 626–28 (1997). 
 176.  2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, §§ 7.1.3.1, 7.1.7; 2013 DePuy ASR 
Settlement, supra note 146, §§ 7.1.3.1, 7.1.7. 
 177.  Jones v. GN Netcom, Inc. (In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.), 654 F.3d 935, 
947–48 (9th Cir. 2011); Sylvester v. CIGNA Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 34, 47 (D. Me. 2005) (noting 
“the reverter clause and clear sailing clause raise a presumption of unfairness”); BARBARA J. 
ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR 
JUDGES 13, 20 (2005); Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the 
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 
617, 631 (2010). 
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Propulsid used them.178 When reversion clauses are paired with 
stringent claims-filing procedures and attorneys’ fees are calculated 
using the fund’s initial size—not claimants’ benefit—self-dealing 
concerns increase.179 As Justice O’Connor recognized in the class-
action context, allowing judges to base attorneys’ fees on a fund’s 
sticker price would “decouple class counsel’s financial incentives from 
those of the class, increasing the risk that the actual distribution will 
be misallocated between attorney’s fees and the plaintiffs’ recovery.”180 
This can, she explained, “undermine the underlying purposes of class 
actions by providing defendants with a powerful means to entic[e] 
class counsel to settle lawsuits in a manner detrimental to the 
class.”181 Without Rule 23’s regulatory safeguards, the practice is even 
more troubling.182 
In sum, Propulsid’s designers were right. Their deal did 
become a template for future cases, and it was remarkable. But the 
remarkable things about the agreement were the ways in which it 
perfected the shift toward considering clients as inventories and 
entities instead of individuals, flaunted ethical rules (ceasing to 
represent non-settling clients seems to violate Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.16, and attorney advertising restrictions risk 
violating Rule 5.6(b)), and reduced competition.183 
B. Lead Lawyers Bargain for Common-Benefit Fees 
Propusid’s design likewise kick started a trend of expertly 
wedding plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interest in collecting fees to the 
 
 178.  Supra notes 112–123, 176 and accompanying text. By contrast, no amount of the $56.9 
million in the Yaz ATE settlement could revert to the defendant. Yaz ATE Settlement, supra 
note 139, § 4.01(F). 
 179.  In re Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 947 (“Moreover the settlement also contained a 
‘kicker’: all fees not awarded would revert to defendants rather than be added to the cy pres fund 
or otherwise benefit the class.”); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 
2004) (noting the questionable nature of allowing unclaimed funds to revert to the putative 
wrongdoer); NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 12:29 (5th ed. 2013) (“[B]ecause class counsel’s fees 
may be pegged to the size of the fund made available (prior to reversion), a reversionary fund 
may be a warning that counsel has undersold the class’s claims.”). 
 180.  Int’l Precious Metals Corp. v. Walters, 530 U.S. 1223, 1223 (2000) (O’Connor, J., 
statement respecting denial of certiorari). 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  See supra notes 112–123 and accompanying text. 
 183.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16, 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (terminating the 
lawyer-client relationship and restricting the right to practice respectively); ABA Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 93-371 (1993); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 102, at 
284–92. See generally David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 913, 923–34 (1998) (likening absent class members to entities). 
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defendant’s closure goal: without convincing one’s entire client roster 
to settle, the defendant’s required claimant-participation rate would 
fail, the deal would collapse, and fees would disappear. Requiring 
attorneys to become signatories and to treat their clients as an entity 
means that attorneys’ financial interests are intertwined with the 
deal’s success. For lead lawyers, the stakes are even higher. In 
addition to their clients’ contingency fees, they stand to gain common-
benefit fees from the entire group. 
To fund massive lawsuits, lead lawyers must front substantial 
resources to cover things like expert and administrative costs and the 
costs of taking depositions and creating document repositories. To do 
this, they pool their money into a fund. As such, some common-benefit 
payments are better viewed as reimbursing leaders for these costs. As 
in any contingent fee case, when litigation proves less successful than 
they’d hoped, recoveries may not cover those expenses.184 But in 
successful litigation, when leaders settle their own cases, they (like 
others) will have to pay a percentage of their clients’ gross settlement 
proceeds into the fund. For leaders, that money will eventually 
transfer from one pocket to the other at the same rate (unless the 
judge awards them less of a common-benefit fee), but collecting 
attorneys’ fees from other cases can generate significant income. 
Because fees are judicially imposed, information about them is 
more readily available. Table 2 includes information from the thirty 
(of the seventy-three) products-liability and sales-practice 
multidistrict litigations that concluded in non-class settlements 
(either as inventory settlements or holistic aggregate settlements),185 
even where the settlements were not publicly available. The totals in 
the final row indicate the prevalence of each fee practice. All 
proceedings taxed some state-court litigants. Plaintiffs’ leadership in 
88.8 percent of the proceedings with publicly available settlements 
negotiated some aspect of their common-benefit fee with the 
defendant. While 36.6 percent of the proceedings included at least one 
objection, that number is somewhat misleading for the most objectors 
were either lead lawyers complaining about their cut of the common-
benefit fund allocations or attorneys concerned about taxing state 
cases. 
 
 184.  Not all proceedings are profitable and leaders’ out-of-pocket costs may exceed their 
return. E.g., Consent Order Authorizing Final Disbursement from Common Benefit Fund 
Account, In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01845-TWT (N.D. Ga. 
Aug. 15, 2014) (noting that the executive committee expended far more in out-of-pocket costs 
than was deposited into the common-benefit fund). 
 185.  Information from the Asbestos litigation was not included since the early docket entries 
are not electronically available. 
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This convergence of fee-pricing practices is significant in 
thinking through potential implications of cartel-like collusion across 
multidistrict proceedings.186 Although the law punishes only explicit 
collusion, game theory recognizes that when cartel members have 
shared beliefs of how others will react to their behavior, it can have 
real-world social and financial costs.187 When used alongside credible 
punishment mechanisms, members’ shared understanding can sustain 
a self-enforcing, collusive equilibrium.188 Put simply, this 
understanding becomes the new profit-maximizing norm, despite its 
self-dealing nature. Accordingly, the following sections explain how 
certain practices deviate from a well-accepted restitutionary theory of 
fees, and how leaders’ self-interest in maximizing common-benefit fees 
can breach their fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs and endanger 
adequate representation. 
 
TABLE 2: COMMON-BENEFIT FEE PRACTICES OCCURRING IN 
PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDING WITH NON-CLASS AGGREGATE 



























































































































1355 Propulsid No No Yes, directly Yes, if state-court 
judge orders or 




1431 Baycol No No Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via court order No 
1507 Prempro No No Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via 
participation agmt  
Yes 
1657 Vioxx Yes Yes Yes Yes, via 




1742 Ortho Evra Yes Yes Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via 
participation agmt  
Yes 
 
 186.  See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 33–36 (1984) (observing that 
in repeated games, the players are more likely to reach the cooperative, joint-maximizing 
solution). 
 187.  HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, §§ 4.3, 4.4 (noting that adhering to “a common law concept 
of ‘agreement’ . . . makes little sense in the context of strategic behavior among competing 
firms”); Ayres, supra note 168, at 296–97. 
 188.  Ayres, supra note 168, at 296–97. 
        



























































































































1763 Human Tissue No No Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via participation 
agmt  (could exclude 
state cases with a 
promise not to use 
common-work 
product in them) 
No 
2243 Fosamax No Yes Yes Yes, via participation 
agmt  and settlement 
agmt  
No 






No order available No 
1842 Kugel Mesh Hernia 
Patch 
No No Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via participation 




1845 ConAgra Peanut 
Butter 
No No Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, if counsel 
consents or if 
plaintiff received a 
tangible benefit 
Yes 
1871 Avandia No No Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via participation 
agmt  
Yes 
1909 Gadolinium Contrast 
Dyes 
No Yes* Confidential 
settlement  
Yes, via participation 
agmt  
No 
1928 Trasylol No No Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via participation 
agmt  
Yes 
1943 Levaquin Yes No Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via court order No 
1953 Heparin No Yes Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via participation 
agmt  
No 




2004 Mentor Corp  
ObTape 
No No Confidential 
settlement 





Yes Yes Confidential 
settlement 
Yes, via participation 
agmt , or by 
benefitting from 
MDL work product 
No 
2100 Yasmin & Yaz 
(Drospirenone) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes, via participation 
agmt  and settlement 
agmt  
No 
2158 Zimmer Durom Hip 
Cup 
No No Yes Yes, via settlement 






2187 C R  Bard, Inc  Pelvic 
Repair Sys  
No Yes* Confidential 
settlements 
Yes, via participation 






2197 DePuy ASR Hip 
Implant 
Yes Yes Yes Yes, via settlement 
agmt  subjecting 





 189  Judge Goodwin presides over five technically separate pelvic-mesh proceedings; some 
objections are filed in one proceeding, but pertain to all. None appear on this proceeding’s docket. 
        



























































































































2299 Actos (Pioglitazone) No No Yes Yes, court order 
covered payments 
made by defendants 




2325 American Medical 
Systems  
No Yes* Partially  
confidential 
settlements  
Yes, via participation 






2326 Boston Scientific 
Corp  Pelvic Repair 
Sys  
No Yes* Confidential 
settlements 
Yes, via participation 












Yes, via participation 














No common benefit 
order–cases brought 
by one law firm 
No 
2391 Biomet Magnum Hip 
Implant 
No No Yes, directly Yes, by signing 
motion or seeking 
compensation, and 
by settlement agmt  
No 
2385 Pradaxa No Yes Kept confidential Yes, by seeking 
compensation 
Yes 
2387 Coloplast Corp  
Pelvic Support Sys  










Of the proceedings 
with publicly 
available 
settlements, 88 8% 
negotiated fees 
with defendant (8 
of 9) 
100% taxed state-
court attorneys in 
some form;  
88 8% of proceedings 
with publicly 
available settlements 
(8 of 9) did so by 
negotiating with 
defendants 
36 6% had 
known 
objections  
*Escalating percentages were not specified in the order, but the judge noted that 
attorneys who did not sign participation agreements may be subject to increased 
assessments. 
 
 190  Supra note 189. 
 191  Supra note 189. 
 192  Supra note 189. 
 193  Supra note 189. 
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1. Using Early Bird Discounts and Summary Fee Increases 
When lead lawyers ask the judge to create a common-benefit 
fund, the percentages are often modest. As Table 2 shows, however, at 
least twenty-three percent of lead attorneys have found ways—
through court orders or settlement—to increase that assessment and 
maximize profits as the litigation progresses. In Chantix,194 
Yasmin/Yaz,195 DePuy ASR,196 and Levaquin,197 leadership requested 
and received court-ordered fee increases without opposition.198 When 
leaders made the same request in NuvaRing, one attorney did object, 
but only as to his allocation as a steering committee member.199 
Lead lawyers in Vioxx went one step further: they used 
settlement to contract around the court’s three-percent common-
benefit fund and raise it to eight percent.200 Yet, unlike most examined 
 
 194.  In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-02039-IPJ (N.D. Ala. Dec. 
18, 2012) (order). 
 195.  In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill., June 23, 2014) (case management order 63 supplement to 
case management order no. 14,); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. May 16, 2014) (order granting 3315 
Motion for Relief); In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-02039-IPJ (N.D. 
Ala. Dec. 18, 2012) (order). 
 196.  In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-
02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2014) (amending Case Management Order No. 13); In re DePuy 
Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 
28, 2011) (case management order no. 1 at 5). 
 197.  In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 0:08-md-01943-JRT (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2013) 
(second amended pretrial order no. 3) (setting fees at 9.5 percent); In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 0:08-md-01943-JRT (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2009) (pretrial order no. 3) (declining to set a 
fee percentage). 
 198.  In Baycol, the last available order on fees indicated a six percent holdback. In re Baycol 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 0:01-md-01431-MJD-SER (D. Minn. Mar. 1, 2011) (pretrial order 166, 
closure of MDL 1431 Fee and Cost Account (Common Benefit Fund)). One attorney has, however, 
indicated that “Baycol began at 4%, and was recently increased to 8%–12%.” Motion of Plaintiffs’ 
Executive Committee for Third Amendment to Case Management Order No. 9 at 4, In re Ortho 
Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2008). 
 199.  Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough’s Objections to Special Master’s Recommendation for 
Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS 
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 2014); In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-MD-1964 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 
2011) (amended case management order no. 3). In Pradaxa, the judge addressed the entry and 
subsequent withdrawal of objections by four firms on December 11, 2014 to distribution of 
common-benefit funds. These objections are no longer available on the docket. However, in Judge 
Herndon’s order, he states that all of the plaintiffs’ firms are currently in agreement over the 
distribution of funds as of January 20, 2015. In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Products 
Liability Litigation, No. 3:12-md-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2015) (order concerning 
distribution of common-benefit fees and expenses).  
 200.  Vioxx Settlement, supra note 126, § 9.2.1; In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-
01657-EFF-DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005) (pretrial order no. 19). 
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cases, the carte blanche revision incited numerous objections.201 
Accordingly, the judge appointed a Liaison Counsel, which eventually 
persuaded leaders to decrease their request to 7.5 percent.202 
Nevertheless, the judge reduced the award to 6.5 percent—still a 
notable raise from the initial three percent.203 
Finally, 46.6 percent of the proceedings in the data escalated 
common-benefit fees based on how quickly individual counsel agreed 
to them.204 For example, Ortho Evra initially levied fees and costs at 
three percent and raised them to five for those who waited, but the 
court later eliminated the discount.205 The court increased the tax 
from three to six percent, applied it to all pending cases (early birds 
too), and ruled that if newly filed or transferred cases failed to sign up 
on time, then the fee would jump to eight percent.206 Plainly, the point 
was to incentivize prompt buy-in. 
The practice of escalating common-benefit fees is troubling in 
two respects. First, judges typically issue these orders early in the 
 
 201.  In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646–47 (E.D. La. 2010); Silver, 
supra note 170, at 2001–02 . 
 202.  Vioxx, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 646–47. 
 203.  Id. at 655. On total fees and costs, see In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:05-
md-01657-EFF-DEK (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2013) (pretrial order no. 51(A)) (awarding $40,000 in 
costs plus $214,944.60 to liaison counsel); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2:05-md-01657-EFF-
DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 9, 2011) (order and reasons) (awarding $315,250,000.00 in attorneys’ fees); 
In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2:05-md-01657-EFF-DEK (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2009) (pretrial order 
no. 51 on disbursement of costs) (awarding $40,049,748.16 in costs plus $500,000 to liaison 
counsel).  
 204.  In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Products Liability Litigation, No. 3:12-md-02385-
DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2012) (case management order no. 16 (establishing common-benefit 
fee and expense fund)); In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2010) (case management order no. 14 
(establishing Common Benefit Fee and Expense Fund) at 3–4); In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010) (case management order no. 17 at 3–4); 
Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion for Creation 
of a Common Benefit Fund at 11, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2009) (requesting a ten percent total assessment for those who waited until 
settlement); In re Heparin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-hc-60000-JGC (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2008) 
(pretrial order no. 6 common benefit order); Participation Agreement, In re Gadolinium-Based 
Contrast Agents Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-gd-50000-DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2009) (noting 
that those who do not sign the participation agreement “may be subject to an increased 
assessment on all GBCA cases in which they have a fee interest”). Later amendments to the 
pretrial order removed the escalating fees based on the timing of consent. See In re Heparin 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-hc-60000 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2008) (first amended pretrial order no. 6 
common benefit order). 
 205.  In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio July 23, 2009) 
(third amended case management order no. 9). 
 206.  Id.  
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litigation.207 This may induce quick consent by participating attorneys, 
but it does nothing to incentivize faithful agency by the steering 
committee. In fact, it does precisely the opposite, particularly when 
the order is designed to enlist competing state-court lawyers. 
Professor Richard Nagareda’s observation on this point in the class 
context holds true here as well: “What high-value damage claimants 
need is not so much a ‘day in court’ as the prospect of a different 
bargaining agent whose self-interest is not tied up with the sale of 
[plaintiffs’] rights en masse so as to achieve maximum [closure].”208 
Demanding early assent to the monopoly power by escalating fees or 
summarily increasing fees during the litigation does no such thing. 
Rather, it reduces the number of bargaining agents who might push 
their clients’ cases toward trial in state court or postpone their consent 
until they can decide whether the negotiated settlement benefits their 
clients. Put simply, this practice reduces the prospect of a market-
based check on lead lawyers’ fees and results. 
Second, increasing common-benefit fees for latecomers is at 
odds with the purpose of a common-benefit fund, which is predicated 
on unjust enrichment. Without a fund, non-lead attorneys might 
prefer to free ride on leaders’ efforts, cash in on any resulting 
settlement, and pocket the windfall. Unjust enrichment thwarts this 
scenario when leaders confer a benefit, meaning that judges should 
tailor fees to the benefit conferred.209 An escalating rate based on the 
timing of the attorney’s consent may in no way approximate that 
benefit; those who sign-up early may actually benefit more from 
leaders’ efforts since they can access discovery materials and 
independently assess acceptable settlement terms. 
2. Expanding Fees to State-Court Litigants 
Lead lawyers have not limited their fees to the confines of 
federal jurisdiction. They have uniformly expanded their tax base and 
raised the costs of competing by enveloping state-court claimants 
through either “voluntary” participation agreements like those in fifty-
three percent of the cases (e.g., Prempro,210 Human Tissue,211 
 
 207.  For example, the Panel consolidated Fosamax on August 18, 2006. In re Fosamax 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2006) (MDL transfer order). 
Judge Keenan granted lead lawyers’ common-benefit fund request on January 5, 2010, and the 
master settlement agreement is dated March 24, 2014. 
 208.  Nagareda, supra note 1, at 168. 
 209.  Burch, supra note 41, at 102–09. 
 210.  Including state court litigants led to the following tally of fees and costs. In re Prempro 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv-01507-BRW (E.D. Ark. Sept. 28, 2015) (order) (awarding 
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Ethicon,212 and American Medical Systems213) or settlement 
provisions.214 Some judges, like the one in ConAgra Peanut Butter, 
have been more cautious and assessed (without a participation 
agreement) only those state litigators who consent or plaintiffs who 
“received a tangible benefit” from leaders efforts,215 while others (as in 
Kugel Mesh) have worried that using substantial benefit as a metric 
may over-extend their jurisdiction to include unfiled claims.216 Still 
others, like the judge in Levaquin, have changed their orders over the 
course of litigation—moving from expressly taxing state plaintiffs 
whose lawyer also has pending cases in the multidistrict proceeding, 
to stating generally that the assessment obligation “attaches to cases, 
claims, or attorneys within the full scope and extent” of the court’s 
jurisdiction.217 
 
$852,746.63); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv-01507-BRW (E.D. Ark. Sept. 9, 2015) 
(order) (awarding $1,035,000); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv-01507-CRW (E.D. 
Ark. Aug. 1, 2014) (order) (awarding $64,581,093); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:03-cv-
01507-BRW (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2014) (order) (granting a total of $9,693,687.06 in costs and 
fees). 
 211.  In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:06-cv-00135-WJM-MF (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 
2006) (pretrial order no. 4) (providing a “limited waiver option” that allowed litigants to pay six 
percent, but promise not to use the work product in related state-court cases). 
 212.  In re Ethicon, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md-02327 (S.D. W. 
Va. Jan. 15, 2016) (pretrial order # 211 (order establishing criteria for applications to MDL 2327 
fund to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed and expenses incurred for 
MDL administration and common benefit and appointment of common benefit fee and cost 
committee)). 
 213.  E.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., Pelvic Repair Systems Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md-
02325 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2016) (pretrial order no. 204 (order establishing criteria for 
applications to MDL 2325 fund to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed 
and expenses incurred for MDL administration and common benefit and appointment of common 
benefit fee and cost committee) at 6–7); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 2:12-md-02325 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 26, 2013) (pretrial order. no. 77 (agreed order 
establishing MDL 2325 fund to compensate and reimburse attorneys for services performed and 
expenses incurred for MDL administration and common benefit)). 
 214.  See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 101, at 231 (“[V]irtually all antitrust issues not 
involving collaboration (or merger) among competitors are best analyzed by asking whether they 
unjustifiably confer on one party the power to raise price by raising its rivals’ costs.”). 
 215.  In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01845-TWT (N.D. Ga. 
Apr. 7, 2009) (order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motion for the establishment 
of a common-benefit fund). 
 216.  In re Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01842-ML-LDA (D.R.I. 
Nov. 19, 2009) (memorandum and order). 
 217.  Compare In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 0:08-md-01943-JRT (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 
2009) (pretrial order #3 on plaintiffs’ common-benefit fund, common cost fund, contingent fee 
appointments, fee and cost sharing, time and expense reporting) (expressly taxing state plaintiffs 
whose lawyers also have pending MDL cases), with In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 0:08-
md-01943-JRT (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2013) (second amended pretrial order #3 on plaintiffs’ common 
expense fund for reimbursement of common-benefit costs only) (stating that the assessment 
obligation attaches to cases, claims, and attorneys). 
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Although taxing state litigants has proven thorny for judges 
and far more objectionable to the litigating lawyers,218 the practice has 
not waned. It continues to curb state courts’ potential use as a 
competitive check on the federal proceeding, for rational attorneys are 
unlikely to heavily invest in developing state cases or in novel theories 
of liability only to have their recoveries taxed by federal leaders. 
In 2011, the court in NuvaRing cited its jurisdiction over the 
attorneys practicing before it as a means to levy the common-benefit 
tax on settling state-court plaintiffs who used the same lawyers.219 
The order explicitly included attorneys practicing in “New Jersey 
State Court or any other state” with at least one case in the transferee 
court.220 That hook then ensnared “all cases, including un-filed 
cases.”221 The order also extended to attorneys who received any of the 
steering committee’s work product.222 Consequently, when lead 
lawyers negotiated the master settlement, there was no need to use it 
to bait state-court plaintiffs into paying common-benefit fees—the 
court’s order did it for them. 
A similar proposed order in DePuy ASR aimed to “assess all 
cases . . . regardless of whether any substantive benefit was conferred 
by the PSC.”223 But some state lawyers balked: they had already 
created a document repository with 12.5 million pages of discovery, 
retained experts, and were prepared to litigate their clients’ claims 
without any help from federal leaders.224 Citing precedent from the 
Genetically Modified Rice litigation, where the judge declined to order 
state-court litigants to contribute to a common-benefit fund, the 
attorneys argued the transferee court lacked jurisdiction over them.225 
Nevertheless, the court applied its order to all plaintiffs’ attorneys and 
their law firms who represented a client in the multidistrict 
 
 218.  E.g., In re Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01842-ML-LDA 
(D.R.I. Sept. 2, 2009) (sur-reply memorandum of Johnson Law Firm plaintiffs in further support 
of partial objection to motion for entry of an assessment order in MDL 1842) (objecting to the 
assessment of state court plaintiffs). 
 219.  In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2011) 
(amended case management order no. 3 at 2–3) (establishing Common Benefit Order). 
 220.  Id. at 3–4. 
 221.  Id. at 4. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Plaintiff’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Executive and Steering Committees’ Motion for 
Entry of a Common Benefit Order at 4, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2011). 
 224.  Id.  
 225.  In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06 MD 1811 CDP, 2010 WL 716190, at *9–
11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2010) (memorandum and order) (creating a common-benefit fund).  
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proceeding.226 When the leaders in DePuy ASR later requested 
common-benefit fees, they did so under seal,227 presumably to avoid 
further objections and public scrutiny. 
Although the DePuy ASR court never received additional 
objections, its implied rationale (and the explicit rationale given in 
NuvaRing) has gradually eroded. Lead lawyers in the Genetically 
Modified Rice litigation contracted around the judge’s decision not to 
include state-court litigants through settlement. When challenged, 
they argued the NuvaRing theory: that the federal court needed 
jurisdiction over only the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the defendant—not 
the plaintiffs themselves.228 But the Eighth Circuit disagreed: “Even if 
the same plaintiffs’ attorneys participated in the MDL, the district 
court overseeing the MDL does not have authority over separate 
disputes between state-court plaintiffs and [the defendant].”229 
More recently, in litigation over Avandia’s common-benefit 
fees, the Third Circuit agreed with this core rationale—that district 
courts cannot require attorneys who litigate solely in state court to 
pay federal leadership fees.230 But courts can enforce participation 
agreements that they require attorneys to sign if the attorney hopes to 
access any of the federal work product.231 At best, this is jurisdictional 
bootstrapping. The Avandia order assessed fees for all Avandia claims 
in which an attorney who signed a participation agreement had a fee 
interest, “regardless of whether those claims are subject to the 
jurisdiction of MDL 1871.”232 So, a law firm that represented a few 
clients in the multidistrict proceeding but filed most suits in state 
courts (twenty-five and four thousand, respectively in the objector’s 
 
 226.  In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-
02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2011) (case management order no. 13). 
 227.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Under Seal, In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., ASR 
Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2015). 
 228.  In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig. Settlement, MDL No. 1811, §§ 8.1.1, 8.1.2 (MDL 
settlement agreement). 
 229.  Phipps Grp. v. Downing (In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig.), 764 F.3d 864, 874 (8th 
Cir. 2014). The judge has now certified a class composed of those lead lawyers, other law firms, 
and clients who paid for common benefit services and expenses that is suing objectors for unjust 
enrichment. See Downing v. Goldman Phipps PLLC, No. 4:13CV206 CDP, 2015 WL 4255342, at 
*7–8 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2015). 
 230.  In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 617 F. App’x 136, 141 (3d 
Cir. 2015). For the total fees and costs awarded, see In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 07-md-01871, 2012 WL 6923367, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2002) (awarding 
$143,750,000 as 6.25 percent of the estimated value of the settlements and $10,050,000 for 
future administrative fees and expenses). 
 231.  In re Avandia, 617 F. App’x at 141; see also In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-2990, 2016 WL 4010439, *2–5 (3d Cir. July 27, 2016). 
 232.  In re Avandia, 617 F. App’x at 139. 
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case) had to pay common-benefit fees for all clients, which deters firms 
from investing in and developing competing state-court suits.233 
In Avandia, the defendant used an ad hoc settlement strategy 
without a master settlement,234 but global deals allow lead lawyers to 
circumvent these jurisdictional problems. By inserting fee provisions 
into a master settlement, plaintiffs (and their counsel) who want to 
settle must also “consent” to leadership’s common-benefit fee. This 
allows lead attorneys—with the defendant’s blessing—to reach 
settling state-court plaintiffs who would otherwise fall outside of the 
federal court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, eighty percent of proceedings 
(eight of ten—Propulsid I & II,235 Vioxx,236 Fosamax,237 Biomet,238 
Yasmin/Yaz,239 Actos,240 DePuy ASR I & II,241 and Zimmer Durom Hip 
Cup242) with publicly available non-class settlements used those 
agreements to subject all settling plaintiffs to the transferee judge’s 
fee assessment. The two that did not insert fees into settlements 
included NuvaRing and American Medical Systems, both of which had 
broad court orders that already covered state plaintiffs.243 
Of those that used settlements to reach state-court plaintiffs, 
two stand out. First, in Fosamax, if a lawyer waited until settlement 
to agree to the common-benefit tax (as many state-court attorneys 
would), then the court’s order increased the tax from six to nine 
percent.244 Second, in Zimmer Durom Hip Cup, the judge expressly 
 
 233.  Although the objecting firm, Girardi Keese, petitioned for Supreme Court review, the 
request was denied. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Girardi Keese Law Firm v. Plaintiffs’ 
Advisory Comm., No. 15-704, 2015 WL 7713601 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2015); Amanda Bronstad, Girardi 
Keese Loses SCOTUS Bid in Avandia Fee Fight, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 29, 2016), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202750967854/Girardi-Keese-Loses-SCOTUS-Bid-in-
Avandia-Fee-Fight?slreturn=20160913080025 [https://perma.cc/JLT3-UA2Q]. 
 234.  Avandia Lawsuit, DRUGWATCH (May 16, 2016), http://www.drugwatch.com/Avandia/ 
lawsuit.php [https://perma.cc/4N8P-PB67]. 
 235.  Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 9(A); Second MDL Program Term Sheet 
§ 9(A), In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2005). 
 236.  Vioxx Settlement, supra note 126, § 9.2.1. 
 237.  Fosamax Settlement, supra note 129, ¶ 14. 
 238.  Settlement Agreement § 10(b), In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Biomet Settlement]. 
 239.  Yaz ATE Settlement, supra note 139, § 4.01(B), (C); Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra 
note 139, § 1.03 (subjecting accepting state-court participants to the MDL court’s jurisdiction and 
presumably its fee awards). 
 240.  Actos Settlement, supra note 148, § 10.04. 
 241.  2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, § 4.1.8; 2013 DePuy ASR Settlement, 
supra note 146, § 4.1.8. 
 242.  Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 150, § V.C. 
 243.  Supra notes 213, 219–223. 
 244.  In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010) 
(case management order no. 17 establishing plaintiffs’ common defense fund at 3–4). For the 
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struck proposed language in the common-benefit order that taxed 
state-court litigants.245 But leaders then contracted around this 
restriction via settlement and included a provision that unilaterally 
taxed all settling plaintiffs four percent.246 The court then ratified the 
workaround in two ways: (1) by ordering all multidistrict plaintiffs to 
participate in the settlement’s mediation process, comply with its 
deadlines, or face dismissal;247 and (2) by requiring all participating 
lawyers to register all their cases (filed or unfiled, in state or federal 
court).248 The result was that lead lawyers effectively used their 
bargaining authority with the defendant to expand both the federal 
court’s jurisdiction and leaders’ fee base to include settling state-court 
cases and unfiled claims. 
3. Negotiating Common-Benefit Fees with the Defendant 
Anytime lead lawyers negotiate aspects of their fees with the 
defendant, they raise concerns about self-dealing.249 Contingent fees 
are designed to increase proportionally alongside a plaintiff’s 
recovery—to tie the fates of lawyer and client. When leaders take 
things one step further and bargain for the defendant to pay their 
common-benefit fees directly, they sever that tie. As a result, the 
attorneys’ financial self-interest may no longer be linked to their 
clients’ outcome, but to the defendant’s wishes.250 
Despite these self-dealing concerns, this is precisely what lead 
lawyers did in both Biomet and Propulsid. In Propulsid, lead lawyers 
asked the court to ratify the fees they negotiated directly with the 
 
total calculation of fees and costs, see In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-
JCF (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2015) (case management order no. 21 concerning release of common-
benefit funds); Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Memorandum in Support of its Consent Motion 
for Distribution of Common Benefit Funds, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-
01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2015) (noting that contributions, costs, and held costs would 
constitute most of the fund, $2,426,126 of $2,459,475). For awards to plaintiffs see Declaration of 
Timothy M. O’Brien ¶ 6, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2015). 
 245.  In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-cv-04414-SDW-MCA (D.N.J. 
Jan. 21, 2011) (case management order 3: order establishing common-benefit fund). 
 246.  Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 150, § V.C. 
 247.  In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414-SDW-SCM (D.N.J. 
May 13, 2016) (case management order regarding settlement agreement). 
 248.  Zimmer Durom Settlement, supra note 150, § I.B. 
 249.  Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 134. 
 250.  This concern has long been recognized as one of structural collusion in the class 
context. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 
625, 647–48 (1987). Courts have agreed. E.g., Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 
1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1999). For an excellent analysis of the problem in multidistrict litigation, see 
Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 133–34. 
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defendant by citing common benefit as a supporting rationale.251 
Unjust enrichment lies at the heart of common-benefit awards.252 As 
such, fees must come out of that benefit (the fund), not directly from 
the defendant. And the work must benefit the claimants. In Propulsid, 
only thirty-seven of 6,012 (0.6 percent) claimants received no more 
than $6.5 million collectively; the strict claims process extinguished 
the rest.253 Yet, lead lawyers collected over $27 million in “common-
benefit” fees,254 vividly illustrating the worry that a defendant might 
negotiate higher fees in exchange for less relief to claimants.255 
By contrast, the Biomet outcome initially appears less 
troubling. Lead lawyers negotiated a $6 million fee directly with the 
defendant via a separate agreement contingent on fulfilling the 
plaintiff-participation percentages, as well as a five-percent fee 
assessment (plus one percent for costs).256 But the court’s order 
required them to accept the lesser of the two—not both.257 In their fee 
request, lead lawyers noted that $6 million was the lesser award given 
that the gross settlement award was $144.3 million, five percent of 
 
 251.  Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee’s Motion for Award of 
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs at 12, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-
md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. May 3, 2005). 
 252.  Burch, supra note 41, at 102–04; Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ 
Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 663–66 (1991). 
 253.  This number does not include the 2,059 claimants who enrolled in the program and had 
their claims extinguished but did not submit claim forms. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Distribution of Attorney’s Fees at 5 and Ex. B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-
01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); see Joint Report No. 97 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ 
Liaison Counsel, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. July 
31, 2012). The totals added in the text are not, of course, in the Joint Report, but derived from 
numbers provided in that and previous reports. 
 254.  In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 
2014) (order); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2, 
2005) (order); Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final 
Distribution of Remaining Funds (MDL Settlement Program), In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2014); Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Distribution of Attorney’s Fees at 5, Ex. B (Re: MDL Settlement Program II), In re Propulsid 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); Propulsid I 
Settlement, supra note 104, § 19. 
 255.  Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 133. 
 256.  Motion for Payment of Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses from the Biomet 
Common Benefit MDL Assessment Fund ¶ 7, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015) (“Pursuant to a separately 
negotiated settlement agreement dated January 31, 2014, the Biomet Common Benefit 
Settlement Agreement (CBSA), Biomet will deposit an additional $6 million into the Biomet 
Common Benefit Attorney’s Fee Fund for the sole purpose of resolving the Common Benefit 
Attorney Fees associated with this litigation.”). 
 257.  In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-
CAN (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2014) (case management order establishing common-benefit fee and 
expense funds § 2(c)). 
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which made the common-benefit set aside $7.2 million.258 Moreover, 
they argued that $6 million was but 3.99 percent of the total 
settlement value—a figure “many objective parties” would cite as 
“being underpaid.”259 Leadership, however, “agree[d] that this amount 
is reasonable” because negotiating their fee with Biomet allowed “for 
100% return of the provisional 5% assessment to counsel and 
claimants alike.”260 
Biomet leaders appear generous. But lead lawyers apparently 
represented most settling claimants, for they had no cases left after 
the settlement, and the judge had to appoint a new steering 
committee.261 As such, the $6 million fee seems like a bonus at best 
(paid by the defendant presumably in exchange for something), or 
double dipping at worst. If leaders represented most claimants, a 
traditional set aside would simply take money from their contingent 
fee and pay it back to them in common-benefit fees. But accepting $6 
million directly from the defendant avoided that pocket-shifting 
charade and may have compensated lead lawyers again for work they 
had already agreed to perform under their clients’ initial retainer.262 
Common-benefit fees are supposed to compensate attorneys for the 
benefit they confer on others—not for work on their own cases.263 
Moreover, accepting payment from the defendant violates basic agency 
law, for side payments negotiated without client consent should be 
given directly to clients.264 
 
 258.  Motion for Payment of Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses from the Biomet 
Common Benefit MDL Assessment Fund ¶ 10, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015). 
 259.  Id. ¶ 18. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-
CAN (N.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2015) (order). 
 262.  Burch, supra note 41, at 132–33. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.02, 8.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
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C. Cartel-like Sanctions Suppress Dissent and Competition 
If lead lawyers are overreaching in settlement design, flouting 
ethical obligations, reducing non-leaders’ fees, and failing to consider 
conflicts, then why do non-lead attorneys rarely object?265 Most 
plaintiffs’ attorneys play the long game. Objecting in the face of 
judicially sanctioned cooperative norms and powerful repeat players 
can render them ineligible for future leadership roles and diminish 
their chances of receiving common-benefit work. 
In this way, plaintiffs’ leadership across multidistrict 
proceedings can act like oligopolies and cartels.266 Cartels punish 
defectors by imposing costs on them and denying them access.267 When 
attorneys become lead lawyers, they have the power to control access 
and inflict costs, too: they distribute common-benefit work to allies, 
use settlements to restrict attorney advertising and reduce attorney 
demand, suggest common-benefit fee allocations, and report 
uncooperative behavior to the judge—carrots and sticks, in other 
words, that impair rivals’ financial and leadership opportunities.268 
For example, when the judge in the DePuy ASR Hip Implant litigation 
appointed a fee committee comprised in part of several high-level 
repeat players—Chris Seeger, Pete Flowers, and Steve Skikos—they 
had the power and means to sanction, reward, and incentivize others, 
particularly those in the five other pending hip-implant 
proceedings.269 
Given the degree of specialization and capital contributions 
required to litigate multidistrict proceedings, the plaintiffs’ bar is 
relatively small. Attorneys work together frequently. As such, they 
 
 265.  Supra tbl.2. 
 266.  Leslie, supra note 15, at 587–90. 
 267.  HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, §§ 4.1, 4.1a3 (noting some similarities between cartels and 
oligopolies); Ayres, supra note 168, at 306–10. 
 268.  See Ayres, supra note 168, at 306–08 (discussing how cartels can punish through 
advertising); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 148 
(2005) (defining anticompetitive exclusionary conduct). Judges often appoint lead lawyers to fee 
allocation committees and solicit input on how to distribute attorneys’ fees. E.g., In re Vioxx 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. June 13, 2012) (order) 
(appointing lead lawyers to fee allocation committee). Power needn’t be equal among members; 
they must simply have enough authority to credibly threaten to punish defectors. See ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 179 n.42 (1991). 
 269.  In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 10-MD-
2197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2015) (case management order no. 25). Contemporaneously 
pending hip implant cases included Biomet (MDL No. 2391), DePuy ASR (MDL No. 2197), 
Zimmer Durom (MDL No. 2158), Wright Medical Technology (MDL No. 2329), DePuy Pinnacle 
(MDL. No. 2391), and Stryker Rejuvenate and ABG II Hip Implant Products Liability Litigation 
(MDL No. 13-2441) (consolidated on June 12, 2013). 
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form a close-knit group (though not necessarily one predicated on 
friendship)270 that may develop and enforce norms to maximize 
members’ collective welfare in current, concurrent, and future 
litigation.271 As repeat actors interact with one another regularly, they 
form dyadic relationships to others in the social network,272 which 
allows gossip and information about attorneys’ reputations and 
common practices to flow freely among them. This may give lawyers 
inside information about past payoffs and sanctions. Because 
information flows easily through the network, it increases the 
opportunities for both tacit and explicit collusion and enables leaders 
to credibly punish and reward others for following or disregarding 
norms.273 
Although off-the-record conversations with involved attorneys 
suggest social and financial sanctions are prevalent, they are 
nevertheless difficult to assess quantitatively. The best evidence is 
silence. These are, after all, the same attorneys who generate the 
robust literature on collateral attacks in class actions and partake in 
reverse auctions where defendants play them off of one another to 
achieve the lowest settlement price. News reports of infighting among 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, secret financial deals, payoffs, as well as occasional 
judicial opinions about fee disputes, just scratch the surface of their 
complex and often acrimonious relationships.274 Despite ample 
anecdotal conversations off-the-record, objectors rarely speak up 
 
 270.  “A group is close-knit when informal power is broadly distributed among group 
members and the information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them.” 
ELLICKSON, supra note 268, at 177–78. Moreover, these close-knit groups have social networks 
that allow for credible and reciprocal applications of power. Id. at 181. 
 271.  E.g., id. at 167–78. 
 272.  Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 16–23). 
 273.  See NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED 160–61 (2009) (noting 
how networks among boards of directors allow for collusion and market manipulation); 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 4.4a (distinguishing between tacit and express collusion with 
regard to oligopolies); Leslie, supra note 15, at 589–91, 598–99 (explaining trust-based networks 
and sanctions in cartels). 
 274.  E.g., Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & 
Herz, LLP, 601 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995–96 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (describing lawsuit between two 
plaintiffs’ firms over the alleged breach of a joint venture agreement in antitrust lawsuits); 
Emily Field, Atty Who Exposed GM Switch Defect Blasts Drivers’ Attys, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/750639/atty-who-exposed-gm-switch-defect-blasts-drivers-attys 
[https://perma.cc/KE66-ZRUJ] (chronicling allegations by one lead lawyer against co-lead counsel 
that they had made decisions based on their own financial interests and froze out other executive 
committee members in decisionmaking); Alison Frankel, Exposing Class Action Objectors: Lieff 
Cabraser, Ted Frank in ‘Lurid’ Dispute, REUTERS (June 22, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2015/06/22/exposing-class-action-objectors-lieff-cabraser-ted-frank-in-lurid-dispute/ 
[https://perma.cc/A9LM-FNAX] (chronicling the business relationship between nonprofit objector 
Ted Frank and for-profit plaintiffs’ lawyer, Christopher Bandas). 
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during leadership selection, even though being chosen generates 
significant fees. Nor do most attorneys object when lead lawyers ask 
the judge to increase their common-benefit fees midway through the 
litigation, even though it reduces individual attorneys’ profits.275 This 
silence speaks volumes. 
Policing group norms doesn’t just affect leadership 
appointments and compensation. Evidence from social science 
suggests that the conditions likely present in these leadership groups 
may infect substantive decisions, too. When reputation is important, 
group members tend to adjust their positions to tilt toward whatever 
the dominant member believes and are more likely to withhold 
opposition.276 Moreover, even when privy to unique information that 
others lack, lower-status members tend not to voice that information 
for fear of disapproval.277 Discussing shared information is safer; it 
leads others to view the member as more competent, credible, and 
knowledgeable.278 But attorneys have different expertise and diverse 
clients. When that information is not shared, representation is poorer 
because of its absence. 
D. What Then Do Plaintiffs Receive? 
Based on the limited non-class settlements available, there is 
reason to be concerned that when repeat players influence the 
practices and norms that govern multidistrict proceedings the results 
they obtain may principally benefit them at the plaintiffs’ expense, 
 
 275.  Several attorneys objected to the court creating a common-benefit fund in the ConAgra 
Peanut Butter litigation. The lead lawyers then mooted those objections by exempting the 
objectors from the assessment. In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-
01845-TWT (N.D. Ga. Apr. 7, 2009) (order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motion 
for the establishment of a common-benefit fund); Transcript of Proceedings at 26, In re ConAgra 
Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:07-md-01845-TWT (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2009). 
 276.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 26–27 
(2009). 
 277.  Id. at 28–29; see also Armin Faulk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Driving Forces 
Behind Informal Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETRICA 2017 (2005) (finding that cooperating group 
members impose the most severe sanctions on defectors and that retaliation is a driving factor 
behind fairness-driven informal sanctions); Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social 
Preferences Matter—the Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and 
Incentives, 112 ECON. J. C1, C2–C3 (2002); Michael Schrage, Daniel Kahneman: The Thought 
Leader Interview, 33 STRATEGY+BUSINESS 121, 124 (Winter 2003). Reciprocity and reputational 
concerns, along with trustworthiness, are most robust when people cooperate with one another 
over time in repeated interactions. Frans van Dijk et al., Social Ties in a Public Good 
Experiment, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 275, 291–92 (2002). 
 278.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 29. 
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particularly those plaintiffs with idiosyncratic claims.279 Leaders face 
systematic temptations at multiple points to serve themselves and act 
disloyally toward plaintiffs. As such, when repeat players collaborate, 
collectively maintain market power, and appear not to improve 
plaintiffs’ results, there is cause for concern.280 
Neither clients nor their attorneys freely consent to 
multidistrict litigation or the subsequent selection of lead counsel. In 
fact, many actively resist transfer; lawyers often push for the 
transferee court to remand their cases to their original court.281 This 
non-voluntary aspect makes selecting lead lawyers akin to appointing 
class counsel.282 But judges pay little attention to adequate 
representation on the front end—often appointing leaders before 
conflicts are known. And though plaintiffs have individually retained 
counsel (unlike all but the named plaintiff in class actions), that 
attorney has little to no control once the judge empowers the leaders. 
She cannot fire lead attorneys even when she feels they are not acting 
in her clients’ best interest, and she regains control of her clients’ suits 
only in the unlikely event of remand. Often, the most she can do is 
complain that the leaders have violated their fiduciary obligations to 
the whole group—a move that risks alienating her from receiving 
common-benefit work and future lead roles.283 
The checks and balances for ensuring adequate representation 
are likewise absent on the back end. Even though class settlements 
included coercive provisions as well,284 without a class, judges lack the 
explicit authority to ensure private non-class settlements are “fair, 
 
 279.  The practices I have described likewise have a significant impact on autonomy 
considerations that rest on an assumed right to decline a settlement. See Martin H. Redish & 
Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers 
of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 114 (2015) (raising due process concerns with 
multidistrict litigation even when individual litigants can “opt out” of a settlement). 
 280.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 163–
64 (2005) (“[A]ntitrust policy tolerates collaboration among competitors who collectively have 
market power only to the extent that it tends to reduce costs or improve products, and the firms 
pass at least some of these economic improvements on to consumers.”).  
 281.  E.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer, In re Bos. Sci. Corp. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 2:12-md-02326 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 19, 2016). 
 282.  See Redish & Karaba, supra note 279, at 110–11 (unfavorably contrasting due process 
protections under Rule 23 with those in multidistrict litigation). 
 283.  See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 234 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(“Whether or not there is a direct or formal attorney-client relationship between plaintiffs and 
the PSC, the PSC and its IRPA members necessarily owed a fiduciary obligation to the 
plaintiffs.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.22 (2004) (discussing the selection 
of lead counsel and fiduciary duties); Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 119–20 (noting the 
difficulties in challenging the selection of lead counsel).  
 284.  E.g., In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 354 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
For an in-depth overview of such provisions, see Nagareda, supra note 1, at 204–16. 
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reasonable, and adequate.”285 And lead lawyers have no incentive to 
raise conflicts. They profit from their own clients’ contingent fees and 
common-benefit fees—from representing as many people as possible—
not from recognizing divergent interests. Their common-benefit fees 
are typically measured by the time they spend litigating, not by 
plaintiffs’ recoveries or the benefits obtained. Put simply, leaders’ 
compensation destroys the contingent fee’s simple beauty: when 
functioning properly, contingent fees align the financial interests of 
attorneys and clients, preventing the need for expensive monitoring. 
But multidistrict litigation instills monopolistic control in leaders’ 
hands, severs the contingent-fee link for their common-fund 
compensation, and then inhibits monitoring by allowing lead 
attorneys to operate in secret away from the watchful eye of non-lead 
lawyers.286 
Collateral attacks, attorney malpractice actions, and appeals 
are not much help either. Even though class actions can be 
problematic too, at least non-class counsel stood to gain from soliciting 
a sub-segment of a previously certified class, filing a new case, and 
contending that preclusion didn’t apply because of inadequate 
representation. But master settlements are predicated on client 
consent, which can blanket the host of wrongs that preceded it: to 
enroll in a settlement, both clients and their individual attorneys must 
expressly waive all of their objections to both the settlement 
documents and the release of their claims.287 Conversely, those who do 
not settle have no standing to challenge the settlement’s terms and 
have few options other than trying to convince enough plaintiffs to 
hold out so as to trigger the walkaway clause. Even though attorney 
malpractice suits are still possible, they are unlikely since courts and 
commentators have interpreted the governing ethics rules 
inconsistently.288 Finally, as private deals, settlements are not 
appealable. And, on the off chance an appeal could occur, some judges 
have gone so far as to expressly waive parties’ ability to appeal 
through their common-benefit fund participation agreement.289 
 
 285.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 286.  E.g., In re DePuy ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 7, 2016) (sealed order no. 18) (granting sealed motion for common-benefit fees). 
 287.  E.g., 2015 DePuy ASR Settlement, supra note 146, at 22–23 (certification of counsel). 
 288.  Compare Tilzer v. Davis, Bethune & Jones, L.L.C., 204 P.3d 617, 628–30 (Kan. 2009) 
(finding evidence of an ethics violation in executing an aggregate settlement), with G.H. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 412 S.W.3d 326, 327–28, 327 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no violation under 
similar circumstances).  
 289.  E.g., In re C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2187 (S.D. W. 
Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (pretrial order no. 54 at 5–6): 
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Thus, few regulatory mechanisms exist to police the line 
between acceptable settlements that rational claimants should accept 
because the offer is simply too good to pass up, and those that they 
can’t refuse in the non-consensual “Godfather sense,” as Professor 
Richard Nagareda has described them.290 That is, some coercive 
settlement terms can be akin to a metaphorical gun to the head. 
Consequently, this Section considers the probable costs the absence of 
monitoring creates. 
1. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely to Receive the Peace Premium 
Because defendants need to end lawsuits to ease shareholders’ 
minds about future business prospects, delivering finality can unlock a 
“peace premium,” gains for plaintiffs that might not exist otherwise.291 
But with no accountability, repeat players may be tempted to design 
mutually beneficial deals that allow them to reap the peace 
premium—not the plaintiffs. 
Table 3 below gathers the available information about leaders’ 
common-benefit fees and costs and displays it alongside claimants’ 
recoveries for the non-class settlements occurring within the 
dataset.292 Some claimants fare better than others, and there are 
variables that are inherently unknown to outside researchers, such as 
how many weak claims might have flooded the litigation. But points of 
concern linger.293 Take Propulsid, for example: only 0.6 percent of 
 
Participating Counsel have (or will have) agreed to and therefore will be bound by the 
court’s determination on common benefit attorney fee awards, attorney fee 
allocations, and expense awards, and the Participating Counsel knowingly and 
expressly waive any right to appeal those decisions or the ability to assert the lack of 
enforceability of this Agreed Order or to otherwise challenge its adequacy. 
 290.  Richard Nagareda has written about class-action provisions extensively in these terms. 
See Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out 
Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 141. 
 291.  Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox 
of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 413–17 (2014); Nagareda, supra note 1, at 164; Rave, 
supra note 92, at 1192–98. 
 292.  Costs include reimbursement for money attorneys spent to litigate the suit. For 
information on the dataset, see supra Part I.A. 
 293.  Anecdotal evidence is rife with mistrust of the deals these lawyers create. See, e.g., 
Barry Meier, Frustration from a Deal on Flawed Hip Implants, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/business/frustration-from-a-deal-on-flawed-hip-implants 
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TE8L-ZVYK]: 
But some patients contend that the deal’s real winners are Johnson & Johnson and 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Those lawyers are set to receive about one-third of the 
settlement, or about $800 million. The single biggest chunk of those fees will go to the 
firms most involved with developing cases against Johnson & Johnson and 
negotiating the settlement; they will get a bonus of about $160 million. 
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claimants recovered money, totaling little more than $6.5 million.294 
Yet, leaders collected over $27 million in fees.295 If those claims lacked 
merit, as some believe,296 then judicially dismissing them earlier 
seems preferable to paying the leadership a premium to disserve their 
clients. The latter undermines contingent-fee principles, perpetuates 
public fears about attorneys getting rich while doing little for those 
they represent, and diminishes litigants’ faith in the judicial system. 
To be sure, Propulsid is an outlier in some respects, but its 
steering committee’s statement that it would serve as a template for 
future proceedings rang true. As Part II.A.1 illustrated, some aspect of 
the three closure provisions Propulsid introduced—attorney 
recommendation, attorney withdrawal, and walkaway clauses—were 
later replicated, in whole or in part, in all future settlements in the 
data.297 The full effects of that replication, however, are impossible to 
trace for some aspect of twenty-seven of the twenty-nine deals that 
followed it (ninety-three percent) remain confidential. From the data 
that is available, the low payout rates in Ortho Evra298 and 
 
 294.  This number does not include the 2,059 claimants who enrolled in the program and had 
their claims extinguished but did not submit claim forms. See Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees (Re: MDL Settlement Program II) at 5, Ex. B, In re 
Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-MD-1355 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); see also Joint Report No. 
97 of Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Liaison Counsel, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00-MD-
1355 (E.D. La. July 31, 2012). The totals added in the text are not in the Joint Report but are 
derived from numbers provided in that and previous reports. 
 295.  In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 
2014) (order); In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. June 2, 
2005) (order); Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Final 
Distribution of Remaining Funds, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-
KWR (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 2014); Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of Attorney’s 
Fees (Re: MDL Settlement Program II) at 5, Ex. B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:00-
md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012); Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 19. 
 296.  But see Melody Petersen, Jury Levies $100 Million Award Against Heartburn Drug 
Maker, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/30/us/jury-levies-100-
million-award-against-heartburn-drug-maker.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/BY67-GZV2] (“A 
Mississippi jury awarded $100 million in damages late Friday night to 10 people who said they 
had been injured by Propulsid, a heartburn drug that was taken from pharmacy shelves last 
year after it was linked to dozens of deaths.”). 
 297.  Burch & Williams, supra note 43 (manuscript at 42–43). 
 298.  On fees and costs awarded, see In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-
DAK (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2012) (order) (awarding $950,000 for post-label cases); In re Ortho 
Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio July 20, 2010) (order) (awarding 
$253,645.20 in expenses); In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. 
Ohio May 22, 2009) (order) (awarding $2,338,280.10 in expenses); In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio May 7, 2008) (order) (awarding $522,959.56 in 
expenses); and Memorandum in Support of PSC’s Motion for Reimbursement of Common Benefit 
Expenses at 2–3, In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio June 
28, 2010) (noting sealed amount awarded as $43,238.20 and requesting an additional 
$253,645.20). For payouts, see Transcript of Status Conference, In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. 
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NuvaRing299 are alarming when compared with common-benefit fees. 
Recovery rates appear higher in Vioxx,300 Biomet,301 Pradaxa,302 and 
perhaps Yaz/Yasmin,303 which is still pending, but it’s precisely the 
dearth of information for the remaining ninety-three percent that 
should trouble us most given how little regulation exists. Put simply, 
if the information that lead lawyers are willing to make visible so 
readily appears to enrich them and the defendants with whom they 
broker the deal, one is left to wonder what the private aspects must 
look like. Plainly, the concern is that the gains unlocked in exchange 
 
Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2009). As of March 31, 2008, the court 
assessed a three percent award of $2,061,535.29 based on settlements to date, which means 
plaintiffs recovered $68,717,843.00. Memorandum in Support of PSC’s Motion for 
Reimbursement of Certain Advanced Costs at 4, In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-
40000-DAK (N.D. Ohio Apr. 17, 2008). No updates are available after 2008. 
 299.  For information on fees and costs, see In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., 4:08-md-
01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Dec. 18, 2014) (order approving the special master’s report and 
recommendation regarding the allocation and distribution of common-benefit fees and expenses); 
Proposed Order Granting Special Master’s Supplemental Report and Recommendation, In re 
NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Sept. 15, 2015); Special 
Master’s Supplemental Report and Recommendation at 7, Ex. A, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 2015) (awarding $893,387.73 in common-
benefit fees); and Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Allocation and 
Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses at 16, Ex. 1, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2014) (recommending $10,123,395 in fees and 
$2,923,034.88 in expenses). For claims rates, see Transcript of Status Hearing at 7, In re 
NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS, (E.D. Mo. Sept. 9, 2015) (noting that 424 
out of 3,704 had been denied, and 473 (based on numbers given) were still in the claims review 
process). 
 300.  In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2014) 
(order and reasons at 8). 
 301.  In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-
CAN (N.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2015) (order) (paying $6 million in common-benefit fees to the first 
steering committee and $849,250.00 to the Garretson Resolution Group); Motion for Payment of 
Common Benefit Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses from the Biomet Common Benefit MDL 
Assessment Fund ¶¶ 10–12, In re Biomet M2A Mangum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2015). 
 302.  For fees and costs, see Special Master’s Report and Recommendation on the 
Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2014). For claimant recovery, see 
Case Management Order No. 88 at 7, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Eexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:12-md-02385-DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2014). 
 303.  In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2015) (minute order approving special master’s 
report and recommendation) (awarding $77,644,000.00 in fees, and $5,803,010.77 in costs); 
Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Allocation and Distribution of 
Common Benefit Fees and Expenses, In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices 
& Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2015); Transcript of 
Proceedings Status Conference at 2–3, 7, In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales 
Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF (S.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (providing 
information on claimants’ recovery rates). 
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for delivering peace may be common-benefit fees—not enhancements 
for claimants. 
Indeed, one theme emerges from dissecting the settlements: 
repeat players on both sides persistently benefit from the current 
system. Defendants gain closure, and lead lawyers broker deals that 
reward them handsomely and sometimes pay litigants very little. 
These outcomes are tied to the settlements, which fuse individual 
lawyers’ financial interests to the defendant’s closure goal. Without 
tendering one’s entire client list over to the settlement, the 
defendant’s required claimant-participation rate would fail, the deal 
would collapse, and attorneys’ fees would disappear. Still, the point is 
not that lead plaintiffs’ attorneys explicitly collude with the defendant 
by trading closure for fees.304 Nor is there a viable means to 
demonstrate that leaders’ monopolistic power leads to lower outputs, 
for even if they exist, few alternative settlement values are publicly 
available for comparison. Instead, the point is this: setting aside bad 
faith and overt collusion still leaves one key fact—the same players 
appear in the vast majority of these proceedings and design 
remarkably similar settlements that benefit themselves. And that 
suggests that oversight is warranted. 
  
 
 304.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, §§ 4.4b, 4.6a (explaining tacit collusion in oligopolies 
and noting that “[f]actors such as high concentration on the seller’s side and diffusion on the 
buyer’s side, significant economies of scale, a standardized product and publicly announced 
prices and terms, suggest that a market is conductive to express or tacit collusion”); Howard M. 
Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 963 (2014) 
(noting that defining collusion as a “secret agreement for a wrongful purpose” is a “red herring”).  
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TABLE 3: COMMON-BENEFIT AWARDS AND NON-CLASS  
CLAIMANT RECOVERY WITHIN THE DATA 
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2. Plaintiffs Appear to Be Inadequately Represented 
The overarching danger for plaintiffs is inadequate 
representation. Profiting at claimants’ expense can disserve all 
settling plaintiffs equally, but since multidistrict proceedings require 
only a common question of fact, litigants can also be uniquely 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis one another. In class actions, due process 
requires separate representation when structural conflicts of interest 
exist.306 Structural conflicts “present a significant risk that the 
lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the 
litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside 
 
 305   In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-02299-RFD-PJH (W.D. La. 
Sept. 1, 2015) (case management order: holdback order at 5). 
 306.  Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 625–26 (1997) (noting the class must share the same interest and injuries). 
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from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor 
claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.”307 Multidistrict 
litigation should demand no less. 
Plainly, settlement provisions that chiefly benefit lead lawyers 
risk violating this principle, but conflicts among claimants can prove 
disabling, too. Differences may manifest while trying to establish 
liability, such as variations among claims308 and injuries,309 state-of-
the-art issues,310 claims arising pre- and post-label changes, statutes 
of limitation,311 state law discrepancies,312 or insurance-coverage 
questions,313 while others may arise only when contemplating 
remedies. In direct representation, informed consent can paper over 
many conflicts, and only some will amount to structural conflicts.314 
But most conflicts will not be apparent at the outset of the case when 
leaders are appointed and clients do not freely consent to that 
representation. Likewise, forcing their attorneys to sign common-
benefit participation agreements to gain access to leaders’ work 
product in no way alleviates this concern. 
 
 307.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 308.  See, e.g., In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., No. 4:06-md-01811-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 
18, 2007) (order appointing leadership counsel) (appointing separate representatives for 
Mississippi farmers and farmers who would prefer to litigate individually in state court). 
 309.  For instance, hip-implant plaintiffs who had surgery revising the injury claimed will be 
differently situated than those without, and some claimed cobalt and chromium poisoning as 
well as device loosening. E.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 27–29, In re Biomet M2a-Magnum 
Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-CAN (N.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2012) 
(discussing differences between plaintiffs subject to revision surgery and those who have the 
device still implanted). 
 310.  For example, in the hip implant litigation cases differed over the information available 
to surgeons in different years. Id. at 27 (discussing which cases to select for bellwether trials 
because there are “some serious state-of-the-art issues which plague two sides as to whether an 
orthopedic surgeon in 2011, who’s implanting a device after substantial information, is a totally 
different case”). 
 311.  E.g., id. at 30 (“There may be some rogue cases that are older that there’s some statute 
of limitations.”). 
 312.  When transferee courts do remand actions, they often cite case-specific differences in 
state laws as a reason for remanding. E.g., In re Activated Carbon-Based Hunting Clothing 
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1200 (D. Minn. 2012); In re Light 
Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Me. 2011); In re NuvaRing 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS, 2009 WL 4825170, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2009). 
 313.  E.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 958–59 
(W.D. Wis. 2008) (subclassing a class action because of different statutes of limitation); Maloney 
v. Califano, 88 F.R.D. 293, 294–95 (D.N.M. 1980) (subclassing based on the time taken by the 
government to make disability determinations).  
 314.  Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 102, at 282 (“[A]lthough concurrent client-client 
conflicts of interest exist in any mass plaintiff representation, such conflicts ordinarily should 
not prevent mass representation as long as the clients are aware of the conflicts and give their 
informed consent.”). 
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Divisions can also arise between lead lawyers who negotiate 
the settlement and non-lead attorneys. Dealmakers are privy to the 
settlement matrix and the confidential guidance document given to 
the claims administrator, which explains qualifying criteria for 
recovery.315 This knowledge allows leadership to tailor their own 
clients’ claim submissions to maximize their payout (and the leader’s 
contingent fees). Consider two examples: 
First, in Biomet, settlement designers had an understanding 
that if a claimant thought she was entitled to more than the 
presumptive award, she could seek an enhancement through 
mediation; after opening the file, however, Biomet could likewise seek 
a reduction.316 Had the claimant accepted the presumptive award, the 
file would remain “closed,” and Biomet would pay the presumed 
award.317 But none of this was spelled out in the settlement itself. 
Granted, nothing in the settlement contradicted the practice, so when 
non-lead lawyers complained and requested interrogatories from lead 
counsel, the judge took lead counsel’s word that the steering 
committee tried to inform them and denied the discovery request.318 
Second, in the Fosamax litigation, the judge permitted evidence 
about claimants’ Fosamax use to come from either pharmacy records 
or physician and dental records.319 But the settlement designers 
limited proof to pharmacy records. In at least one client’s case, this 
meant the difference between a $500 “category 1” claim and an 
$80,000 “category 4” case.320 While trying to clarify the claimant’s 
classification, Merck subjected the case to no less than three Lone Pine 
orders as a prelude to requesting dismissal.321 
To be sure, divisions routinely arise between claimants 
competing for the same settlement money. But the concern lies in 
ensuring that the settlement administration process is a fair one ex 
ante. As such, claimants with structurally conflicting interests need 
their own representative at the table when dealmakers negotiate and 
formulate settlements. 
 
 315.  E.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-
1708 (DWF/AJB), 2009 WL 5195841, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2009) (“[T]he Special Masters 
would be guided by an allocation plan proposed by the PLCC [Plaintiff’s Lead Counsel 
Committee] and approved by the Special Masters.”). 
 316.  In re Biomet M2a-Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02391-RLM-
CAN (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2015) (case management order no. 3 at 2–3). 
 317.  Id. at 3–4. 
 318.  Id. at 4–5. 
 319.  Osborn Law, P.C.’s Response to Merck’s Third Motion for a Lone Pine Order at 3, In re 
Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2014). 
 320.  Id.  
 321.  Id. at 1. 
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III. REGULATING THE MONOPOLY 
One overarching theme emerges from analyzing the 
settlements that repeat players design: the lead lawyers comprising 
the monopolistic power have few reasons to discipline themselves, and 
current circumstances render external checks ineffective. As repeat 
players wield their cohesive interests to their own benefit, allowing 
them to self-regulate can generate perverse results. As repeat actors 
in powerful positions standardize and replicate practices that benefit 
them and allow them to control others’ compensation, they further 
insulate themselves from competitive market forces that might 
otherwise disrupt self-dealing. 
In many economic markets, monopolistic authority can lead to 
higher prices and lower outputs. Here, the danger exists that 
defendants will accede to provisions that enhance lead lawyers’ 
compensation in exchange for closure, less compensation for plaintiffs, 
and reversionary clauses. Lower output could thus mean inadequate 
representation through discounted payouts to claimants, stricter 
evidentiary requirements, or more coercive participation measures. 
Whether actual collusion exists or not, prophylactic regulation is 
necessary to address the abundant opportunities for self-dealing. 
Given the information barriers that prevent judges and clients 
from monitoring leadership, however, regulation should incentivize 
and leverage other plaintiffs’ attorneys to function as checks and 
balances. Plaintiffs’ lawyers know all too well what happens behind 
the scenes and how it affects them and their clients, but their payoff 
for cooperating, staying silent, and playing the long game is currently 
more profitable than competing.322 That profit calculation has to 
change. Faithfully representing plaintiffs’ interests must be more 
lucrative than falling in line and climbing the leadership ranks. 
Judges have the power to appoint leaders and the power of the 
purse.323 Common-benefit funds are judicially created, and should 
likewise be judicially administered—not circumvented through 
settlement’s backdoor or shielded by sealed fee petitions.324 And 
 
 322.  See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, § 4.4(a) (noting that oligopolistic market 
structures can themselves produce a “ ‘consensus’ about how each firm can maximize its own 
profits by tacitly participating in a strategy to maximize the joint profits of the group”). 
 323.  Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and 
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 2119, 
2163–65 (2000). 
 324.  See Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 134 (discussing how settlement negotiations 
resulting in higher common-benefit fees harm non-lead attorneys and claimants). Settlements 
that do anything more than simply subject the settling parties to the transferee judge’s fee 
orders smack of self-dealing. 
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though some scholars prefer to limit judicial involvement since judges 
continually empower the same attorneys, heavily favor settlement, 
ratify questionable settlement practices, and are repeat players too,325 
most judges do care about achieving justice, but lack unbiased 
guidance. Moreover, judges have welcomed training on how to 
overcome their own biases in other contexts, demonstrating 
receptiveness to critics and new methods.326 As such, educating judges 
can be part of the solution. By implementing several changes, well-
informed judges can hold leaders accountable and instill competition 
without legislative or rulemaking intervention, which allows for 
further innovation and adaptation. 
The first step is for judges to reject consensus slates for 
appointing lead lawyers in favor of a competitive selection process that 
permits attorneys to air objections confidentially to a special master. 
Issuing an order that presumptively adds (or replaces) lead lawyers 
with the attorney who successfully demonstrates an unaddressed 
structural conflict of interest enhances the payoff for defecting, 
prompts lead lawyers to be vigilant about whether conflicts exist, and 
promotes fundamental due process through adequate representation. 
The second step is for judges to compensate lead lawyers based 
on a percentage of the benefit leaders actually confer on plaintiffs (as 
opposed to a settlement fund’s inflated sticker price or a set 
percentage of the fund). Tying fees to benefits instead of directly to 
defendant’s closure goals realigns common-benefit fees with basic 
contingent-fee principles: the better claimants fare, the better 
leadership fares. Faithful representation should follow suit. 
The third step is to invigorate competition through state courts 
and calculated decentralization. By creating pricing packages for 
state-court attorneys who want to access some (but not all) common-
benefit work, transferee judges can motivate state-court attorneys to 
compete, develop claims under different states’ laws, and thus more 
accurately price payouts under the settlement grid. Compensating 
state lawyers whose work benefits all claimants using quantum 
meruit principles encourages them to invest in developing their 
 
 325.  E.g., id. at 169–74 (noting that judges lack incentives to ensure that common-benefit 
work is done well and that existing practices compromise judicial independence by creating close 
relationships with lead lawyers). 
 326.  Terry A. Maroney, Why Choose? A Response to Rachlinski, Wistrich, & Guthrie’s “Heart 
Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow their Feelings?,” 93 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
317, 318–19 (2015) (noting that judges routinely invite academics who reveal their cognitive 
biases to them to conferences and concluding that “there is something deeply comforting in 
recognizing judges’ humanity” and that “many judges enjoy—at least when among themselves—
being seen as they see themselves: ordinary people seeking to perform a difficult job consistently 
and fairly, with variable levels of success”).  
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cases—not to skimp in hopes of reducing a common-benefit tax’s 
impact.  
Remands also play a vital role. By issuing a standing order 
indicating that they will suggest that the Panel remand non-settling 
cases to their courts of origin after a global settlement, transferee 
courts can employ market forces to discipline the leadership’s 
monopoly power.327 Potential remands pressure lead lawyers to craft 
settlements that cater to multiple injury types by dismembering their 
consolidated power structure and thereby reducing non-consenting 
plaintiffs’ accompanying common-benefit fees. Remands likewise 
return plaintiffs’ most valuable bargaining chip: trial. When 
combined, these proposals tap into the competitive rivalries within the 
plaintiffs’ bar, inciting those who possess the most relevant 
information and have the most at stake to police the monopoly. 
A. Competing to Become the Monopoly: Leadership Selection Criteria 
Consumers (legal clients included) tend to fare better in 
competitive markets. When firms compete, they can distinguish 
themselves based on price, expertise, and specialization.328 
Competition serves as an antidote to cartelization and corruption, 
incentivizes innovation, reduces prices, and encourages diversity.329 
The economic and regulated industries literature provides some apt 
analogies for incentivizing market checks on lead lawyers’ 
monopolistic power in a particular proceeding. Competing for the 
market, that is, competing to become the monopoly, may produce some 
of the same benefits of open-market competition.330 
If practice proved as straightforward as theory, then there 
would be no need for further regulation: competing to become a lead 
lawyer would do all the work. Judges could simply trust the process. 
But some of the economic criticisms of this theory are applicable here 
too.331 One of the most salient is the idea that initial ex ante 
competition for monopoly power may not adequately regulate ex post, 
 
 327.  The Panel could likewise institute this change unilaterally by amending its own Rule 
10.1. See infra note 419 and accompanying text. 
 328.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2 
(2005) (defining a competitive market as one of “low prices, high output, and maximum room for 
innovation”). 
 329.  SCOTT E. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY 214–17 (2011). 
 330.  Bailey, supra note 34, at 178. 
 331.  DECKER, supra note 34, at 38–39. 
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opportunistic behavior.332 Thus, there’s a need for judicial action as 
well. 
1. Competitive Selection Processes and Criteria 
Although it’s more time intensive, judges need to employ truly 
competitive processes in appointing lead lawyers—not rely on 
consensus slates. Lawyers have little incentive to consider adequate 
representation when brokering a consensus since representing more 
people (even with conflicting interests) leads to higher fees and a 
greater willingness to invest in the suit.333 Relying on self-selection 
methods can encourage undisclosed fee-sharing arrangements that 
may adversely affect settlement incentives,334 tit-for-tat reciprocity 
among repeat players, and unrepresentative committees. In short, 
consensus numbs the competitive forces that could erode repeat actors’ 
cartel-like power across multidistrict proceedings by allowing rivals to 
enter the leadership ranks.335 
As judges or special masters assume a more active role in 
selecting leaders, what should they look for and how might they assess 
those traits? While the sample leadership application and evaluation 
forms in the Appendix provide a concrete starting point with specific 
criteria, the goal—in contrast to the usual mantra of cooperation—is 
to appoint a small, cognitively diverse group somewhat akin to a 
“team of rivals.”336 Put simply, well-functioning decisionmaking 
groups tend to have five to six members who are not like-minded.337 
 
 332.  Id. at 39. Similar problems arise in private prison systems, for instance. E.g., James 
Theodore Gentry, Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 
YALE L.J. 353, 354–60 (1986). 
 333.  Burch, supra note 22, at 121. 
 334.  E.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), rev’d, 
818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1987) (approving a plaintiffs’ management committee’s internal fee-
splitting agreement that would give financing attorneys three times the amount they advanced 
to finance the litigation). 
 335.  See FRAZER, supra note 15, at 10 (observing that dynamic competition can correct 
inefficient markets by eliminating monopoly power). 
 336.  As Cass Sunstein explains using a political example, 
In the presidency of George W. Bush, many failures occurred because of an 
unfortunate culture that encouraged, rather than combated, group polarization. . . . 
By contrast, Lincoln’s presidency has been described as a healthy Team of Rivals, in 
which Lincoln self-consciously chose diverse people who could challenge his 
inclinations and test one another’s arguments in the interest of producing the most 
sensible judgments. 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 29–30. 
 337.  While financing the suit may require leaders and steering committees to get buy in 
from additional attorneys, empirical research suggests that “[g]roups containing 3 to 8 members 
[are] significantly more productive and more developmentally advanced than groups with 9 
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Just as teams of doctors need skeptics to make accurate diagnoses and 
successful corporate boards require diverse, assertive members that 
don’t kowtow to the CEO,338 leadership groups in multidistrict 
litigation need members with mixed perspectives who are not afraid to 
openly disagree. As Professor Cass Sunstein has argued, “In business 
and in government, successful leaders seek divergent views and fresh 
opinions”; “Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt are the foremost examples; they made special efforts to 
ensure they did not live in echo chambers.”339 
What is it that people with diverse perspectives contribute to a 
group—and more importantly—to representation that a well-oiled 
network of repeat players may not? Answering this crucial question 
requires a very brief excursion into theory. There are certain patterns 
that emerge and hold true across many contexts—ecosystems, political 
elections, and economies, for instance. Here are two: (1) diversity 
typically helps these systems function and contributes to innovation 
and productivity; and (2) these systems need competition to flourish, 
and diversity drives competition.340 So, it is unsurprising that studies 
from a variety of scholarly disciplines indicate that cognitively 
heterogeneous teams can outperform homogenous ones on disjunctive 
tasks like identifying and cultivating successful legal arguments.341 
People with varied perspectives and heuristics frame and solve 
problems in different ways. When homogenous thinkers approach a 
problem, they are likely to get stuck at the same point.342 But groups 
with cognitively diverse members can employ different tricks or 
reframe the problem in a way that allows the whole group to move 
forward. They have different peaks, in other words. Over time, 
 
members or more,” and productivity further increases in groups with five to six members. Susan 
A. Wheelan, Group Size, Group Development, and Group Productivity, 40 SMALL GROUP RES. 
247, 257–58 (2009). 
 338.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 147–48; Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Boards Great, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/09/what-makes-great-boards-great 
[https://perma.cc/4X9J-YMH5]. 
 339.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 83. 
 340.  PAGE, supra note 329, at 8–9, 215–17. 
 341.  SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER 
GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES xiv–xv, 325–27 (paperback ed. 2007). As Scott Page 
points out, “[m]ost real world tasks are neither purely disjunctive nor purely conjunctive[,]” 
which is likewise true for the work of a plaintiffs’ steering committee. Id. at xv; Stefan Schulz-
Hardt et al., Dissent as a Facilitator: Individual- and Group-Level Effects on Creativity and 
Performance, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS 
149, 150–54, 162–63 (Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Michele J. Gelfand eds., 2008); Gayle W. Hill, 
Group Versus Individual Performance: Are N + 1 Heads Better than One?, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
517, 533 (1982). 
 342.  PAGE, supra note 341, at 157. 
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however, cognitively diverse agents that interact frequently can lose 
those differences; members’ thinking may converge, assimilate, and 
become cohesive as the similarities among settlement practices 
illustrate.343 
Still, not all diversity is created equal. Unlike “identity” 
diversity, which includes visible differences such as race, ethnicity, 
age, gender, physical disabilities, and demographic dissimilarities, 
“cognitive” diversity focuses on diverse knowledge and expertise 
stemming from training, experiences, expertise and, yes, identity.344 
While identity can play a role by creating experiential differences that 
prompt contrasting analytic tools to develop, physical characteristics 
alone may tell us little.345 For example, a Mexican American woman 
raised in an upper class family who attends Harvard Law School may 
have similar analytical tools and training as white males attending 
the same school.346 As such, cognitive diversity can’t readily be 
identified from someone’s appearance; training and life experiences 
are traits that require understanding someone’s background.347 
Judges should seek cognitively diverse members with varied 
expertise and perspectives who will disclose privately held information 
and dissent over matters that are relevant to the leadership’s 
substantive tasks—not contrarians.348 Not all conflict is productive. 
Appointing a group of malcontents who dislike one another is unlikely 
to benefit anyone; relationship conflicts are detrimental to a group’s 
longevity and performance, regardless of the type of task.349 These 
interpersonal conflicts tend to distract group members from the job at 
hand, prompting them to focus instead on threats, increasing their 
own power, or cultivating their supporters.350 Process-oriented conflict 
doesn’t fare much better. The more leaders’ opinions differ over the 
 
 343.  Id. at 343. 
 344.  Id. at 7–8, 302–12, 324–27; Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A 
Field Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741 (1999); 
Eden B. King et al., Conflict and Cooperation in Diverse Workgroups, 65 J. SOC. ISSUES 261, 267–
68 (2009); Elizabeth Mannix & Margaret A. Neale, What Differences Make a Difference?: The 
Promise and Reality of Diverse Teams in Organizations, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 31, 41–42 
(2005); Abby L. Mello & Lisa A. Delise, Cognitive Diversity to Team Outcomes: The Roles of 
Cohesion and Conflict Management, 46 SMALL GROUP RES. 204, 205–07 (2015).  
 345.  Mello & Delise, supra note 344, at 204–05.  
 346.  PAGE, supra note 341, at 359. 
 347.  Id. at 302–10. 
 348.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 84–85 (2003). 
 349.  See Karen A. Jehn, A Multimethod Examination of the Benefits and Detriments of 
Intragroup Conflict, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 256, 275–76 (1995). 
 350.  Karen A. Jehn, A Qualitative Analysis of Conflict Types and Dimensions in 
Organizational Groups, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 530, 531 (1997). 
        
2017] MONOPOLIES IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 141 
means for achieving their ends, the worse their performance.351 And 
there is no need for conflict in conducting standardized, routine tasks 
like reviewing discovery materials and producing documents.352 
But conflict that centers on a non-routine task’s substance—
such as which legal theories are best suited for class certification, how 
to argue against motions to dismiss and motions for summary 
judgment, or how to structure a settlement—is beneficial, particularly 
when coupled with norms that favor discussing substantive conflicts 
and suppressing relationship conflicts.353 So, members with diverse 
perspectives and expertise who make complex, non-routine decisions 
can benefit from dissenting perspectives—those perspectives can 
generate superior alternatives and yield new information.354 This 
suggests that judges need to change the kind of information they 
request, and focus on compiling a qualified group with mixed 
experiences that complement one another. To aid in this endeavor, the 
sample leadership form and applicant scoring sheet in the Appendix 
provide straightforward information-gathering and assessment tools, 
while the pocket guide for leadership appointments and compensation 
explains best practices and cites to further reading for judges 
interested in the theory.355 
2. Permitting Confidential Objections to Special Masters 
Current practices and norms reward silence, not dissent. When 
judges require attorneys to openly object to proposed leaders,356 they 
are unlikely to receive candid comments. Why? The conditions are ripe 
for conformity and informational cascades: the relevant plaintiffs’ bar 
is small and lead lawyers can influence and sometimes directly control 
others’ attorneys’ fees.357 Passing a microphone in open court to solicit 
 
 351.  See id. at 551. 
 352.  See Jehn, supra note 349, at 260, 275–76 (explaining that task-related conflict can be 
beneficial when the group’s assignment is complex and demands creativity and innovation, but 
detrimental when assignments are routine). 
 353.  See Jehn, supra note 350, at 551–52. 
 354.  Jehn, supra note 349, at 260. 
 355.  Infra apps. A3: Pocket Guide for Leadership Appointment and Compensation; A4: 
Sample Leadership Application Form; A5: Leadership Applicant Scoring Sheet. 
 356.  E.g., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 
2010, No. 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2010) (pretrial order no. 1) (setting initial 
conference). 
 357.  See ELLICKSON, supra note 268, at 170–74 (discussing the role of sanctions for 
objectors/defectors in close-knit groups who aim to maximize their own welfare); SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 348, at 28–29, 68 (discussing the role of group identification and conformity). But see 
Transcript of Proceedings at 49, In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 4:13-md-02420-
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information from attorneys about one another is likely to lead to an 
information cascade where group members withhold privately held 
information, fall in line behind those asked first, and simply echo that 
sentiment.358 
Most objections occur nowhere within judicial earshot. Instead, 
attorneys hash them out behind closed doors, oftentimes before a 
power broker even convenes a leadership meeting.359 Presently, one of 
several scenarios might unfold. First, if the challenger is powerful 
enough, the presumptive leaders might offer the objector a position in 
a concurrent or future multidistrict litigation. Second, if no deal is 
struck and the challenger has allies backing her, then that alternative 
group might present a competing slate or seek appointment alongside 
the principal group.360 Finally, if the competitor is not well positioned, 
then she must choose between capitulating or publicly opposing 
attorneys who may be empowered. 
Soliciting objections need not be so treacherous. The solution is 
somewhat straightforward: appoint a special master to oversee 
leadership selection. Lawyers can air their preferences and grievances 
confidentially to the special master and perhaps the judge’s law 
clerks.361 The clerks and the special master can speak privately with 
the attorneys, assimilate and score the application forms, and then 
recommend a slate to the judge.362 The judge can then treat the final 
 
YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) (claiming that if selected, the consensus group would not exclude 
objectors from receiving work). 
 358.  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 348, at 23–24, 68–69; SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 90–93. 
 359.  When plaintiffs’ attorneys could not reach a consensus as to who would represent the 
indirect purchasers in the LCD antitrust litigation, Dan Becnel noted, “I tried to—when we came 
down here to—to have three, make a deal, and—and Mr. Berman decided not to. So the bulk of 
us think Mr. Cotchett and the Cabraser firm are excellent.” Transcript of Proceedings at 51, In re 
Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., No. 4:13-md-02420-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013); see 
also Supplemental Objection of Daniel E. Becnel, Jr. to Plaintiffs’ Common Benefit Fee Award, 
Ex. B (Affidavit of the Becnel Law Firm, LLC as Per Order No. 6(D)) at 1, In re Vioxx Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 2:05-md-01657-EEF-DEK (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2011): 
Numerous meetings were held in California, Texas, New York, Washington, D.C., 
Miami and New Orleans in an effort to organize this case for over a year prior to the 
MDL. My office initiated many of these meetings and I undertook to have a consensus 
built for electing leadership and for the sharing of information . . . . 
 360.  Some judges have even requested that leadership applicants include lists of supporting 
attorneys with their application. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & 
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:15-md-02672-CRB (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (pretrial order no. 2: 
applications for appointment of plaintiffs’ lead counsel and steering committee members at 2).  
 361.  Judge David Proctor has used this procedure. See Special Master’s Rule 23 Report 
Recommending Interim Plaintiff Leadership Counsel, In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust 
Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2013). 
 362.  For detailed information on this interview and screening process as well as information 
about application forms, see Burch, supra note 41, at 125–28. 
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appointment as a confirmation hearing.363 Although this system may 
enable attorneys to jockey for position by needlessly complaining 
about one another, their reputations serve as one potential check. And 
the additional costs are surely offset by adequate representation 
gains. 
3. Presumptive Appointments and Removals  
Based on Structural Conflicts 
Competing to become the monopoly through open selection and 
allowing private objections improves the status quo, but does little to 
ensure faithful representation or police opportunistic behavior 
thereafter. As noted, even in diverse leadership groups, members’ 
cognitive differences may dissipate as they begin to identify with one 
another.364 Group identity leads to trust, and trust enables members 
to work together for their mutual gain.365 Just think about cartels: it’s 
easier to collude with fewer players who have long-standing 
relationships, communicate regularly, and use social norms to prevent 
competitors from defecting.366 These traits should sound familiar by 
now, for repeat players share them too. But whereas antitrust laws 
disrupt cartels by creating distrust,367 no parallel currently exists in 
multidistrict litigation. 
Accordingly, the economic calculus must change such that the 
payoff for raising inadequate-representation concerns is greater than 
remaining complicit. If a leadership challenger successfully 
demonstrates that a neglected structural conflict of interest exists and 
that her appointment can alleviate it, then, depending on the conflict, 
the challenger has created a presumption that she should either serve 
alongside or replace current leadership.368 Of course, since judges 
often appoint lead lawyers early in the proceeding, information about 
conflicts among claimants may not yet be available. As such, this 
incentivizes leaders to address and remedy conflicts as they surface. 
Structural conflicts present a high bar: they can arise either 
between the claimants and the leadership or among the claimants 
 
 363.  See, e.g., Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust 
Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 364.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 348, at 28–29. 
 365.  Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become 
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 311–12 (1992); Wheelan, 
supra note 337, at 249–50. 
 366.  Leslie, supra note 15, at 564–68, 579–81, 584–88, 590–91. 
 367.  Id. at 622–36. 
 368.  See Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 287, 347–63 (2003) (proposing a similar solution in the class context). 
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themselves, but must “present a significant risk” that leaders might 
“skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some 
claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of 
their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the 
lawyers themselves.”369 Pretrial efficiency may require placing 
monopolistic control in the hands of a few attorneys, but with that 
power comes the responsibility to act as fiduciaries for all claimants—
not just one’s individual clients.370 That is the very crux of structural 
collusion—there need not be a backroom deal or conscious collusion. 
The mere act of pursuing one’s own (and one’s clients’ own) self-
interest can lead to conflicted representation for non-clients.371 
Allowing structural conflicts to persist without separate 
representation violates basic due process rights in the class context,372 
and, by extension, the multidistrict context.373 Multidistrict leadership 
and steering committees have morphed from voluntary, ad hoc groups 
into mandatory, judicially created ones.374 And multidistrict 
proceedings share key traits with class actions: principal-agent 
concerns, mandatory consolidation, judicially imposed organization, 
judicially awarded common-benefit compensation, and a small cadre of 
attorneys who owe fiduciary duties to all claimants while 
monopolizing control and decisionmaking. Moreover, some global 
settlements have adopted class-like characteristics such as walkaway 
provisions and, in one case (the Yaz/Yasmin Gallbladder Settlement), 
included an automatic-enrollment provision that required non-
participating plaintiffs to affirmatively opt out, as they would in a 
Rule 23(b)(3) class.375 As such, multidistrict litigation should afford 
plaintiffs the same adequate representation protections. 
Issuing a standing order that presumptively removes lead 
lawyers who created or ignored structural conflicts of interest and 
presumptively replaces leaders with the competing lawyers who 
successfully demonstrated the conflict—so long as the challenger has 
the requisite experience and available funding—can harness market 
 
 369.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 370. Id. § 1.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §10.22 
(2004); Silver, supra note 170, at 1987–91. 
 371.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 855 (1999). 
 372.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600, 606, 626–28 (1997). 
 373.  Redish & Karaba, supra note 279, at 132–33. 
 374.  For a historical overview of how these concerns have evolved as group organization 
becomes increasingly formal and mandatory, see Burch, supra note 41, at 87–91. 
 375.  Yaz Gallbladder Settlement, supra note 139, § 1.01(A). 
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forces to discipline the leadership’s monopoly power.376 If the entire 
leadership has disserved claimants to advantage itself, then the judge 
should clean house.377 Similarly, if some leaders structured the 
settlement, negotiated side deals for their own clients, or litigated in a 
way that systematically biases non-client claimants for reasons that 
have no bearing on their claim’s strength,378 then the judge should 
replace those attorneys—presumptively with the challenger 
demonstrating the conflict.379 Alternatively, certain conflicts among 
claimants suggest that the challenger should serve alongside current 
leaders, not unseat them. If some clients have materially different 
claims or circumstances such that unified representation would pose a 
direct ex ante conflict (such as the conflict between those with present 
and future claims in Amchem380), then judges should presumptively 
add the challenger to the leadership roster to separately represent 
those plaintiffs’ interests.381 
B. Regulating Fees to Encourage Competition  
and Fidelity to Claimants 
Transforming leadership selection is only half of the puzzle. 
Leadership’s fidelity to claimants must likewise be linked to their 
 
 376.  See Nagareda, supra note 368, at 347–63. Sample language for this order is included 
infra at app. A6: Sample Orders Suggesting Remand and Replacing Leaders. 
 377.  The circumstances in Propulsid seem to provide one such example. See supra notes 
104–123 and accompanying text. 
 378.  The latecomer provisions in the DePuy ASR settlements provide one such example. See 
supra notes 164–176 and accompanying text. 
 379.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 388 (2008) (“After Ortiz, such ‘side 
settlements’ now seem to represent a per se ‘impermissible conflict of interest.’ ”); Samuel 
Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 385 
(noting that courts should ensure against “structural allegiances of class counsel that would 
create incentives to favor one part of the class over another, or be biased against seeking the best 
possible return to a defined subset of claims”); Richard G. Stuhan & Sean P. Costello, Robbing 
Peter to Pay Paul: The Conflict of Interest Problem in Sibling Class Actions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1195, 1213–14 (2008) (noting that side deals give class counsel “great incentive” to reach 
any settlement that may survive judicial scrutiny). Depending on the circumstances, when 
competitors replace a current leader, the incumbent might still apply for common-benefit fees 
based on the quantum meruit principles outlined below. Fees are more acceptable when the lead 
lawyer recognizes the conflict in negotiating a side deal for her own clients and resigns from the 
leadership. 
 380.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626–28 (1997). 
 381.  On the difference between ex ante and ex post conflicts created by the settlement itself, 
see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1649, 1685–91 (2008). 
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common-benefit fees.382 Awarding leaders a flat percentage of either 
the claimants’ gross recovery or the fund’s sticker price does little to 
promote faithful service. And reflexively imposing common-benefit 
taxes on state-court litigants without some showing that those 
claimants actually benefited from federal efforts stifles state-court 
lawyers’ incentives to compete. Their rational response isn’t to expend 
resources on case development, but to invest as little as possible to 
profit when taxed through a global settlement. By contrast, using 
quantum meruit principles to customize fee percentages based on the 
benefit leadership actually bestowed better aligns lead lawyers’ and 
claimants’ financial interests, empowers state courts as competitive 
checks on overbearing deals, and irons out doctrinal wrinkles. 
1. Compensate Leadership on a Quantum Meruit Basis 
Judges and lead lawyers routinely invoke the common-fund 
doctrine to justify awarding leadership’s fees. But common funds rest 
on restitution principles and assume that class members, as passive 
beneficiaries, implicitly consent to fee awards.383 That’s simply not the 
case in multidistrict litigation; plaintiffs have their own attorneys and 
have no choice but to accept and pay for lead lawyers’ judicially 
appointed services.384 
Lead lawyers also contend that courts should base their fees on 
the total amount of the fund—claimed or not—and routinely cite the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert as support.385 
This overlooks a crucial distinction between the Boeing class and 
multidistrict litigation: in Boeing, all class members had to do to 
obtain their settlement money was prove they were class members, 
which made them the “equitable owners” of their award;386 
 
 382.  Fees drive strategy. See, e.g., Field, supra note 274 (accusing lead lawyers of foregoing 
a stronger case for bellwether trial when the family’s attorney refused to pay lead lawyers half of 
any attorneys’ fees if the plaintiff won). 
 383.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 29 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (“The contingent nature of the class action fee—the fact that a fee is payable only in 
the event of success, and then only by deduction from the recovery—obviates most of the 
potential threat of forced exchange.”). 
 384.  As the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment makes plain: “By 
comparison with class actions, court-imposed fees to appointed counsel in consolidated litigation 
cannot be explained entirely by restitution principles, since litigants may have no choice but to 
accept and pay for certain legal services as directed by the court.” Id. 
 385.  444 U.S. 472 (1980); e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Distribution of 
Attorney’s Fees (Re: MDL Settlement Program II) at 2–3, Ex. B, In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. 
Litig., No. 2:00-md-01355-EEF-KWR (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2012). 
 386.  Boeing, 444 U.S. at 480–82. 
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multidistrict litigation claimants are not automatically entitled to 
their share—they must overcome evidentiary hurdles first.387 
The unjust enrichment theory likewise shifts: Boeing class 
members would receive a windfall if they failed to compensate class 
counsel for helping them,388 but multidistrict litigation plaintiffs must 
often surrender their right to sue in court in favor of the claims-
administration process before knowing whether they will recover. 
While negotiating a no-hassle claims-resolution process that 
compensates plaintiffs based on easily identified medical criteria is a 
start, restitution principles still require a link between plaintiffs’ 
ultimate recovery and attorneys’ fees.389 Without that link, results like 
those in Propulsid (where leadership’s fees—$27 million—grossly 
outpaced claimants’ collective recovery—$6.5 million) are possible.390 
The fear is the same one that animated changes to coupon 
settlements: class counsel could exchange class members’ rights for 
valueless coupons in return for hefty attorneys’ fees.391 After the Class 
Action Fairness Act, federal courts must now calculate attorneys’ fees 
based on the value of redeemed coupons.392 
Common-benefit fees necessitate a similar shift. Without tying 
fees to benefits, the danger exists that leadership might negotiate high 
settlement amounts, use that inflated price to justify their fees, but 
then capitulate to a defendant’s demands for stringent claims-
resolution criteria, reversionary clauses, or both.393 Using quantum 
meruit principles, however, deflates this premise.394 Quantum meruit 
awards depend on a variety of factors, such as lead lawyers’ 
opportunity costs, financial risks, billing practices (whether hourly 
billing or contingent fees), work, time spent,395 the case’s status, the 
 
 387.  E.g., Propulsid I Settlement, supra note 104, § 2. 
 388.  Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478. 
 389.  See Burch, supra note 41, at 102–04; Silver, supra note 252, at 663–66. 
 390.  See supra notes 294–295 and accompanying text. 
 391.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29–30 (2005). 
 392.  28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012). 
 393.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
2010) (discussing issues with fees that are not tied to the actual value of class members’ claims). 
 394.  Burch, supra note 41, at 128–35. 
 395.  See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974) (assessing 
time spent on a case); Ackermann v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986) (examining specific services rendered); Richardson v. Parish 
of Jefferson, 727 So. 2d 705, 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (considering attorney billing rate and hours 
involved); Hiscott & Robinson v. King, 626 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (considering an 
attorney’s hourly billing rate); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 
cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 2000); Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers’ Contracts is Different, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 448 (1998) (discussing “whether [a] lawyer is entitled to compensation 
despite a violation of the lawyer’s duties to the client”).  
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amount of work the individual plaintiffs’ chosen attorneys contributed 
to the outcome,396 and—most importantly—the plaintiffs’ ultimate 
success. 
By their nature, quantum meruit awards typically entail 
evaluating the results obtained and the objective benefit to the 
client.397 As such, while judges might issue an initial order holding 
back a portion of the settlement funds and award interim payments to 
finance the litigation, before they award final common-benefit fees, 
they should require parties to submit an accounting statement.398 This 
final accounting should describe the benefits leaders conferred on 
plaintiffs, how the settlement funds were allocated, the number of 
plaintiffs who submitted claims, how many plaintiffs recovered in each 
category or tier, and the average recovery amount in each category or 
tier. Common-benefit fee awards should then be a percentage of 
plaintiffs’ actual recovery, not the fund itself.399 
Leadership has the burden of demonstrating that their efforts 
benefitted claimants, making them more profitable than they would 
have been without them. As such, where available, leaders should 
likewise include information about settlement values and verdicts 
obtained outside the multidistrict process as a comparative baseline. 
The accounting should then be available to the plaintiffs and their 
individual attorneys such that they can respond and object. This 
information allows judges to fine tune fee awards according to 
plaintiffs’ actual benefits and discourages attorneys from padding 
their billable hours. For instance, because document review can 
 
 396.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 39 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW. INST. 2000) (“The standard rate or hourly fee might be modified by other factors bearing on 
fairness, including success in the representation and whether the lawyer assumed part of the 
risk of the client’s loss, as in a contingent-fee contract.”); Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee when 
the Client Discharges a Contingent Fee Attorney, 41 EMORY L.J. 367, 392–93 (1992) (discussing 
how the size of recovery is a factor used to determine attorneys’ fees). 
 397.  See, e.g., 520 E. 72nd Commercial Corp. v. 520 E. 72nd Owners Corp., 691 F. Supp. 728, 
739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d without op., 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989) (“In determining the value of 
an attorney’s services in quantum meruit, the following factors must be considered: 1. The 
difficulty involved in the matters in which services were rendered; 2. The nature of the services; 
3. The amount involved; 4. The professional standing of counsel; 5. The results obtained.”); In re 
Hall, 415 B.R. 911, 923 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2009) (citing Lewis v. Smith, 618 S.E.2d 32, 35–36 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2005)): 
Under quantum meruit, attorney fees are valued in light of the amount of the work 
done and by the results obtained. The court must determine whether the client 
received any benefit from the services and the value of the services rendered. Value is 
determined in terms of value to the client. 
 398.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13(e) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
(proposing a similar accounting for class counsel’s attorneys’ fees). 
 399.  See Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767, 
787–88 (2014) (proposing a similar adaptation for cy pres recoveries). 
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generate billable time, law firms may be less likely to outsource 
review to a cheaper legal process vendor that could perform the 
service at less expense to plaintiffs.400 But subtracting and 
reimbursing costs and then awarding lead lawyers a percentage of 
plaintiffs’ actual recovery may encourage leaders to use vendors that 
require only attorney supervision.401 
Some circumstances should prompt judges to consider raising 
or lowering the percentage awarded for common-benefit fees. For 
example, meritorious objections from a particular tier of claimants 
might prompt judges to lower the common-benefit percentage awarded 
from that tier to better reflect the benefits conferred,402 and higher 
settlements outside the multidistrict process might prompt judges to 
lower the common-benefit percentage across the board.403 Similarly, 
evaluating benefits on a tier-by-tier basis encourages attorneys to 
maximize deterrence aims and value for “lower tier” claimants with 
less severe injuries—whether through added compensation or 
equitable or injunctive measures. This change incentivizes leaders to: 
(1) streamline and simplify the claims process, (2) expedite payouts, 
and (3) maximize the amounts (or equitable relief) paid to plaintiffs. 
Put simply, leadership has to actually benefit plaintiffs to be paid. 
Quantum meruit likewise allows judges to implement a 
relatively novel theory of common detriment,404 where they subtract 
money from a firm’s common-benefit fee if its attorneys disrupt and 
delay the process without benefitting claimants.405 Judges have, for 
 
 400.  See Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profit for Costs, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 587, 
603–04 (2014) (discussing functions that nonlawyers can perform under attorney supervision, 
such as work coding and searching discovery documents, but noting that paying attorneys more 
for their time incentivizes them not to outsource work in a cost-effective manner). 
 401.  Id. 
 402.  Though contingent fees from their own clients will still incentivize leaders to maximize 
payouts in particular tiers, ensuring adequate representation by appointing lawyers who 
represent claimants across the spectrum should help mitigate those disadvantages. 
 403.  Of course, there are many variables here. For example, some cases will inevitably have 
stronger causation evidence and may not be representative of others, or state lawyers may have 
relied on the multidistrict litigation’s common-work product to produce the results. The point, 
however, is that higher settlements outside the consolidated litigation should trigger closer 
judicial scrutiny.  
 404.  E.g., In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. ASR Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 
1:10-md-02197-DAK (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2015) (case management order no. 25 at 4); Special 
Master’s Report and Recommendation on the Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and 
Expenses at 5–7, In re Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-md-02385-
DRH-SCW (S.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2014); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. 
Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2009 WL 5195841, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2009). 
 405.  E.g., Special Master’s Report and Recommendation Regarding the Allocation and 
Distribution of Common Benefit Fees and Expenses at 12, In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig., 
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example, used this theory to sanction attorneys who fail to disclose 
claims-allocation plans to clients,406 hamper settlement payouts, 
reduce settlement proceeds, or unjustifiably interfere with and delay 
settlement negotiations.407 As such, the danger is obvious: courts must 
take great care to distinguish between task-substantive conflict (even 
if it fails to produce a tangible benefit) and relationship or process-
oriented conflict that might prove detrimental to the group.408 Failing 
to appreciate those differences can dampen all conflict, leading once 
again to an echo chamber. 
Differentiating between dissenting behavior that improves 
representation versus behavior that disserves the group and assessing 
fees on a more granular level may necessitate appointing special 
masters. Special masters can alleviate fears over financial sanctioning 
and conflicting interests that arise when judges designate lawyer-led 
fee allocation committees.409 And when they work with certified public 
accountants, they can audit billing reports (on a monthly basis, for 
instance) and spot billing outliers early on—not at the end when fee 
fights may erupt. 
2. Best Practices Can Empower State-Court Cases as  
Competitive Checks 
Quantum meruit can likewise recognize and compensate 
competitive and complementary state-court efforts. As Part II.B.2 
explained, lead lawyers have gone to great lengths to ensure that 
state-court plaintiffs pay common-benefit fees if they have attorneys 
with cases in the transferee court or want to participate in a master 
settlement. On one hand, leaders’ concern is understandable: state 
litigants may be freeriders who simply sit back and wait for leaders to 
negotiate a deal. Avoiding common-benefit fees would unjustly enrich 
 
No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS (E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2014); In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis 
Liab. Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d 907, 927 (N.D. Ohio 2003). 
 406.  In re Guidant, 2009 WL 5195841, at *7–8. 
 407.  In re Oral Sodium Phosphate Solution-Based Prods. Liab. Action, No. MDL 2066, 2010 
WL 5058454, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2010) (memorandum and order). 
 408.  Supra notes 348–354 and accompanying text (discussing differences among conflict 
types). 
 409.  E.g., In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. 
May 31, 2013) (order regarding protocols for plaintiffs’ counsel time and expense submissions) 
(using a special master to compile and submit billing expenses on a monthly basis); see also In re 
Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. June 10, 2014) (order 
regarding non-waiver of work product doctrine protection and attorney-client privilege as a 
result of the submission of plaintiffs’ common benefit time and expense records to the special 
master and the court). 
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idle lawyers and their clients at the leadership’s expense.410 On the 
other hand, significant verdicts routinely affect factually related cases 
across the country, but those spillovers do not create compensable 
benefits. 
The main problem is that awarding a common-benefit 
assessment of “X” percent is too blunt a tool. It doesn’t distinguish 
between an attorney with all of her cases in the multidistrict 
proceeding and one with twenty-five federal cases and four thousand 
state-court suits. Nor does it adjust for the lawyer who has litigated 
exclusively in state court without any help from the federal court’s 
document repository and is ready for trial, but has clients who opt for 
the global settlement. And it doesn’t increase fees for counsel who wait 
for leaders to announce a settlement before dumping a bevy of cases 
into the proceeding to cash in on others’ efforts. A flat tax thus 
discourages attorneys from competing in state court where they might 
form multiple centers of power that reveal additional information 
about claims valuation. Nuance is necessary both to serve fairness 
principles and to encourage state-court markets to function as rival 
regimes. 
If federal common-benefit fees discourage lawyers from 
pushing state-court claims to trial, the status quo not only dampens 
state courts’ use as a competitive check by raising rivals’ costs, it also 
forestalls information from developing about claims’ diverse values. 
States can differ over parties’ rights, and respecting those differences 
is central to federalism.411 But settlements are expertly designed to 
reduce outcome variance, and may thus provide less compensation to 
claimants in states that permit idiosyncratic claims such as loss of 
consortium, emotional distress, fear of disease, or medical 
monitoring.412 States’ citizens will likewise have heterogeneous 
preferences that can affect jury verdicts. Global settlements that 
follow bellwether trials in the multidistrict proceeding simply cannot 
recapture this variety with jurors from the transferee forum. 
 
 410.  In re Nineteen Appeals Arising out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 
F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1992): 
[W]hen a court consolidates a large number of cases, stony adherence to the American 
rule invites a serious free-rider problem . . . . [E]ach attorney, rather than toiling for 
the common good and bearing the cost alone, will have an incentive to rely on others 
to do the needed work, letting those others bear all the costs of attaining the parties’ 
congruent goals. 
 411.  Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 579 (1996). 
 412.  See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 604, 628–29 (1997) (striking down 
a settlement class action for failing to compensate claimants’ unique claims, among other 
reasons). 
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Consequently, settlements may substantially misprice certain 
claims.413 
Hewing common-benefit fees to quantum meruit principles 
and, as the next Section details, automatically remanding non-settling 
plaintiffs can eliminate barriers to competition and information 
gathering. On the front end, if state-court litigants want to access 
federal work product, then transferee judges should customize 
participation agreements. While contract principles are ill suited for 
attorneys litigating in the transferee court who have no choice but to 
accept,414 tiered pricing packages (like digital photography bundles, 
for example) would allow state-court attorneys to contract with the 
federal leadership based on their document needs. Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
often use sophisticated document repositories with unique login 
information that enables leadership to track which documents have 
been accessed and by whom. 
On the back end, as some courts have done in the past,415 
judges should award common-benefit fees to state-court counsel who 
add value to the federal suit by objecting to practices that threaten 
adequate representation or trying state-court cases, for example. This 
encourages counsel to invest in state suits and can mobilize the 
plaintiffs’ bar’s entrepreneurial power to develop state-specific 
information that informs settlement awards. 
C. Automatically Requesting Remand for Non-settling Plaintiffs 
Jockeying to become the monopoly through competitive 
selection processes, adding to and replacing plaintiffs’ leadership 
based on structural conflicts, and customizing common-benefit fees 
using quantum meruit principles collectively improve multidistrict 
litigation by galvanizing competition. But these changes still lack one 
key pressure point: the threat of trial in the face of an unsatisfactory 
settlement offer. Often touted as the plaintiff’s most valuable 
bargaining chip,416 multidistrict litigation eliminates that threat for 
 
 413.  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 672 (2013). 
 414.  Burch, supra note 41, at 104–08. 
 415.  In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 740, 774 (E.D. La. 2011) (allocating 
common-benefit fees). 
 416.  See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of 
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1379–80 (1995)) (noting that if a fairness 
inquiry controlled class certification, counsel “would be disarmed” and, “confined to settlement 
negotiations[,] could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer”); Erichson, supra 
note 304, at 953, 958 (“[T]he litigation class action works as a tool of plaintiff empowerment.”). 
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all but a few bellwether cases.417 In exchange, the process consolidates 
the masses behind an autocratic leadership that may use settlement 
to condition individual attorneys’ fees on surrendering the lawyer’s 
entire clientele to the claims process, thereby tying plaintiffs’ financial 
fates. That tie is particularly costly when claimants’ interests are non-
uniform. Remand provides a vital alternative, particularly when non-
settled cases may languish in consolidated proceedings that no longer 
benefit from consolidation. Accordingly, transferee judges should issue 
a standing order indicating that they will automatically request that 
the Panel remand non-settling plaintiffs to their court of origin after 
leaders negotiate a master settlement.418 To achieve uniformity, the 
Panel could institute this check unilaterally by simply amending its 
own Rule 10.1(b).419 
In addition to animating competition, automatic-remand 
requests post-master settlement yield four crucial benefits. First, they 
impart procedural justice to plaintiffs with unique claims that are 
most likely to be disserved by a leadership that caters to the majority. 
Remand allows those plaintiffs to pursue their suits in their chosen 
fora if faced with an unsatisfactory settlement offer.420 It likewise 
pressures lead lawyers to negotiate a favorable deal for claimants 
across the spectrum, for leaders should not profit from people they do 
not benefit.421 Second, if discovery has not neared completion before 
settlement, then this should raise red flags about whether the 
settlement value accurately reflects the claims’ merits, and suggest 
that plaintiffs may be better served by conducting their own discovery 
upon remand—not waiting for lead lawyers who have settled their 
 
 417.  Silver & Miller, supra note 32, at 123 (observing that the lack of trials “declaws 
plaintiffs in transferred cases by depriving them of the weapon that pressures a defendant to pay 
a reasonable amount in settlement: the threat of forcing an exchange at a price set by a jury”). 
 418.  Although parties can request that the Panel remand cases, it never appears to have 
done so without such a suggestion from the transferee court. Burch, supra note 95, at 418. 
Sample language for issuing these orders is included infra Appendix A6: Sample Orders 
Suggesting Remand and Replacing Leaders. 
 419.  Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Rule 10.1(b), 277 
F.R.D. 480 (2011). 
 420.  This may affect counsel and plaintiffs’ decision of where to sue, for many of them 
currently file directly in the transferee court after consolidation, which would weaken the threat 
of remand. Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 763 (2012). As Professor Bradt suggests, 
one solution would be to require a plaintiff who files directly in the multidistrict proceeding to 
declare an appropriate home court for remand purposes. Id. at 816. 
 421.  Supra Part III.B.1 (discussing quantum meruit compensation principles); see also 
Resnik et al., supra note 21, at 389–91 (“Regulation should not only provide a generic 
admonition; it should also authorize judges to police those procedures by warning lawyers that 
failure to meet these obligations could be grounds for disaggregation and could be relevant to the 
payment of both costs and fees.”). 
        
154 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1:67 
cases to unselfishly fulfill their fiduciary obligations. Although some 
efficiency may be lost, the gains in individual autonomy may be a 
worthwhile trade at this stage. 
Third, remanding cases to their transferor courts destabilizes 
leadership’s power structure. Remand dislodges the omnipotence lead 
lawyers exercise and vests control in individual counsel’s hands. It 
also undermines the settlement vortex, which currently limits 
plaintiffs to two choices: settle or risk dismissal. Remanding gives 
them a third option—trial. By increasing available institutional 
resources (judges and courts), remand destabilizes the monopoly and 
can advantage plaintiffs with claims that may be undervalued by a 
global settlement.422 As such, remand is a mixed bag for defendants: 
Without a unified negotiating group that can deliver a wholesale deal, 
they would have to bargain with individual attorneys and customize 
settlements to reflect differences in state law and claim strength. But, 
because weaker claims can no longer lurk within the masses, the total 
number of plaintiffs may decline. 
Finally, remanding cases to federal transferor courts and 
allowing state-court cases to flourish at times can produce what 
Professor Heather Gerken labels “second-order diversity.”423 Second-
order diversity is generated when many different kinds of groups 
exist, but their members lack internal diversity. Ideologies and goals 
differ across, but not within, the groups. While most of this Article has 
espoused the need for first-order cognitive diversity and dissent within 
lead lawyers’ decisionmaking groups, multidistrict litigation can also 
benefit from allowing state-court judges and transferor judges to 
innovate and experiment.424 
CONCLUSION 
While courts and legislatures may seek tipping points to 
trigger change,425 the reality is that repeat attorneys in this elite bar 
 
 422.  Galanter, supra note 30, at 36 (observing that increasing institutional facilities can 
reduce advantages for repeat players, and would allow claimants to “litigate more and settle 
less”). 
 423.  Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1172–73 (2005).  
 424.  This is the basic thrust behind one line of the federalism literature arguing that state 
courts should serve as laboratories. E.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85, 103 
(1995); Burch, supra note 413, at 685–86; Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the 
Founders’ Design, 54 CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498–99 (1987). 
 425.  E.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a)–(b), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Agenda Book, ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES 39–
41 (Apr. 9–10, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-
committee-rules-civil-procedure-april-2015 [https://perma.cc/P23C-7V4A]; Jeffrey D. Koelemay, 
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are adaptive, resilient, and likely to withstand these adjustments. 
Thus, enhancing functionality within multidistrict litigation hinges 
not on top-down rulemaking or external legislative reforms, but in 
harnessing the power that already lies within the system itself: 
competition. The plaintiffs’ bar is competitive and aggressive, but 
judicial selection methods and deference to repeat players have 
dampened open rivalry by rewarding cooperation. Dissenters are more 
likely to be shunned and ostracized than rewarded, particularly if 
their objections could derail a lucrative settlement. Consequently, the 
question becomes how to implement adaptive adjustments that could 
capitalize on competitive forces already in play, not how to coerce an 
unlikely paradigm shift. 
Accordingly, this Article draws from basic economic principles 
to reinvigorate competition throughout the multidistrict proceeding. 
At the outset, lawyers jockey to become the monopoly through 
competitive selection processes. Allowing challengers to presumptively 
join or replace leaders who fail to recognize and address structural 
conflicts of interest incentivizes those boxed out of leadership roles to 
police conflicts midstream. So, too, does enabling external state-court 
competition. Carefully hewing to quantum meruit principles can 
distinguish between compensable common benefits and non-
compensable spillovers to justly tax state lawyers without deterring 
them from developing and pursuing their own cases. After settlement 
and beyond, tethering leadership’s common-benefit fees to the results 
they actually obtain for particular claimants may require longer waits 
or interim fee distributions, but it ultimately promotes fidelity in the 
agency relationship. And if claimants are dissatisfied with the 
settlement, giving them the freedom to return to their court of origin 
for trial gives them bargaining leverage both inside the multidistrict 
proceeding and with the defendant. 
In sum, the point is not that repeat players are inherently bad, 
but rather that their self interest can takeover if left unchecked—and 
there is no check. When repeat players oligopolize most leadership 
roles across multidistrict proceedings and then exercise monopolistic 
control over plaintiffs’ claims in a single proceeding, that dominance 
needs balance. Without counterweights and accountability, the line 
between deals that claimants can’t refuse because they are simply too 
good to pass up and those they can’t refuse in The Godfather sense 
gets pushed further into Corleone territory. 
 
Bill to Curb Class Suits Clears Committee; Civil Rights Plaintiffs Thrown a Bone, Class Action 
Litig. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 718 (June 24, 2015). 
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TABLE A1: AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS OCCURRING  
WITHIN THE DATASET 
The following table includes the aggregate settlements that 
occurred as of July 15, 2016, for the seventy-three products-liability 
and sales practice cases that were pending on the Multidistrict 
Litigation Docket as of May of 2013.426 The settlements reviewed for 
this Article are indicated in bold. 
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875 Asbestos 7/29/91 1980s No No 
986 Factor VII or IX Concentrate 
Blood Prods. 
12/7/1993 5/8/1997 Yes  Yes 
1203 Diet Drugs (Phentermine, 
Fenfluramine, 
Dexfenfluramine) 
1/6/1998 1/3/2002 Yes Yes 
1355 Propulsid 8/7/2000 4/30/2004 No Yes 
1431 Baycol 12/18/01 6/30/2005 No No 
1657 Vioxx 2/16/2005 11/9/2007 No Yes 
1742 Ortho Evra 3/1/2006 10/13/2008 No No 
1836 Mirapex 6/22/2007 2/29/2009 No No 
1909 Gadolinium Contrast Dyes 2/29/2008 4/15/2009 No No 
1845 ConAgra Peanut Butter 6/17/2007 5/29/2009 No No 
1763 Human Tissue  6/13/2007 1/30/2010 No No 
1871 Avandia 6/11/07 6/1/2010 No No 
2004 Mentor Corp. ObTape 12/3/08 6/8/2010 No No 
1928 Trasylol 4/7/2008 7/6/2010 No No 
1967 Bisphenol-A Polycarbonate 
Plastic 
8/13/2008 1/3/2011 Yes Yes 
1873 FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde 10/24/2007 3/14/2011 Yes Yes 
1842 Kugel Mesh Hernia Patch 6/22/2007 7/1/2011 No No 
1953 Heparin 6/6/2008 12/1/2011 No No 
2188 Apple iPhone 4 Marketing & 
Sales Practices 
10/8/2010 1/1/2012 Yes Yes 
2179 Deepwater Horizon 8/10/2010 4/18/2012 Yes Yes 
2308 Sketchers Toning Shoe 12/19/2011 5/02/2012 Yes Yes 
2023 Bayer Corp. Combination 
Aspirin 
4/14/2009 5/16/2012 Yes Yes 
1507 Prempro 3/4/2003 6/8/2012 No No 
2047 Chinese Drywall 1/13/2010 6/14/2012 Yes Yes 
1958 Zurn Pex Plumbing 8/21/2008 10/15/2012 Yes Yes 
2284 Imprelis Herbicide 10/20/2011 10/19/2012 Yes Yes 
1943 Levaquin 6/13/2008 10/30/2012 No No 
2223 Navistar Diesel Engine 4/13/2011 11/1/2012 Yes Yes 
 
 426.  A full list of cases included in the database appears in Burch & Williams, supra note 43 
(manuscript at Appendix). 
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MDL 












































2151 Toyota Motor Corp. 
Unintended Acceleration 
4/9/2010 12/26/2012 Yes Yes 
2092 Chantix (Varenicline) 10/1/2009 1/15/2013 No No 
2100 Yasmin & Yaz 
(Drospirenone) 
10/1/2009 3/15/2013 No Yes 
2372 Watson Fentanyl Patch 8/7/2012 6/4/2013 No No 
2233 Porsche Plastic Coolant 
Tubes 
5/23/2011 7/26/2013 Yes Yes 
2197 DePuy ASR Hip Implant 12/3/2010 11/11/2013 No Yes 
1789 Fosamax 11/21/2011 12/9/2013 No Yes 
2325 American Medical 
Systems 
2/7/2012 4/30/2013 No Semi427 
2008 Land Rover LR3 Tire Wear 2/23/2009 5/30/2013 Yes Yes 
2391 Biomet Magnum Hip 
Implant 
10/2/2012 1/31/2014 No Yes 
1964 NuvaRing 8/22/2008 2/7/2014 No Yes 
1629 Neurontin 10/26/2004 5/30/2014 Yes Yes 
2385 Pradaxa 8/8/2012 8/13/2014 No No 
2387 Coloplast Corp. Pelvic 
Support Sys. 
8/6/2012 9/22/2014 No No 
2333 MI Windows & Doors 4/23/2012 12/24/2014 Yes Yes 




2/13/2015 Bankr.428 Yes 
2283 Building Materials Corp. of 
Am. 
10/11/2011 4/22/2015 Yes Yes 
2327 Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair 2/7/2012 3/10/2015 No No 
2299 Actos (Pioglitazone) 12/29/2011 4/29/2015 No Yes 
2187 C.R. Bard, Inc. Pelvic Repair 
Sys. 
10/12/2010 6/23/2015 No No 
2326 Boston Scientific Corp. Pelvic 
Repair Sys. 
2/7/2012 12/7/2015 No No 
2316 Ford Motor Co. Spark Plug & 
3-Valve Engine 
2/8/2012 1/26/2016 Yes Yes 
2327 Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair 
Sys. 
2/7/2012 1/27/2016 No No 
2158 Zimmer Durom Hip Cup 9/9/2010 2/11/2016 No Yes 
2100 Whirlpool Corp. Front 
Loading Washer 
12/20/2008 5/11/2016 Yes Yes 
 
 
 427  This settlement was included as an exhibit to a Securities and Exchange Commission 
filing; some confidential parts of it were redacted. Endo Health Sols., Inc., Master Settlement 
Agreement (Form 8-K EX-10.144) (Aug. 6, 2013). The agreement is between American Medical 
Systems and Freese & Goss, PLLC and Matthews & Associates. Id. 
 428  New England Compounding Pharmacy is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings, so 
the settlement is a bankruptcy trust. In re New Eng. Compounding Pharmacy, Inc., 544 B.R. 
724, 733 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2016). 
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TABLE A2: REPEAT PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS’ PARTICIPATION  
IN NON-CLASS SETTLEMENTS 
The following table includes a list of the highest level repeat 
player plaintiffs’ attorneys (based on their number of appearances 
within the dataset) and whether they participated in any of the nine 











































































































Richard 21 18 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Seeger, 
Christopher 21 16 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Nast, Dianne 19 14 No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 
Becnel, Jr., 
Daniel 14 14 Yes No Yes No No No No No No No 
Parker, 
Jerrold 11 11 No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
Robinson, Jr., 
Mark 14 10 No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No 
Conroy, Jayne 12 10 No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
Parfitt, 
Michelle 11 10 No No No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Levin, Arnold 15 9 Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No 
London, 
Michael 14 9 No No Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Thompson III, 
Fred 12 8 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Lanier, W. 
Mark 11 8 No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
Shkolnik, 
Hunter 9 8 No No No No No No Yes No Yes No 
Crump, 
Martin 8 8 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Restaino, 
John 10 7 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Cartmell, 
Thomas 8 7 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Flowers, Peter 8 7 No No No No No Yes No No Yes No 
DeBartolomeo, 
A.J. 7 7 No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 
Flaherty, 
Yvonne 7 7 No No No No No No Yes No Yes No 
Osborne, 
Joseph 7 7 No No No No No Yes No No Yes No 
Dugan, II, 
James 7 7 No Yes No No Yes No No No No No 
Matthews, 
David 7 7 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Meadow, 
Richard 7 7 No No Yes No No No No No Yes No 
        










































































































Elizabeth 10 6 No Yes No No No No No No No No 
Aylstock, 
Bryan 9 6 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Zonies, Joseph 7 6 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Anapol, 
Thomas 7 6 No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
Salim, Robert 7 6 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Abrams, 
Rachel 6 6 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Blizzard, 
Edward 6 6 No No No Yes No No No No Yes No 
Oliver, Alyson 6 6 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Monsour, 
Doug 6 6 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Climaco, John 6 6 No No No No No Yes No No No No 
Placitella, 
Christopher 6 6 No No No Yes No No No No Yes No 
Garrard, III, 
Henry 11 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Denton, Roger 9 5 No Yes No No No No Yes No No No 
Chaffin, Eric 7 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Love, Scott 7 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Potts, Derek 7 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Burnett, Jr., 
Riley 6 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Mueller, Mark 6 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Alonso, 
Andres 6 5 No No Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Clarke, 
Clayton 6 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Grand, Jeff 6 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Papantonio, J. 
Michael 6 5 Yes No Yes No No No No No No No 
Barrios, Dawn 6 5 Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No No 
Copeland, 
Erin 5 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Goetz, 
Michael 5 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Hauer, Stacy 5 5 No No No No No Yes No No Yes No 
Maniatis, 
Victoria 5 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Miller, 
Michael 5 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Robins, III, 
Bill 5 5 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Saunders, 
Joseph 5 5 No No No No No Yes No No Yes No 
Skikos, Steven 6 4 No No Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Bell, Harry 5 4 No No No No No No No No Yes No 
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A3: POCKET GUIDE FOR LEADERSHIP APPOINTMENT  
AND COMPENSATION 
Timing of Appointments (Interim and Semi-permanent Leaders): 
 Appoint interim leaders to serve until conflicts of interest can 
be identified.429 
Required Disclosures: 
 All financing arrangements (between attorneys, banks, 
financiers, etc.) should be disclosed in camera to the judge or 
special master.430 
Selection Process: 
 Open, written application process with no presumption toward 
reappointing interim counsel. Appendix A4 includes a sample 
leadership application form,431 and A5 contains a scoring sheet. 
 Allow applicants to air objections confidentially to a special 
master and judicial clerks through their applications and 
evidentiary hearings.432 
Selection Criteria and Goals: 
 Aim to appoint no more than five to six leaders to serve on the 
steering committee (this number includes lead counsel).433 
 Seek qualified attorneys with diverse training and expertise 
who will be willing to dissent over non-routine, substantive 
tasks.434 
 Consider applicants’ willingness to seek competitive bids from 
complex settlement administrators who facilitate data 
management, lien resolution, and claims administration as 
well as their willingness to make those payments and costs 
transparent to other plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
 Ensure that claimants with structural conflicts have separate 
representation on the leadership committee435 and that, 
collectively, leaders can finance the litigation.436 
 
 429.  Burch, supra note 41, at 125–26. 
 430.  E.g., In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-cv-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. 
Feb. 28, 2013) (order appointing plaintiffs’ liaison counsel and inviting applications for plaintiffs’ 
leadership committee positions). For additional information, see Burch, supra note 29, at 1331–
32; Burch, supra note 41, at 123–25. 
 431.  See supra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of competitive selection processes and criteria. 
 432.  Burch, supra note 41, at 126; supra Part III.A.2. 
 433.  Supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
 434.  Supra Part III.A.1. 
 435.  Burch, supra note 41, at 122–23; supra Part II.D.2 (discussing concerns of adequate 
representation); supra Part III.A.3 (appointing and removing leaders based on structural 
conflicts). 
 436.  Burch, supra note 41, at 123–25. 
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Adding or Replacing Leaders: 
 If a leadership challenger successfully demonstrates that a 
neglected structural conflict exists and that her appointment 
can alleviate it, then, depending on the conflict, the challenger 
has created a presumption that she should either serve 
alongside or replace current leadership.437 Sample language for 
such an order is included in Appendix A6. 
Common Benefit Assessment: 
 Common-benefit orders should designate presumptive holdback 
amounts and make clear that all final common-benefit fee 
awards shall be judicially allocated on a quantum meruit basis 
that ties fees to the amounts actually awarded to claimants.438 
Percentages awarded should be calculated on the gross 
amounts awarded to plaintiffs after subtracting costs. Judges 
(or special masters) might place claimants or lawyers into 
various presumptive fee categories to aid in this task. 
 Consider pricing packages for state litigants who want to 
access some, but not all, federal work product.439 
 Pay common-benefit awards to attorneys litigating in state 
court who confer benefits on multidistrict plaintiffs (through 
significant trial victories, for example).440 
 If lead lawyers abuse their fiduciary duties toward certain 
claimants, those claimants should not pay common-benefit 
fees.441 
 Common-benefit orders should not escalate fee and cost 
assessments based on the timing of plaintiffs’ attorneys consent 
to the assessment.442 
 Because common-benefit funds are judicially created, they 
should be judicially awarded. Attempts to contract around 
orders via a master settlement agreement should be viewed 
with careful attention to the incentives that animated the 
agreements and to attorneys’ ethical obligations. 
 Fee-transfer agreements are inappropriate for attorneys with 
cases pending in the multidistrict proceeding, but may be used 
 
 437.  Supra Part III.A.3. 
 438.  Burch, supra note 41, at 128–35; supra Part III.B.1. 
 439.  Supra Part III.B.2. 
 440.  Supra Part III.B.2. 
 441.  Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 240 (Tex. 1999) (holding that “a client need not prove 
actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an attorney’s fee for the attorney’s breach of 
fiduciary duty to the client”); supra notes 164–182 and accompanying text (discussing latecomer 
provisions). 
 442.  Supra Part II.B.1. 
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to tailor pricing packages for state-court attorneys who want to 
access some but not all of the leadership’s work product.443 
Automatic Suggestion of Remand: 
 Issue a standing order as part of the initial case management 
order indicating the court will suggest that the Panel remand 
non-settling cases to their courts of origin after a master 
settlement.444 Sample language is included in Appendix A6. 
A4: SAMPLE LEADERSHIP APPLICATION FORM445 
Applications for leadership positions should respond to each of 
the following questions by [date]. The information provided will be 
submitted in camera for confidential review by the judge or appointed 
special master. 
1. Using the template below, please provide a summary list of all 
multidistrict litigations in which you or your law firm have had 
involved clients in the past five years (an example follows). 
Include: 
a. the multidistrict litigation’s subject matter (products 
liability, antitrust, etc.); 
b. whether you held a leadership role (plaintiffs’ steering 
committee, discovery committee, etc.), and, if so, your 
position; 
c. whether others in your firm held a leadership role; 
d. which of those multidistrict litigations are currently 
ongoing (please include these at the top of the list); 
e. for the litigations that have been resolved through a 
non-class master settlement agreement, indicate the 
average award paid to claimants (in each category, if 
applicable) if known, what percentage of your firm’s 
clients agreed to the settlement, and what percentage of 
those clients recovered money through the claims 
process; 
f. and, if you or your firm served in a leadership role, the 
final percentage of the common-benefit fund lead 
lawyers requested for fees and costs, what percentage 
the court awarded, and the amounts awarded to your 
firm for fees and costs. 
 
 443.  Burch, supra note 41, at 106–09; supra Part III.B.2. 
 444.  Supra Part III.C. 
 445.  Details explaining the rationales behind this form can be found in Burch, supra note 
41, at 120–28. 
        























 Firm (PSC 
appointment) 






 80% of firm clients 
settled 
 98% of those settling 
clients recovered money  
 6% fee and 
2% costs 
requested 
 4% fee and 
2% costs 
awarded  
 Total amount 
of fees and 
costs received 
by your firm 
 
2. To the extent that you have subject matter expertise or 
experience handling mass actions that is not reflected in your 
response to number 1, please describe it briefly in no more than 
one page. Your response should highlight organization, writing, 
communication, leadership, and deposition skills. 
3. Please identify any structural conflicts446 that currently exist 
between plaintiffs or are likely to arise during the course of the 
litigation. 
4. Please list the injuries and claims alleged by all your current 
clients (whether in state or federal court) and their states of 
domicile. 
5. Please explain how you plan to finance the suit and disclose (in 
camera) any and all financial arrangements that you have 
made or anticipate making to fund your firm’s financial 
contribution to this suit, whether between plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
banks, vendors, or third-party financiers. 
6. Please disclose any and all relationships with third-party 
vendors and any pricing structures or proposals that those 
vendors can provide for managing pleadings, discovery, 
documents, and claims processes in a cost-effective way. 
7. Is there anyone with involved clients with whom you would 
prefer not to work if selected for a leadership role? If so, please 
explain. 
 
 446.  That is, a conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the lawyers who would 
represent claimants on an aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that would 
present a significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct 
of the litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned 
evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers 
themselves.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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8. Is there anyone whom you feel would be particularly good in a 
given role? If so, please explain. 
Note that numbers 7 and 8 can be answered orally in confidential 
meetings with the special master. 
A5: LEADERSHIP APPLICANT SCORING SHEET 
Substantial research suggests that certain selection methods 
can decorrelate error and overcome decisionmaking biases, such as the 
halo effect, by compiling information from multiple, independent 
evidentiary sources.447 As such, this form is designed for special 
masters, judicial clerks, and judicial assistants to use in evaluating 




To avoid influencing one another and spreading biases, scorers 
should independently review the applications, collectively meet with 
the applicants, and allow them opportunities to confidentially object to 
one another, and then, before discussing them, independently rate the 
applicant’s following traits on a scale of 1 (very weak) to 5 (very 
strong). Scorers should rate each trait sequentially. After all traits are 
scored for all candidates, scores should be tabulated.448 Candidates 
with the highest scores should comprise the presumptive slate, though 
subsequent discussion may affect the selection of those with ties or 
scores at the margin. Judges can then make any necessary 
adjustments or substitutions to address conflicts of interest.449 
 
Applicant’s Name: ___________________ 
____ (a) Organization skills 
____ (b) Leadership or negotiation skills 
____ (c) Writing and deposition skills (or willingness to delegate to 
skilled others) 
 
 447.  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 84–85 (2011). 
 448.  Time and again, research suggests “to maximize predictive accuracy, final decisions 
should be left to formulas, especially in low-validity environments”—not experts. Id. at 225–26. 
Simple formulas that assign equal weights to all relevant predictors using common sense “are 
often very good predictors of significant outcomes.” Id. at 226. 
 449.  For an overview of Daniel Kahneman’s research in this area, see Gus Lubin, Nobel 
Laureate Says There’s a Better Way to Make Hiring Decisions, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 9, 2013, 
12:23 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/daniel-kahneman-on-hiring-decisions-2013-1 
[https://perma.cc/67E8-XFJE]. 
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____ (d) Likelihood of dissenting or objecting as to how other leaders 
perform substantive tasks (e.g., crafting legal arguments, structuring 
settlements) 
____ (e) Dedication to client outcomes 
____ (f) Financing ability 
____ (g) Cognitive diversity (unique but relevant experiences, skills, 
analytical tools) 
____ (h) Close your eyes. Try to imagine the applicant in a leadership 
position, and assign a score on a scale of 1 (weak) to 5 (strong). 
_____  Sum 
A6: SAMPLE ORDERS SUGGESTING REMAND  
AND REPLACING LEADERS 
As part of the initial case management order, judges might include the 
following additional language: 
 
ADDITIONS TO OR REPLACEMENT OF PLANTIFFS’ 
LEADERSHIP—The Court intends to appoint a Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee(s) and Lead Counsel to conduct and coordinate pretrial 
litigation. As part of the leadership application process, the Court has 
requested applicants to identify known structural conflicts of interest. 
Plaintiffs’ leadership owes a fiduciary duty to all plaintiffs in this 
proceeding. Thus, if after the appointment an attorney successfully 
demonstrates that a neglected structural conflict450 exists and that her 
appointment can alleviate it, then, depending on the conflict, the 
challenger has created a presumption that she should either serve 
alongside or replace current leadership. Should challengers replace a 
current leader, the incumbent might still apply for common-benefit 
fees based on quantum meruit principles. 
 
SUGGESTION OF REMAND—Should the parties reach a master 
settlement, the Court will automatically suggest that the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation remand non-settling civil actions 
transferred to this Court for consolidated pretrial purposes that have 
provided basic evidentiary information about their claim. If a master 
settlement occurs, the Court will, without motion from the parties, 
 
 450.  That is, a conflict of interest either between the “claimants and the lawyers who would 
represent claimants on an aggregate basis” or “among the claimants themselves that would 
present a significant risk that the lawyers for claimants might skew systematically the conduct 
of the litigation so as to favor some claimants over others on grounds aside from reasoned 
evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers 
themselves.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.07(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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issue a suggestion of remand that includes an appendix of cases to be 
remanded to the indicated transferor courts. At that time, if counsel 
believes that an error has been made in the Appendix, they should 
notify the Court in writing within fourteen (14) days of that 
Suggestion of Remand so that this Court, if persuaded by the asserted 
error, can notify the Panel. 
 
